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Scientific uncertainty is the characteristic problem of toxic substances
control, and regulators lack the resources to resolve or significantly reduce
uncertainty across all of the risks they must address. For this reason, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has become intensely interested in
setting priorities among its responsibilities. EPA lacks, however, a coherent
framework within which to implement its findings. In this Article, Professor
Applegate proposes that the current regulatory regime for toxic substances be
restructured to emphasize thoughtful priority setting rather than unrealistic risk
standards and deadlines. In his view, Congress should provide broad parame-
ters for agency action in particular cases, but should give specific directions
to the agency for setting priorities and goals. This recommendation necessarily
implicates broader issues of congressional specificity in regulatory statutes,
presidential control of administrative agencies, andjudicial review in the early
phases of the regulatory process. Professor Applegate explores these larger
issues as they relate to his proposal and evaluates his proposal's feasibility by
comparing it to legislatively mandated planning in forest management.
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Introduction
The duties of the Environmental Protection Agency have increased signifi-
cantly in the past decade, but during that time the agency's budget has not
grown in real terms'. As a result, setting priorities has become something of
a preoccupation with EPA's managers.' Since 1987, EPA has undertaken a
number of studies of the relative risks posed by the activities within its pur-
view.3 It has discovered that existing congressional and agency priorities
correlate much more strongly with perceived risk than with calculated risk. For
example, the environmental and health risks posed by hazardous waste sites
tend to be considerably smaller than, say, pesticide residues, despite far greater
funding for the former.' EPA hopes through these studies to determine which
problems deserve the earliest attention and the greatest allocation of its limited
resources, and, to the extent that statutes permit, to reorder its priorities accord-
ingly. In the longer term, EPA hopes to link risk-based priority setting with
integrated pollution control measures across environmental media.5
EPA's intense interest in allocation and priority setting is echoed by several
observers of environmental regulation.6 There are signs that Congress, too, has
1. See Fiscal Year 1992 Budget Review: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 320-21 (1991) [hereinafter 1992 Budget Hearings] (statement of Richard L.
Hembra, Director of Environmental Protection Issues, General Accounting Office); see also GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: MEETING PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS WITH LIMITED
RESOURCES 15-17 (1991) [hereinafter GAO, LIMITED RESOURCES]; Funding Plan for EPA Falls Short of
Inflation Needs of Air, Water Programs, Lobbyists Contend, 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2338 (Feb. 7, 1992)
(quoting Environment Budget Priorities report which stated that EPA's budget in real dollars has grown
6% since 1979, while its workload has doubled).
2. EPA Administrator Reilly has repeatedly sounded this theme. See, e.g., William K. Reilly, Taking
Aim Toward 2000: Rethinking the Nation's Environmental Agenda, 21 ENVTL. L. 1359 (1991); William
K. Reilly, The Turning Point: An Environmental Vision for the 1990's, 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1386 (Dec.
8, 1989) [hereinafter Reilly, The Turning Point]; William K. Reilly, Aiming Before We Shoot: The Quiet
Revolution in Environmental Policy, Speech to the National Press Club, Sept. 26, 1990; ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 2, 16 (1990) [hereinafter SAB, REDUCING RISK].
3. See SAB, REDUCING RISK, supra note 2; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, COMPARING RISKS
AND SETING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES: OVERVIEW OF THREE REGIONAL PROJECTS (1989) [hereinafter
EPA, COMPARING RISKS]; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) [hereinafter EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS]. These
developments are described and critically reviewed in Donald T. Homstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law:
A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 563-69 (1992); Symposium,
Risk Analysis and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 21 ENVTL. L. 1321-1424 (1991); Setting
Environmental Priorities: The Debate About Risk, 17 EPA J. (1991) (entire issue).
4. See EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 77-78, 84-86, 91-99; EPA, COMPARING RISKS,
supra note 3, at 62-65; see also Lester B. Lave, Risk Assessment and Regulatory Priorities, 14 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 307, 309-11 (1989) [hereinafter Lave, Regulatory Priorities] (discussing studies showing that
regulatory expenditures do not correlate with greater risk).
5. See Paul S. Wilson & Ted K. Harris, Integrated Pollution Control: A Prologue, 22 ENVTL. L. i, iii,
viii-x (1992); see generally Integrated Pollution Control: A Symposium, 22 ENVTL. L. 1 (1992).
6. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW 138-42 (1989)
[hereinafter CROSS, CANCER]; JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CHEMICALS AND CANCER
RISK 34-37, 200 (1988); Daniel Byrd & Lester B. Lave, Narrowing the Range: A Framework for Risk
Regulators, ISSUES SCI. & TECH.. Summer 1987, at 92-93, 99. Some commentators have criticized specific
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begun to address the issue. Responding to the lack of growth in EPA's budget,
members of Congress have suggested the need for care in allocating EPA's
resources. 7 Moreover, many of Congress' most recent environmental initiatives
have included requirements that EPA engage in explicit priority setting.' The
General Accounting Office, too, has endorsed EPA's priority-setting activities. 9
These efforts to encourage more explicit priority setting would benefit from the
creation of a Cabinet-level Department of the Environment and the adoption
of a single environmental statute. A comprehensive environmental protection
act would integrate decisionmaking across environmental protection programs.
By integrating decisionmaking, a comprehensive act would create a legal
structure within which Congress and EPA could improve their capacity for
setting priorities among environmental risks. 0
This Article is about the role of priority setting in the control and manage-
ment of toxic substances." It uses this important area of EPA's responsibility
to explore how the current interest in priority setting might be incorporated into
a workable regulatory architecture. The regulation of toxic substances poses a
particularly acute problem of allocating limited resources because its outstand-
ing characteristic is chronic and pervasive uncertainty concerning the nature,
extent, and ability to control toxic risks. 2 The law can address the scarcity
of information in two ways: by improving the development of needed informa-
tion, and by modifying regulatory strategies to use existing information more
effectively. (It's a little like the old Peace Corps public service announcement:
agencies for failing to set priorities. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA:
Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 18-24 (1989) (hereinafter Shapiro
& McGarity, Reorienting OSHA); Richard A. Merrill, CPSC Regulation of Cancer Risks in Consumer
Products: 1972-1981, 67 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1360-65 (1981) [hereinafter Merrill, CPSC Regulation].
7. See EPA's Operating Budget "Capped" for 10 Years; Reilly Defends Request Before Senate
Committee, 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2028 (Mar. 15, 1991); 1992 BUDGET HEARINGS, supra note 1, at 158,
170, 226, 303-04 (statements of Sen. Moynihan). Moreover, many of Congress' most recent environmental
initiatives have included requirements that EPA engage in explicit priority setting.
8. Several examples, from drinking water to hazardous waste, are collected in Homstein, supra note
3, at 568-69 nn.20-25.
9. GAO, LIMITED RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 20-24. The Office of Management and Budget has also
expressed interest in EPA's priority setting. See Risk Reduction Initiative in 1992 Proposal Targets DOE,
DOD, EPA Environmental Programs, 21 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1796 (Feb. 8, 1991).
10. See GAO, LIMITED RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 24; see also Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating
Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 463, 516-21 (discussing merits
of unified statute but concluding that it is politically impractical).
11. The principal statutes of interest include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1988);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988); Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75; Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1991); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (1988); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988) (the Delaney
Clause); Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1988).
12. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic
Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 262 n.4, 264-66 (1991) (describing uncertainty and citing
sources); Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmen-
tal Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 327 n.1 (1991)(citing sources).
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you think the glass is half empty, then you need to fill it; if you think it is half
full, then you need to make the best use of what you have.) The first path has
an appealing directness to it, and in a previous article I suggested a number of
ways in which the regulatory system might generate more information within
the confines of current regulatory strategies and standards. 3
The present Article follows the second path. 4 Instead of taking the current
regulatory scheme as given, it recommends restructuring the regulatory process
to emphasize allocation and priority-setting decisions. The implications of this
course of action are not limited to information policy. Once one begins to tinker
with the underlying regulatory structure and standards, one cannot avoid
consideration of the impact on substantive regulatory policy for toxic sub-
stances. Accordingly, restructuring is advocated not only because it would ease
information demands, but also because it would permit implementation of the
kind of comprehensive, risk-based approach to toxic substances control that
EPA and Congress envision.
Part I of the Article casts uncertainty as a problem of scarcity of informa-
tion, which is a subset of the more general scarcity of public resources relative
to the number and complexity of the problems that government is expected to
address. As such, the first task of the regulator is to allocate information and
other regulatory resources in a rational and effective manner. EPA must be
deeply and continually concerned with setting priorities among the many claims
upon its attention.
Since the choices that limited resources force upon the agency involve
fundamental policy decisions, Part II considers priority setting in the broader
context of choosing between agency flexibility and congressional control. The
technocratic tradition in regulation generally leaves allocation decisions to
specialized agencies, trusting that they will use their discretion to make expert
choices in areas of extreme complexity. Experience, however, has eroded
confidence in unconstrained agency discretion: it is information-intensive, it
leaves fundamental policy decisions to unelected officials, and it does not
always produce effective and efficient regulation. Part II concludes that while
administrative flexibility is important to sophisticated allocation and priority
setting, Congress must give clear direction to the agency's exercise of discre-
tion.
13. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 318-32. Only a few commentators have addressed this aspect of
the problem. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws
to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795 (1989); Milton C. Weinstein, Decision Making for Toxic
Substances Control: Cost-Effective Information Development for the Control of Environmental Carcinogens,
27 PUBj. POL'Y 333 (1979). Governmental studies include NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION
MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (1975); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENvIRoNMENT(1975); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
TOXICrrY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES (1984) [hereinafter Toxicity Testing].
14. The two approaches can be mutually compatible; their effects are cumulative.
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In Part III, the Article proposes restructuring the regulatory process to
encourage EPA to focus its attention on real risks, the most pressing problems,
and to allow EPA to set priorities within a well-defined set of Congressional
goals. This balance is achieved by moving the locus of legislative control of
agency action from the standard-setting phase of the regulatory process to the
earlier priority-setting phase. Specifically, EPA would have considerable
discretion to target risks and to select levels of regulatory stringency, but its
discretion would be constrained by a comprehensive plan for toxic risk reduc-
tion which the agency would adopt in accordance with congressional guidelines.
EPA on its own initiative and pursuant to executive orders has undertaken
detailed planning of the kind contemplated here. However, these efforts are
largely internal to the executive branch, they are not guided by overall legisla-
tive direction, and they are highly constrained by piecemeal legislative priority
setting in the underlying statutes.
Part IV discusses implementation of the proposal, bringing to bear perspec-
tives from other areas of administrative and environmental law. First, the
feasibility of controlling priority setting through mandatory planning is consid-
ered in light of Executive Order No. 12,498, statutory deadlines, "regulatory
budgets," and mandatory planning in natural resources management. While none
of these is in itself a complete model for the priority-setting process suggested
here, each suggests different strengths and potential pitfalls of the proposal.
Second, recognizing that judicial review is often necessary to ensure compliance
with congressional directions, Part IV reconsiders the courts' traditional reluc-
tance to become involved in agencies' priority setting. Examination of the
ripeness and finality doctrines reveals that judicial review is not infeasible, but
requires adequate congressional guidance. Here again, the natural resources
experience is instructive. Finally, Part IV turns to the prospects for restructur-
ing. As yet, Congress has given EPA explicit priority-setting guidance only
within programs (for instance, the National Priorities List of Superfund sites),
but there is reason to expect that broader planning activities can be institutional-
ized within EPA or in a future Department of the Environment.
I. The Problem of Scarcity
A. Sources of Scarcity
It is universally acknowledged that the precise effects of toxic substances
on human health and the environment cannot be stated with any certainty. 5
15. This Article uses the terms "toxic substances" to refer generally to chemical substances that have
long-term deleterious effects on human health. Carcinogenicity (the induction of cancer) is the long-term
effect to which regulators and scientists have paid most attention, because it is a highly sensitive indicator
of toxicity at low levels and because cancer is a major source of anxiety for the American public. See
282
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This uncertainty is rooted in the lack of a clear scientific understanding of ihe
physiological mechanics of carcinogenesis, the induction of cancer by chemical
agents. The science and policy of toxic carcinogenesis have been amply
described elsewhere and need not be repeated in detail here.'6 In the absence
of alternative explanations, scientists cannot rule out the possibility that cancer
is induced by the reaction of one molecule of the toxic substance with one cell
of the target organ. If that is the case, there is no level of exposure to a carcino-
gen which can confidently be characterized as "safe" in the sense of posing a
zero risk. The best that can be done to determine the carcinogenic potential of
such substances is to describe their effects statistically, that is, to state quantita-
tively the level of risk they pose. 7 Public officials, consequently, cannot base
regulatory controls on individualized causation of actual harm. Instead, they
must regulate risk per se."
Risk regulation acknowledges inability to predict who will be harmed and
when, but even risk calculations are subject to uncertainty concerning the data
upon which they are based.' 9 Obtaining a rough, qualitative sense of a chemi-
cal's carcinogenic potential is a relatively manageable task.2' Defining the
precise degree of risk, however, is an enormously difficult and perhaps impossi-
ble undertaking. Toxic health effects can be latent for a long period of time,
they tend to be relatively rare within an exposed population, they are often not
unique to the particular chemical agent, and they can result from chronic, low-
dose exposure that is easily overlooked by the victim and investigators.2' Vast
quantities of toxicologic, epidemiologic, and experimental evidence are needed
to achieve even approximate risk levels.
These information demands are made no easier by the nonthreshold nature
of toxic risks. Since no level of exposure can be regarded as safe, the only way
to assure safety is to ban the chemical. Attractive and simple as a flat prohibi-
tion may seem, it is unrealistic in the short term in an industrial economy that
Applegate, supra note 12, at 262 n.3.
16. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 12, at 264-66; Flournoy, supra note 12, at 333-46 (citing sources).
17. The quantitative conclusion can be expressed as individual risk (e.g., I in 10,000 chance of getting
cancer from this source), rate of excess deaths (e.g., I per 10,000), or absolute number of expected excess
deaths in the exposed population. The differences between these terms are discussed in National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. §61 (1989).
18. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 271-73; see also Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 506-
07, 536 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc), modified sub noma. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir.
1976); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
19. For a discussion of the difference between risk and uncertainty, see Homstein, supra note 3, at
571-73.
.20. The National Cancer Institute, for example, has been able to develop a list of definite, probable,
and likely human carcinogens. As of 1985, the Institute had identified 119 substances that were "reasonably
anticipated to be carcinogens." Richard Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation
of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaption to Scientific Progress, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 17-18 (1988)
[hereinafter Merrill, Delaney].
21. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 264-65; see also GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 39-77 (1991)
(discussing carcinogenesis with particular reference to formaldehyde). "Toxic tort" suits often founder on
proof of causation for this reason. See Applegate. supra note 12, at 272 & n.59.
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is built on carcinogens like benzene22 and vinyl chloride,23 to name two of
the best known.M In many contexts, courts have inferred acceptance of some
minimal hazard level in otherwise unqualified congressional commands.25 In
the principal toxics statutes,26 Congress has expressly recognized the problem,
and these laws mandate achievement of an acceptable, not a complete, level
of safety.
This standard, which I generically call "unreasonable risk," occupies a
middle ground between complete safety (zero risk) and actual harm (100 per
cent risk). It is not otherwise defined,27 but it permits EPA to consider-in
22. Benzene is a widely used industrial solvent. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 615-16 (1980) (Benzene).
23. Vinyl chloride is essential to the manufacture of most plastics. See 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560 (1976);
50 Fed. Reg. 1184 (1985).
24. Virtually all industrial activity depends on the use of one or more potential carcinogens. See Frank
B. Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Significance Threshold on Regulatable Risks of
Cancer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 n. 10 (1986) [hereinafter Cross, Beyond Benzene]; CROSS, CANCER, supra note
6, at 70; Christopher Schroeder, The Evolution of Federal Regulation of Toxic Substances in GOVERNMENT
AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR Two 263,
275-77 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1989) [hereinafter Schroeder, Evolution].
The much-maligned Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c)(3)(A) (1988), exemplifies the problem. Read literally, it bans any food additive that poses any
carcinogenic risk, no matter how small. See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988) (rejecting attempt to apply de minimis standard to Delaney Clause
because Congress wanted it to be "extraordinarily rigid"). Because carcinogens are now known to be
ubiquitous in foods, FDA has been extraordinarily reluctant to invoke the clause. It has done so only four
times (one of which, saccharine, was overturned by Congress), and otherwise made every effort to avoid
invoking it in the first place. See Merrill, Delaney, supra note 6, at 9-41, 76.
25. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323,360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (inferring de minimis standard
in Clean Air Act); see also Benzene, supra note 22, at 614-15, 639-43 (suggesting that strict enforcement
of significance threshold is necessary to avoid excessive delegation).
26. These statutes include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5)(C),(D), 136d(c) (1988) (requiring registration and regulating use of pesticides); the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1988) (controlling production and use primarily
of industrial chemicals); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(5),
6922(a), 6923-6925 (1988) (governing land disposal of waste, especially hazardous waste); the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9602(a), 9621(b)(1), (d)(1) (1988) (providing for cleanup of sites containing hazardous wastes); and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988) (regulating exposure to toxic
substances in workplace).
27. The only exception to this is a provision in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which defines
"unreasonable risk" at a risk of 1/1,000,000. See Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2531. Previously,
Congress had specifically declined to establish a particular threshold.
The sources and characteristics of the unreasonable risk standard are discussed in more detail in
Applegate, supra note 12, at 267-77. For a useful description of the development of a middle-ground risk
level in the caselaw, see Frank B. Cross et al., Discernible Risk-A Proposed Standard for Significant Risk
in Carcinogen Regulation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 65-73 (1991). Ultimately, the idea derives from the
negligence standard and the design-defect standard in tort law, both of which balance safety and other
factors. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 169-73 ("unreasonable
risk"), 694-702 ("unreasonably dangerous") (5th ed. 1984).
The important pollution statutes use variations on the risk theme. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a) (1988). The 1990 revisions of the Clean Air Act specify a residual risk level for toxic air
pollutants. See Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2531; see also U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLO-
GY ASSESSMENT, IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING CARCINOGENS 75-143, 199-220 (1987) [hereinafter
IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING CARCINOGENS] (reviewing statutory authority for and agency action in
regulating carcinogens under major toxics statutes). Outside of EPA and OSHA, the Consumer Product
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each regulatory action-not only the degree of risk that a chemical poses, but
also its benefits, the cost of regulation,2" and other factors such as currency,
level, regulability, voluntariness, occupational, and comparison.29 The cost and
benefit data, of course, add significantly to the already crushing demands for
quantitative risk information.30
The use of a largely undefined, nonzero standard in an ad hoc manner also
invites extensive (and expensive) challenge by affected persons, which in turn
requires the agency to attempt to base its actions on an extensive (and expen-
sive) scientific record. To quantify risk so that it may be compared with costs
and benefits, and to meet affected parties' and courts' demands for precision,
EPA has sought a seemingly precise and certain basis for regulatory action. It
and other agencies have turned to a methodology called quantitative risk
assessment, 31 a four-step process of hazard identification, exposure assessment,
dose-response modeling, and risk characterization. The merits of quantitative
risk assessment are hotly debated, but one thing is clear: given its aspirations
to precise risk measurement, it makes enormous demands on agency informa-
tion and analytical resources. 32 Adoption of the unreasonable risk standard,
in sum, has resulted in extraordinary demands for information concerning the
regulation of toxic substances.
Remarkably, this information is almost entirely unavailable for the vast
majority of toxic substances, and it is severely inadequate for nearly all of the
Safety Act uses the term "unreasonable risk" to describe regulable hazards. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1988).
OSHA differs somewhat from the statutes previously mentioned in two ways. First, the statute itself
does not use the term "significant" risk. Instead, the Benzene case imposed a judicial gloss on the statute,
requiring an initial finding of the existence of a significant risk before the agency could impose controls.
Since Benzene is the Supreme Court's only major venture into toxics regulation, this interpretation takes
on particular importance. Moreover, the Benzene formulation was carried over into the pre-1990 toxics
provision of the Clean Air Act. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride), 824 F.2d
1146, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Second, the operative limitation in the statute is "feasible," a technology-
based (as opposed to purely risk-based) standard.
28. The costs of regulation can include lost revenue, compliance costs, the costs of using more
expensive substitutes for the regulated product, or the costs of foregoing the product and its derivatives
altogether.
29. See CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 77-80. Technological risks, it has been argued, cannot
rationally be rejected without considering the risks to which we all voluntarily expose ourselves on a daily
basis. See, e.g., Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE 271 (1987)
[hereinafter Ames et al., Ranking] (arguing that naturally occurring carcinogens are vastly more numerous
than artificial ones); Lave, Regulatory Priorities, supra note 4.
30. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 361-63.
31. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 264-65, 285-99; see also Lyndon, supra note 13, at 1799-1810;
Weinstein supra note 13, at 344-61. The legal and scientific literature on quantitative risk assessment is
enormous. For fuller descriptions of quantitative risk assessment as practiced by the government, see
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE
PROCESS (1983) [hereinafter NRC, MANAGING THE PROCESS]; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RISK
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONMAKING (1984) [hereinafter EPA, FRAME-
WORK]; Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986) (issued by EPA); Chemical
Carcinogens; A Review of the Science and Its Associated Principles, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,372 (1985) (issued
by OSTP); WILLIAM D. ROWE, AN ANATOMY OF RISK (1977).
32. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 280-84.
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rest.3 3 A recent National Academy of Sciences study concluded that "of tens
of thousands of commercially important chemicals, only a few have been
subjected to extensive toxicity testing and most have scarcely been tested at
all." 34 The present regulatory scheme for toxic substances, therefore, requires
far more data than it possesses or can generate.
35
Information is not the only scarce commodity in toxic substances regulation.
The government has finite resources with which to investigate problems,
develop regulations, and enforce its decisions.36 A major regulatory initiative
that will have a significant economic impact on the regulated industry is likely
to be, for that reason alone, highly controversial. Controversy costs money: the
information and analysis costs associated with developing a major regulation
are high in any event,37 but intensive industry involvement requires extensive
analysis during the rulemaking process to respond to arguments and to prepare
33. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 285-89; Merrill, Delaney, supra note 20, at 16-17 (citing statistics).
34. See ToxIcrrY TESTING, supra note 13, at 92-99. Exposure assessment data and analytic methods
are also needed to monitor releases and consumption. See ToxicrrY TESTING, supra note 13, at 120-24;
see also NRC, MANAGING THE PROCESS, supra note 31, at 150.
35. A number of commentators have emphasized the existence of irreducible or intractable uncertainty
to emphasize the need to find ways to cope with uncertainty. See Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of
Toxic Health Risks: An Essay in Legal Decisionmaking under Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 356-57
(1982) (distinguishing "information uncertainty" and "knowledge uncertainty"); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulation
of Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 733-47 (1979) [hereinafter McGarity, Substantive and
Procedural Discretion]; Marcia R. Gelpe & A. Dan Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environ-
mental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 392-96, 419-25 (1974); William H. Rodgers, Guerilla
Decisionmaking: Judicial Review of Risk Assessments, 15 J. OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 205 (1987)
[hereinafter Rodgers, Guerilla Decisionmaking]. In fact, however, while the mechanism of carcinogenesis
may now be beyond the state of the art, there is no reason to believe that it will always be so, and certainly
no reason to believe that measurement of the effects is unknowable, at least experimentally. The real
problems are feasibility, expense, and timing.
We may quite sensibly decide that resolving uncertainty after a certain point is simply not worth the
effort, but that is a very different thing from saying that the uncertainty cannot be resolved. See Howard
Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"
Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1304 (1985) (contending that overemphasis on precision in
regulation results in inadequate regulatory response); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1357 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming]
(arguing that decisionmakers should confront uncertainty "openly and intelligently"); Weinstein, supra note
13, at 363-64, 380; Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE 3. ON REG.
89, 138-39 (1988) [hereinafter Latin, Good Science]; McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion,
supra, at 737-38. Thus, given a lack of understanding of carcinogenic mechanisms, there may be a degree
of refinement of estimates of toxicity which may ultimately resist quantification, but that level of refinement
is well beyond the lack of basic data that presently plagues toxic substances regulation. See TOxICIrY
TESTING, supra note 13, at 205. In any event, whatever uncertainty remains in quantitative analysis,
additional data and analysis can improve the decisionmaking process. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6,
at 177-78 ("Little is gained from the sophisticated massaging of weak data. The key challenge is to improve
the quality of the data used in risk assessment."); LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION:
DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 127-28 (1981) [hereinafter LAVE, STRATEGY].
36. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 13, at 337.
37. The large number of extremely complex issues involved in EPA's and OSHA's regulation of lead,
whose properties are unusually thoroughly studied and understood, gives some indication of the difficulties
involved in regulating more typical toxic substances. See National Primary and Secondary Air Quality
Standards for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (1978) (issued by EPA); Occupational Exposure to Lead, 40 Fed.
Reg. 45934 (1975) (issued by OSHA).
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for the inevitable court challenge. As a result, agencies are unable to regulate
"more than two or three controversial chemicals in any year."38
Information aside, it is obvious that EPA cannot possibly regulate every risk
that might be worth regulating, as the agency clearly recognizes. 9 Similarly,
industry and society generally have a finite capacity to absorb regulatory costs.
That capacity may be difficult to determine and subject to widely varying
assessments; however, after some point no industry can afford environmental
control without sacrificing economic viability.' One of the principal insights
of the advocates of a "regulatory budget" is that there are important limits to
the "mandated private expenditures" occasioned by regulation.4 Likewise,
society cannot pay for extensive controls or forgo certain products entirely
without sacrificing some quality of life. 2 The scarcity of regulatory resources
therefore mirrors the scarcity of information.
B. Priority Setting
The present regulatory scheme for toxic substances requires far greater
informational and other regulatory resources than are available or can be
obtained. Therefore, apart from developing better and cheaper ways to generate
information, 3 accepting highly imprecise regulatory standards," or adopting
38. See Richard A. Merrill, Federal Regulation ofCancer-Causing Chemicals, 2 ACUS RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS-1982 21, 113 (1982) [hereinafter Merrill, Cancer-Causing Chemicals] (background
report for ACUS Recommendation 82-5); see also Edward A. Tomlinson, Report on the Experience of
Various Agencies with Statutory Time Limits Applicable to Licensing or Clearance Functions and to
Rulemaking, ACUS RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS-1978 119, 139-40 (1978) [hereinafter Tomlinson,
Statutory Time Limits] (background report for ACUS Recommendation 78-3).
39. See Reilly, The Turning Point, supra note 2, at 1389; see also Reilly, Aiming Before We Shoot,
supra note 2, at 10-11 (comparing traditional environmental policy to "Space Invaders" game of blasting
every blip with endless ammunition); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
REGULATING PESTICIDES 4 (1980) [hereinafter NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES].
40. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 361-63; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 96-99; SAB, REDUCING
RISK, supra note 2, app. C at 14 (estimating that $100 billion is spent yearly to administer and comply with
environmental protection programs). Administrator Reilly has estimated that the nation can afford to spend
about 3% of GNP on environmental protection. See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 569 n.26.
41. ROBERT E. LrTAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 134 (1983);
Christopher DeMuth, Constraining Regulatory Costs, Part If: The Regulatory Budget, REGULATION,
Mar./Apr. 1980, at 29. For more on regulatory budgets, see infra Part IV(A)(I).
42. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027,
1028 (1990).
43. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 318-32; Lyndon, supra note 13, at 1835-55.
44. The Delaney Clause requires relatively little information in theory, but it is too extreme. It is also
possible to switch the burden of proof under an unreasonable-risk standard, but this approach imposes the
same inefficiencies as the current unreasonable-risk standard, just in the opposite direction. See Floumoy,
supra note 12 (citing Latin); Rodgers, Guerilla Decisionmaking, supra note 35, at 220-22; see also GRAHAM
ET AL., supra note 6, at 78-79, 210-11 (arguing against the use of generic standards and criteria); McGarity,
Substantive and Procedural Discretion, supra note 35, at 757-58 (arguing the science policy questions based
on insufficient information should not be resolved generically because additional information may become
available to reduce uncertainty).
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largely untried market-based controls,45 effective control of toxic substances
requires that EPA use its scarce resources as efficiently as possible. The
agency's first task, upon which the overall efficacy and efficiency of the rest
of the process depends, is the allocation of resources among potential regulatory
efforts.' Agencies must set priorities among the risks within their purview.
Institutions and individuals charged with risk management must routine-
ly make decisions about which of the possibly many diverse risks within
their purview should be addressed first, given the limited resources for
risk reduction programs. A need to prioritize and rank risks quickly
becomes clear.47
It is important to emphasize that priority setting is not a statement of absolute
value. Addressing asbestos first and groundwater contamination later does not
mean that groundwater is unworthy of attention or that its current condition is
45. A very different group of strategies includes market or economic incentive systems (e.g., marketable
permits, effluent or emission charges) which would leave allocation to individual participants in the
environmental market. Ackerman and Stewart, for example, argue that market-based systems can implement
accurately calibrated regulatory controls at less cost to the agency because source-specific cost-benefit
calculations are devolved to each source. Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra note 35, at 1342-43. See
also Latin, Regulatory Efficiency, supra note 18, at 1267-70 (citing other critics of command and control).
Proponents are probably overly optimistic about the ease with which accurate charges can be set, property
rights delimited, and market mechanisms established. See Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 501-07; Joel A.
Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Comment on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 149, 158, 161 (1991). The incentive approach has little applicability beyond conventional
air and water pollutants. While economic incentives could conceivably be applied to toxic substances-such
as a surcharge on certain chemicals to reduce use-Congress has shown no interest in regulating toxic
substances in this manner.
46. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 335-43; GRAHAMI ET AL., supra note 6, at 105 (characterizing.
unreasonable risk as a Congressional scheme for setting priorities among limited resources); see also Byrd
& Lave, Narrowing, supra note 6, at 93 ("In order not to squander limited resources ... society should
focus regulation on the worst risks and ignore trivial, or de minimis, ones.")
Calabresi and Bobbitt divide these choices into two types. First-order determinations involve the total
resources available. While these are often set by nature or largely unchangeable phenomena-e.g., the nature
of toxic substances, the nature of cancer, the vitality of the economy--they may also be affected by broad
policy choices. The available budget of EPA is a congressional determination that funds for fighting
pollution will be enhanced or diminished relative to other needs. Second-order determinations are those made
in allocating the given resources-who will be the winners and who the losers, so to speak. "[Clommonly
... scarcity is not the result of any absolute lack of a resource but rather of the decision by society that
it is not prepared to forgo other goods and benefits in a number sufficient to remove the scarcity." GutDo
CALABRESI & PHILIP Boaarrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 19 (1978). These categories are not air-tight: the state of
the art in the understanding of carcinogenesis, for example, tends to be a given at any one point in time,
but it can be pushed back (if unpredictably) by additional funding. This Article will focus on second-order
determinations, because its main concerns are agencies and how their processes and structure can be
improved.
47. See Ronald J. Mamicio, Quantifying and Comparing the Benefits of Risk Reduction Programs to
Prioritize Expenditures, in RISK ASSESSMENT IN SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES 97, 98 (James J. Bonin
& Donald E. Stevenson eds., 1989); see also Milton Russell & Michael Gruber, Risk Assessment in
Enviromunental Policy-Making, 236 SCIENCE 286, 286-87 (1987). LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at
2-5 (recommending use of a "legislated regulatory calendar"-like a regulatory budget--to help Congress
to recognize the scarcity of its resources and to allocate them appropriately).
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acceptable.' It is merely the recognition that the agency can only do so much.
Money spent on one risk leaves others uncorrected. The central problem for
toxic substances regulation, in this view, is the allocation of resources by setting
priorities for the agency's attention. If the regulation of toxic substances is to
be effective and reasonably efficient, it is essential that the agency approach
priority setting with care.
II. Discretion and Direction in Priority Setting
Since scarcity is the problem, our task is to structure a regulatory process
to allocate agency resources wisely (or at least not wastefully) and in general
conformity with the public will. Two general approaches are available within
the context of traditional regulation. 9 One is to give EPA broad discretion
to apply its knowledge and experience. This approach seeks efficiency through
the flexible application of technocratic or rationalist criteria. Agencies have
special technical expertise which enables them to determine how best to
approach a problem; therefore, they should enjoy a large measure of discretion
within which to operate.
The other approach questions the political legitimacy of expertise and insists
on tight control over agency discretion through clear congressional directives
enforced by searching judicial review. A statute should clearly identify the
circumstances under which the agency may act and precisely describe the
actions it may take. Agency discretion, in the alternative view, has not in
practice achieved some kind of neutral efficiency, and in any event neutral
efficiency is neither determinate nor a goal in itself. Instead, agencies should
apply definite, democratically established standards for the management of toxic
substances.
A. Discretion and the Technocratic Tradition
The technocratic approach to regulation is often traced to the New Deal
period, though it may be experiencing a resurgence.50 The New Deal Ideal
described by Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler has at its core the affirma-
48. See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 617-24 (pointing out that importance of problems depends in large
part on where the baseline is set). It is also true that, since the agency may never get to the low-priority
item, as a practical matter the groundwater contamination may be treated as if it is acceptable.
49. Traditional regulation is used here to refer to "command and control" regulation, including most
incentive systems in which the government sets the parameters (price, quantity, entitlements) within which
the market operates. Incentive systems are not incompatible with the approach suggested here. EPA could,
for example, assign a certain priority to benzene emissions and choose to regulate them with an emissions
tax.
50. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet
Revolution in Administrative alw, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 845-77 (describing a new "executive implementa-
tion" model of administrative law).
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tion of expertise and its value in resolving regulatory problems. It follows that
regulators should be relatively free from political control and judicial over-
sight.5' The technocratic approach to informational and resource scarcity
means, in essence, taking the New Deal Ideal seriously. As a model for agency
decisionmaking it has three components: the managerial agency, the use of
rationalist criteria and methodologies for decisionmaking, and freedom from
excessive judicial and executive control.
1. The Managerial Agency
The purpose of administrative agencies in the technocratic tradition is to
exercise broad-ranging management and coordination functions. James Landis'
classic statement of the New Deal philosophy emphasized the need for a
managerial government that accomplishes its tasks in the way that non-govern-
mental bureaucracies (great businesses) do.
52
The central New Deal mission is to create a decisionmaking structure
capable of deploying the varieties of relevant expert knowledge. Without
a sober understanding of the scientific and social facts, there can be no
hope of defining an intelligent solution to the chronic problems of a
complex and interdependent society.53
51. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (OR HOW THE CLEAN
AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT
SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT) (1981); see also JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978) (similarly characterizing the New Deal
approach). But see Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1263 n.236 (1986) [hereinafter Rabin, Historical Perspective] (agreeing with Ackerman and Hassler
generally, but arguing that they overstate the coherence of any contemporaneous theory of administrative
agencies).
Statements of the Ideal can be found in a number of important contemporary sources. See JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT
(1930); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE (1940); Louis L. Jaffe, Invective and Investiga-
tion in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (1939) (responding to Roscoe Pound's attack on
"administrative absolutism" in Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. REP.
331 (1938)).
For the present, I assume that executive control of EPA (exercised primarily through the Office of
Management and Budget) is subordinate to legislative control. This assumption is clearly not accurate, and
I address OMB's role in Part IV(A)(2), infra.
52. LANDIS, supra note 51, at 10-13, 23-24; ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51; see also RABIN,
supra note 51, at 1253, 1261, 1267-68 (discussing the courts' acceptance of the managerial state and
comprehensive governmental planning). Peter Huber is a current advocate of expert, businesslike administra-
tion of risk. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 320-32 (1985).
53. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51. See also CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 14 (describing a decisionmaking method paradigm of
science or expertise).
For discussion of contemporary expressions of the importance of expertise, see Latin, Regulatory
Efficiency, supra note 35, at 1275-1304 (citing and disagreeing with them). Latin points to Stewart,
Ackerman, and Breyer, among others, as modem technocrats. The "risk portfolio" idea would seem to
exemplify this faith in expert solutions. See Richard B. Stewart, The Role of Courts in Risk Management,
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Colin Diver describes this model of the managerial agency as the "comprehen-
sive rationality" paradigm.54 Comprehensive rationality calls for the agency
to go through a well-defined process of specifying goals, identifying alternatives
and analyzing their consequences, and optimizing choices among the alterna-
tives. 5 Diver's paradigm partakes heavily of the managerial technique of
decision analysis, 56 a borrowing that is entirely in keeping with Landis' vision.
Applied to scarcity, the technocratic view is that the agency should be given
the flexibility to apply its knowledge and expertise to pick and choose most
wisely among the many alternative strategies that confront it. In particular, it
would give the agency control over its own priority setting. 7 Since priority
setting is essentially a technical issue which ought to be resolved by scientific
methods, it makes sense to give the expert agency the maximum leeway to
reach and implement its own conclusions. 8
The expert agency must be able to identify and choose targets freely, and
to decide what techniques to use against them and appropriate levels of strin-
gency. "[S]ensible regulation, and indeed reasoned decisionmaking, requires
choice among alternatives."59 Without a "diverse menu of risk-management
options," experts cannot apply rationalist methodologies, exercise professional
judgment, or use whatever information is available to set sensible priorities.6"
16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10208, 10208-10 (Aug. 1986) [hereinafter Stewart, Role of Courts]; see
also Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra note 35, at 1360 (defending a similar proposal). Consider also
Jerry Mashaw's definition of "bureaucratic rationality," which he recommends for the Social Security
disability system:
From the perspective of bureaucratic rationality, administrative justice is accurate decision-
making carried on through processes appropriately rationalized to take account of costs. The
legitimating force of this conception flows both from its claim to correct implementation of
otherwise legitimate social decisions and from its attempt to realize society's preestablished goals
in some particular substantive domain while conserving social resources for the pursuit of other
valuable ends.
JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 26 (1983).
54. The opposing paradigm is incrementalism. See Colin Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administra-
tive Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 396-401 (1981). Diver's main interest is administrative procedure, in
particular, the choice between rulemaking and adjudication. He characterizes the New Deal as the "Golden
Age of Incrementalism," id. at 401-09, and argues that the trend toward a comprehensive rationality
paradigm arose from the 1960's movement to control agency action. Id. at 409-11.
55. See id. at 396-99, 413-21.
56. See id. at 396-97 nn. 12-16; see also HOWARD A. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY
LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968).
57. See Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA, supra note 6, at 18-24; CROSS, CANCER, supra note
6, at 140-41; Merrill, CPSC Regulation, supra note 6, at 1305-06, 1363-64; Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming,
supra note 35, at 1320 (arguing for limited private initiation rights "[iun light of competing claims on scarce
agency resources [and] the necessity of flexibility in regulatory policy").
58. See Homstein, supra note 3, at 569-84 (describing the "allure" of science, rationality, and integrated
management).
59. LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 94; see also id. at 84, 90 (describing the regulatory process).
60. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 207-08 (albeit recommending more elaborate information);
see also Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework,
69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1316-20 (1981) [hereinafter Stewart, Regulation] (recommending that agencies
have a choice among regulatory techniques which can be tailored to individual regulated entities); BARUCH
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2. Rationalist Methods and Criteria
Expert agencies should apply rationalist methodologies and criteria. Thomas
McGarity identifies two subdivisions of the technocratic approach. Traditional
regulatory thinking, which he calls "techno-bureaucratic rationality," is charac-
terized by pragmatic, technicians' solutions to regulatory problems. The alterna-
tive, the technocratic reformers' model, which McGarity calls "comprehensive
analytical rationality," seeks to analyze a proposal (together with its various
alternatives) in the broadest possible context, primarily making use of economic
techniques.6' The latter is the more aggressively rationalist model and, predict-
ably, it makes greater informational demands and aspires to precise results. The
rationalist tools of analysis, planning, and optimizing require inputs that can
be measured, manipulated, and compared. Thus, technocratic rationality in its
ideal form is highly quantitative.
62
A quantitative approach to toxic substances control mainly focuses on risk
and cost. The touchstone of the endeavor is cost-effectiveness, that is, the
greatest risk reduction at the least cost. A quantitative approach to the regula-
tion of toxic substances was given strong impetus by the Supreme Court in
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, the
Benzene case. The plurality opinion strongly implied that quantification of risk,
benefits, and cost was the preferred basis for the imposition of regulatory
controls.63 The balancing (at least roughly) of quantified risks, benefits, and
costs is fundamental to the balancing ethic of the unreasonable risk regime.'
FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK 48-52 (1981) (discussing techniques of professional judgment and
formal decision analysis); John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne
Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clear Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 140-42 [hereinafter Graham,
Agency Forcing] (discussing need for flexibility in choosing regulatory strategies).
61. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243,
1253-58 (1987) [hereinafter McGarity, Regulatory Analysis]. McGarity's implicit historical claim is that
comprehensive analytical rationality is a departure from, in fact a reaction to, the techno-bureaucratic
tradition that originated with the New Deal. Id. at 1270-71. While McGarity's purpose is to contrast the
comprehensive and techno-bureaucratic models, both in fact are fundamentally rationalist approaches.
62. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 9
(1974) Ihereinafter ACKERMAN ET AL., UNCERTAIN SEARCH]; Diver, supra note 54, at 412-21; LAVE,
STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 131 (emphasizing value of quantification to a rationalist process of identifying
and analyzing alternatives).
63. Although not explicitly required to do so by the Benzene decision, 448 U.S. 607, 652-53 (1980),
OSHA inferred that the decision required the agency to quantify risks before determining their significance.
See Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460, 34,461 (1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910) (OSHA concludes that Benzene requires it to "attempt to quantify risk, if possible, and determine
whether the risk is significant"); see generally Latin, Toxic Health Risks, supra note 35, at 383 (criticizing
quantification requirement). OSHA's core evidentiary support for the subsequent cotton dust rule was
quantitative, as the Supreme Court specifically noted on review. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490, 505 n.25 (1981) (upholding OSHA standard).
64. The rise of quantification is traced in Applegate, supra note 12, at 280-84. A zero-risk strategy,
of course, requires only a qualitative judgment that some risk exists, while quantification is clearly necessary
for risk-risk or cost-benefit determinations of appropriate non-zero levels of risk. See LAVE, STRATEGY,
supra note 35, at 15-24; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 109.
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In deciding individual cases and in making programmatic choices, EPA has
failed to achieve an efficient or effective allocation of its toxics-regulation
resources.6 5 The technocratic solution is for the agency to apply rationalist
criteria to improve the efficiency of priority setting.66
a. Risk
Risks must be evaluated at the individual and comparative levels. The
regulator must consider both how far to limit exposure to a potentially carcino-
genic but highly useful industrial chemical given the cost of control ("how safe
is safe enough"), and which risks to control, given limited resources (a "risk-
risk" decision).67 The unreasonable risk standard responds well to the techno-
cratic vision of regulatory analysis by trying to identify accurately which risks
ought to be regulated and which should not, based on an evaluation of risk,
cost, and benefit in each instance. As such it is also a tool for limited priority
setting which separates the important from the unimportant.68 Unreasonable
risk avoids the Scylla and Charybdis of zero risk and actual harm, and gives
the agency a great deal of flexibility to exercise its judgment.69 Even if ideally
applied, unreasonable risk addresses only one chemical at a time. It is at least
as important for the regulator to compare toxic risks to be certain that less
serious risks are not being treated while more serious ones go unchecked.
Efficiency and efficacy therefore require that the agency make appropriate
choices about which risks to attack and in what order.70 Risk quantification
65. See, e.g., Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA, supra note 6, at 2; Merrill, CPSC Regulation,
supra note 6; Merrill, Cancer-Causing Chemicals, supra note 38, at 111-14.
66. The terms "technocratic" and "rationalist" are taken from several important studies of regulation,
including ACKERMAN ET AL., UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 62, at 9-11 ("technocratic model"); ACKER-
MAN & HASSLER supra note 53 ("New Deal Ideal"); Diver, supra note 54 ("comprehensive rationality");
McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1253 ("comprehensive analytical rationality"); and Richard
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1975)
("traditional [expertise] model" of administrative law).
67. See Lester B. Lave, Health and Safety Risk Analyses: Informationfor Better Decisions, 236 SCIENCE
291, 294 (1987) [hereinafter Lave, Better Decisions] (arguing that "how safe is safe enough" questions
require information similar to that required by more obviously comparative "risk-risk" decisions, because
the former require a trade-off of other social goods for risk reduction).
68. See CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 73-75; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 101-05 (arguing
that Benzene, 448 U.S. at 644 n.49 reflects a desire to use "significant risk" as a way of focusing limited
administrative resources); Cross et al., supra note 27, at 62-65; Cross, Beyond Benzene, supra note 24, at
8-11; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 90-91
(1990) [hereinafter SUNsTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION].
69. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 101-05; CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 74; LiTAN & NORD-
HAUS, supra note 41, at 89-94. A common technocratic complaint is that agencies have failed to use their
flexibility to rationalize their treatment of various risks. See generally Cross et al., supra note 27; CROSS,
CANCER, supra note 6.
70. See Michael S. Baram, Use of Comparative Risk Methods in Regulatory and Common Law, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 8-13 (1987) (describing use for priority setting); see also Byrd & Lave, Narrowing,
supra note 6, at 93; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 200; Richard Wilson & E.A.C. Crouch, Risk
Assessment and Comparisons: An Introduction, 236 SCIENCE 267 (1987).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
and comparison are cornerstones of the technocratic approach to priority
setting.7
b. Cost
When resources are limited, consideration of cost is not only justified, it
is inevitable.72 "No sensible regulatory program ... can be indifferent to
cost."73 Even in nominally cost-oblivious regulatory schemes, cost is at least
a sub rosa policy determinant because the alternative is impossible given
limited regulatory and social resources. 74 Moreover, where the statute imposes
a nonzero level of risk, cost is the only plausible reason why any added risk
is acceptable.75 In the technocratic view, an agency ought to be able to take
into account the relative worths of chemicals or activities in targeting them for
action and in assessing the degree of stringency of control. It should be more
reluctant to limit the use of a more valuable or irreplaceable chemical than a
less valuable or easily replaceable one that poses an equivalent risk.76 Simi-
larly, the degree of stringency should be subject to cost considerations. After
a certain point the marginal reduction in risk becomes extremely expensive
relative to previous reductions. "Simply regulating to the hilt whatever pollut-
ants happen to get on the regulatory agenda may preclude an agency from
dealing adequately with more serious problems that come to scientific attention
later."77
A key element of cost is the expense of information. It could well be
sensible, in terms of cost, to attack first the chemicals whose risks, benefits,
and characteristics are most familiar, even though the absolute risk they pose
71. See SAB, REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at 19-20 (suggesting that EPA develop risk-based
priorities); EPA, COMPARING RISKS, supra note 3; UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 3.
72. The nature and measurability of costs and benefits are surveyed in Rodgers, Guerilla Decision-
making, supra note 35, at 193-201; McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1276-1308.
73. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 68, at 90.
74. See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 290
(1983) (discussing role of cost in EPA action under § 109 of the Clean Air Act). Required to follow "listing"
of a hazardous air pollutant with stringent control, EPA simply refused to list in the first place. John P.
Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 258-60 (1990).
75. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 275-76; Dwyer, supra note 74, at 273-74, 308-09; National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,496, 28,512 (1988) (issued by EPA);
see also GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 101 ("significant risk" is necessarily cost-based). Under the
"significant risk" formulation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Supreme Court emphasized
that "significant" was intended to remove from the agency the power to impose enormous regulatory costs
with little or no corresponding health benefit. See Benzene, 448 U.S, at 640-41, 664.
One of the most plausible ways of determining what risks are acceptable without considering cost is
to compare other risks, but that requires the risk data described here to be available and comparable. See
Dwyer, supra note 74, at 272-73; NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 39, at 58-60; Benzene, 448
U.S. at 656-57 (significant risk approximates comparative risk); Wilson & Crouch, supra note 70, at 269-70;
Baram, supra note 70, at 8-13 (describing and benefits and difficulties of comparative risk assessment in
setting agency priorities). •
76. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 207.
77. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra note 59, at 1337 (discussing BAT standard).
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is relatively small."8 Conversely, an uncertain risk might be a lower priority
than a certain one, because the cost of obtaining sufficient information to
impose legally sustainable and reasonably accurate controls would be lower.79
Howard Raiffa's work in decision analysis provides a methodology for identify-
ing relevant factors, estimating the value of additional certainty (the cost of
error), and placing a value on additional data.8" Where information resources
are limited and the goal is to achieve the greatest risk reduction, the value of
additional information ought to be carefully considered.8
c. Cost-Effectiveness
As a general proposition, faced with limited resources and the need to make
choices, we should accomplish our environmental goals (however defined) in
a cost-effective way. That is,
[b]ased on the assumption that the objective is to achieve the greatest
possible health benefits for the amount of resources expended, cost-
effective resource allocation would give the highest priority to actions
that achieve the greatest health benefit per dollar drawn from the
resource pool.82
Given a fixed resource pool, a cost-effective scheme sets priorities so as to
achieve as much in total environmental protection as possible, usually but not
necessarily in terms of reducing risk.83 It is also firmly in the technocratic
tradition that these priorities must be based on "sound scientific data and
analysis . . . 'to develop realistic, achievable, cost effective, environmentally
sound goals."'"
78. Fischoff suggests that it might make sense for an agency to attend first to hazards which show the
"greatest promise of quick, cheap fixes." FISCHOFF, ET AL., supra note 60, at 155.
79. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 39, at 52-53 (classifying pesticides on basis of
availability of relevant data); see also Wilson & Crouch, supra note 70, at 269 (certainty is relevant to
evaluating risk levels). At OSHA, the availability of information is a (and was the) key determinant in going
forward with candidates for regulation. Note, Deciding What to Regulate: Priority-Setting at OSHA, 2 VA.
J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 108-14 (1982).
80. See RAIFFA, supra note 56. Decision analysis is applied to toxic substances regulation in Weinstein,
supra note 13, at 371-80; FIsCHHOFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 105-07; TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 11,
at 207-08.
81. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 371-72.
82. Weinstein, supra note 13, at 337-38.
83. Cost-effectiveness can be a way of selecting among alternatives when costs are fixed ("How much
risk reduction does each alternative achieveT'), when the goal is fixed ("What is the cheapest way to
eliminate lead?"), or when both are variable. See FISCHHOFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 104; ACKERMAN ET
AL., UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 62, at 137.
84. Scientists Urge National Research Council to Back National Envirotnental Institute, 22 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 2182 (Jan. 24, 1992) (quoting environmental scientist George Barnes); see also EPA Should
Establish Strong Science Base in Addition to Regulatory Role., 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2122-23 (Jan. 10,
1992) (reporting recommendations of an expert panel on EPA's research and development activities).
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Getting the most "bang for the buck" is particularly important when com-
paring risks of potential concern.85 An agency ought to prefer to exercise
control where it would be fairly easy to do so, because it could reduce risks
with fewer resources from both agency and industry. 6 Because the premise
of cost-effectiveness is uncontroversial, and because cost-effectiveness does not
require the wide-ranging inquiry contemplated by cost-benefit analysis, Con-
gress and agencies have been more willing to adopt it.87 A more ambitious
version of this idea is the so-called risk portfolio approach. 88 The inverse of
an investment portfolio, its overall goal is "the progressive reduction of the risk
in the existing portfolio" of environmental hazards.89 The portfolio, like other
comparisons, assumes an objective, tolerably reliable, and presumably quantita-
tive risk assessment on which to base its technocratic analysis.
3. Freedom from External Controls
In order to make full use of its expertise, the agency requires the flexibility
to choose responses to take into account changed circumstances and new or
better information. 90 Both of McGarity's technocratic models imply consider-
able agency freedom from executive and judicial control. 9' Comprehensive
analytical rationality emphasizes a broad view based on economic analysis, and
the techno-bureaucratic model "rel[ies] heavily upon professional judgment, a
kind of intuition informed by technical training and experience." '92 Central to
rationalist decisionmaking is that ex ante congressional control is limited to
setting goals, and ex post judicial review is limited to narrow, adjudicable
questions of procedure and arbitrariness. It is the duty of the agency in the first
instance to perform the analysis and make choices.93 Congress should provide
85. See ACKERMAN ET AL., UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 62, at 137-44.
86. For example, the agency might be well advised to look first at relatively cheap, quick fixes. See
Cyril L. Comar, Introduction, in DE MINimis RISK xiii (Chris Whipple ed., 1987) (suggesting guidelines
for setting priorities "to avoid squandering resources"); see also FisCHHOFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 155.
87. See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) ("protect adequately against such risk using the least
burdensome requirements"); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a) (requiring selection of "cost-effective response"
at Superfund sites). OSHA, which steadfastly resisted cost-benefit analysis during the Carter Administration,
was willing to use cost-effectiveness in making regulatory choices. See Identification, Classification, and
Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5240-41, 5256 (1980).
88. See Stewart, Role of the Courts, supra note 53, at 10208-09.
89. Id. Stewart's proposal in many ways embodies the paradigm of comprehensive rationality: it
emphasizes process, rationalist criteria, and overall solutions. See Stewart, Role of Courts, supra note 53,
at 10209.
90. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 5; GRAHAM Er A.., supra note 6, at 207-08; Stewart,
Regulation, supra note 60, at 1316-19.
91. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1317-30 (arguing that while regulatory analysis
is not intended to expand judicial supervision, it can be used to improve the quality of review).
92. id. at 1255.
93. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental
Law, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311,355 (1991) (finding that "wasted resources and misdirected priorities"
are the result of the "combination of impossible statutory mandates and increased judicial access"). See also
Diver, supra note 54, at 425-28 (explaining Benzene), 433-34 (emphasizing role of agency); Guruswamy,
Vol. 9: 277, 1992
Worst Things First
only the "most general kinds of policy guidance" to free the agency to engage
in rationalist decisionmaking processes." Intensive congressional oversight
and direct congressional commands regarding the regulation of particular
substances are regarded as inefficient, ill-informed, or simply outdated "micro-
management."95 EPA is more than usually subjected to both forms of detailed
congressional control.96
Likewise, the courts must severely limit their oversight of the administrative
action to ensuring that it has been taken according to a thoughtful process.97
Aggressive judicial attention to the establishment of threshold levels of risk,
to the certainty with which they are established, and to the reliability of the
agency's scientific case, can impose a burden of proof on an agency that is
extremely difficult-read extremely expensive-or impossible to meet. This
may compel the agency to allocate significant resources to a risk that may not
justify great attention (especially if a deadline or petition forces the agency to
address the particular problem), and also involves the courts in areas outside
the judges' expertise.98 The conclusion often expressed is that courts should
not intrude into agency science and judgments, that they should not hold
agencies to burdensome procedure and documentation.99 Agencies, not courts,
supra note 10, at 508, 533-34 (arguing that comprehensive rationality can force an agency to take integrative
approach to media and problems).
94. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 5-6; LANDIS, supra note 53, at 70 ("Difficulties in
administrative adjustment frequently flow from a too elaborate formulation of standards.").
95. See, e.g., CROSS, CANCER supra note 6, at 140. TSCA singles out PCBs for particular attention,
15 U.S.C. § 2605(e); RCRA focuses on dioxins, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e). Congress has also taken to listing
chemicals on a fairly regular basis. See, e.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1).
96. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PRoBS. 205, 229-30 (1991); Daniel J. Fiorino, Can Problems Shape Priorities? The Case of Risk-
Based Environmental Planning, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 82, 85-86 (1990).
97. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 6; Diver, supra note 54, at 421-28 (analyzing Vermont
Yankee and Cotton Dust).
98. This attitude reached its peak in a Fifth Circuit opinion in which the court rejected an OSHA
standard because it was not based on what in the court's view constituted "good science." See Gulf South
Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1140, 1146 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Asbestos
Information Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting evidence based on uncertain
assessment analysis); Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398,406-07 (5th Cir. 1980) (agency
bears burden of demonstrating existence of risk). This approach has been severely criticized. See Kenneth
S. Abraham & Richard A. Merrill, Scientific Uncertainty in the Courts, ISSUES SCi. & TFCH., Winter 1986,
at 93, 97-99 (criticizing Gulf South); Latin, Toxic Health Risks, supra note 35, at 349-59 (criticizing
Benzene).
Several commentators have noted that courts and agencies have very different thresholds of proof, and
that courts (encouraged by opponents of the regulation) are often insensitive to the distinctions between
different burdens of proof. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 186-87; Latin, Good Science, supra note
35, at 92-95; McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion, supra note 35, at 100 (EPA & OSHA);
GAO, TOXIC SUBSTANCES: EFFECTIVENESS OF UNREASONABLE RISK STANDARDS UNCLEAR 4-6 (1990)
[hereinafter GAO, Toxic SUBSTANCES].
99. See CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 152-53; Abraham & Merrill, supra note 98, at 106; GRAHAM
ET AL., supra note 6, at 215; Robert Dorfman, The Lessons of Pesticide Regulation, in REFORM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 26-27 (Wesley A. Magat ed., 1982).
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are in the best position to consider technical data, to draw on expertise, and to
allocate limited resources.10°
The risk portfolio, an exemplar of the technocratic approach, emphasizes
administrative primacy in relation to both Congress and the courts:
The portfolio approach to risk management requires consistency and
coordination in decisionmaking to achieve risk reduction in a rational
and cost-effective manner and to ensure that similarly situated, compet-
ing generators of risk are treated equally. Administrative agencies (in
contrast to both courts and legislatures) are centralized and specialized.
Accordingly, they can achieve a greater degree of consistency and
coordination and are better suited to serve as the front-line mechanism
for regulating risk.'0'
The Congressional role in assembling the portfolio is limited to setting the
regulatory objectives, and the role of the courts is limited to enforcing them
and ensuring procedural regularity. 102
B. The Need for Direction: Post-New Deal Skepticism
The New Deal Ideal was in many ways just that. In the decades following
World War II, Congress and many students of regulation reached the conclusion
that regulatory problems cannot be satisfactorily managed merely by the
intervention of technocratic agencies. 103 In this section, I identify four inter-
woven strands of post-New Deal skepticism: the informational critique, which
questions the practical ability of an agency to apply its expertise; the legitimacy
critique, which questions the neutrality of expertise and its consistency with
democratic values; the rationalist critique, which doubts that flexibility, without
more, can ensure technocratically sensible results; and the historical critique,
which questions the success in fact of New Deal-type agencies in coping with
100. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1195 (1982).
101. Stewart, Role of Courts, supra note 53, at 10209; see also Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra
note 35, at 1355-59 (recommending constrained cost-effectiveness analysis by agency, freed from require-
ments of uniform treatment and all-or-nothing stringency).
102. See Stewart, Role of Courts, supra note 53, at 10209-10.
103. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 53, at 7; Stewart, Reformation, supra note 66, at 1678-88.
But see GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 185-89 (1991) (concluding that Landis' vision is
still accepted, if not acknowledged).
An early critique of faith in expertise included Harold J. Laski, The Limitations of the Expert, 162
HARPER'S MONTHLY MAGAZINE 101 (1930) (Fabian Tract No. 235). In the post-New Deal era, see MARVER
H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); THEODORE J. LowI, THE
END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969); HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS
(1962); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAME-
WORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971) (report of the Ash Council).
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complex regulatory problems. Each points to the need to modify the pro-
discretion technocratic approach with the addition of clear congressional
guidance for agency action.
1. The Informational Critique
The administrative costs of the ideal rationalist, technocratic approach would
be exorbitant. In toxics regulation, a nonzero, cost-conscious risk standard is
far more demanding of information than a simple zero-risk standard because
it aspires to accurate calibration of risks and costs."° Flexibility to set priori-
ties among risks adds to the expense. Comprehensive rationality, observes
Diver, "makes ravenous demands on agencies' limited investigative resources
and cognitive faculties."' 5 McGarity considers it "an abstract ideal that may
never be achieved."0 6 Loss of faith in comprehensive rationality can therefore
be traced to the vast universe of problems about which detailed data would
have to be generated to support expert analysis. 10 7
Howard Latin has been a persistent critic of the supposed virtues of cost-
effectiveness, technocratic expertise, and agency discretion. His most telling
criticism is empirical. Information of sufficient definiteness does not exist to
provide an adequate basis for the exercise of what could be called expertise in
any meaningful sense.' Faced with huge data gaps and uncertainties, agency
choices are necessarily driven by policy and not by "fact."'0 9 Citing the case-
by-case approach to toxic substances that has achieved abysmally few regula-
tions under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act (and TSCA), Latin charges
that attempts to "fine-tune" regulatory strictures have failed for lack of
104. See LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 26-27, 127-28; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6. at 108-10;
CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 84-85.
105. Diver, supra note 54, at 428.
106. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1257-58 (contrasting ideal of comprehensive
rationality unfavorably with the "real world"); id. at 1276-84, 1287-92, 1303-08 (discussing lack of cost,
impact, and health information).
107. See Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 482-84; see also Diver, supra note 54, at 431 (concluding that
comprehensive rationality is inappropriate under conditions of uncertainty or under an immature regulatory
regime).
108. Latin, Good Science, supra note 35, at 105-07; Latin, Regulatory Efficiency, supra note 35, at
1273-84, 1297-99; see also Mintz, supra note 45, at 161-62 (agreeing with Latin); Gillette & Krier, supra
note 42, at 1088-90, 1103 (arguing that not enough data exists to justify claims to expertise).
109. Latin, Good Science, supra note 35 at 102-03, 123-26. Latin observes, "EPA's selection of a mid-
range position on this issue (i.e., site specificity in counting tumors) reflects an implicit social policy choice
that is not required by the norms of good science and that cannot be resolved solely on the basis of scientific
judgments." Id. at 103.
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data." Moreover, the cost of obtaining the necessary information (if it is
obtainable at all) is prohibitive."'
The informational critique raises serious doubts about the practical ability
of an agency to apply its expertise in the real world of scarcity of information
and resources. In its place, these critics recommend techniques for regulating
toxic substances that would reduce the information needed for taking action;
these include, for instance, the use of generic standards or categories of
risks." 2 Even if they are scientifically imprecise, such approaches would more
accurately reflect Congress' goal of protecting health and the environment.
2. The Legitimacy Critique
Reliance on expertise and its data demands necessarily entails delay and
expense while information is developed and thoroughly analyzed. To critics
such as Latin, there is no a priori reason why protective action ought to be
subordinated to rationalist analysis and "good science.""' 3 Especially under
conditions of scarcity, it is clearly a policy choice to sacrifice safety to certainty
and comprehensiveness. Expertise, in other words, is not necessarily benign.
Quantification, in this view, is not only impossible (the informational
critique), but undesirable. Basic trade-offs between health and cost, between
safety and development, are not resolvable as technocratic exercises." 4 Since
no neutral equation or analytical tool can determine whether a risk is "reason-
able" or "unreasonable," the delegation of its resolution to an expert agency
both avoids and obscures the real policy decision being made." 5 These deci-
sions are fundamentally political and must be based on broader sets of values,
many of which are not quantifiable." 6 Quantification is meaningful only to
110. Latin, Regulatory Efficiency, supra note 35, at 1304-31. Technocrats, on the other hand, explain
this effect as the paradox of overregulation (requiring too much stringency) resulting in underregulation
because regulators are unwilling to impose irrationally tight controls. See SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION,
supra note 68, at 91-92, 106-07; JOHN MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY (1979).
111. Latin, Regulatory Efficiency, supra note 35, at 1279-81; see also supra note 35 (discussing the
existence of irreducible uncertainties).
112. See Latin, Regulatory Efficiency, supra note 35, at 1324-31; see also ACKERMAN & HASSLER,
supra note 51 at 10-11 (identifying uniform controls as significant departure from New Deal Ideal).
113. Latin, Good Science, supra note 35, at 100.
114. See FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 44-57; Latin, Good Science, supra note 35, at 93-95; SUNSTEIN,
RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 68, at 96-97.
115. See Hornstein, supra note 3, at 587-616 (criticizing expected-utility theory and comparative risk
for failing to account for equity in and public judgments about risk exposure); LEE CLARKE, ACCEPTABLE
RISK? 8 1-82, 178-82 (1989); see also David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case ofthe
Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 789, 819-20 (1983) (asserting that Congress used general statements
of goals for EPA to avoid hard choices); Latin, Good Science, supra note 35, at 145-46 (relying on science
and expertise hides policy choices); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 685-88 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (leaving to OSHA the trade-off of lives and cost
contained in the idea of "significant" risk was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
116. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 9-16 (1990).
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a limited extent where lives and deaths are involved," 7 and intensity of risk
is only one of a number of concerns that ought to be considered: voluntariness
of encountering risk, equity of risk distribution, certainty of assessment, famil-
iarity, "dread," and others."' Without quantification, most technocratic tools
have limited utility, even theoretically," 9 and the democratic critics are will-
ing to forgo them.
It follows that these choices should not be made by expert elites but through
publicly responsive systems. Ackerman and Hassler observe that post-New Deal
statutes prefer accountable individual agency heads to commissions, and they
impose apparently specific, tight deadlines. 2 ( Adherence to a strong version
of the nondelegation doctrine would assure direct and narrowing authority from
citizenry to Congress to agency.' 2 ' While the difficulty of applying a clear
standard has left this avenue largely unexplored as a means of judicial control,
it provides a continuing mandate that Congress guide agency expertise. Respon-
siveness to congressional demands, in other words, provides legitimacy.' 2
Accountability also implies broad public participation and accountability
of representatives, as reflected in Richard Stewart's interest representation
model of administrative law. Lacking conviction that neutral expertise provides
meaningful limits on agency discretion, this model guarantees broad citizen
access to the regulatory process to ensure that various public interests are
117. See generally Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at 1070-85; WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPT-
ABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 78-95 (1976); Guruswamy, supra note 10, at
504-09. The conceptual problems with cost-benefit analysis are similar in nature and have been thoroughly
canvassed elsewhere. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health
and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 193-201 (1980) [hereinafter Rodgers,
Benefits, Costs, and Risks]; MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988).
118. See LOWRANCE, supra note 117, at 86-94 (array of considerations); National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,496 (1988) (variety of considerations); English, supra note
119, at 498-99 (equity); Wilson & Crouch, supra note 70, at 269 (certainty); Gillette & Krier, supra note
42, at 1071-85 (elements of public perception of risk).
119. See LOWRANCE, supra note 117, at 9-10, 86-94, 109-14; FISCHHOFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 101-
05; see also Howard Kunreuther & Ruth Patrick, Managing the Risks of Hazardous Waste, 33 ENV'T 13
(1991) (discussing difference between public and technical perception of risk); GAO, LIMITED RESOURCES,
supra note 1, at 19-20, 23-24 (these choices reflect important values among which Congress must choose).
Some have suggested that the analytical methods of the technical approach may make it risk-preferring,
in contrast to the public's risk-aversion. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at 1060-61. Decision analysis
seeks to avoid this problem by focusing on perceived rather than statistical risks. See FISCHHOFF ET AL.,
supra note 60, at 106.
120. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 8-9.
121. Then-Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger vigorously argued for the application of the
nondelegation doctrine to Congress' vague (if not nonexistent) guidance to OSHA for the health-cost trade-
off implicit in the "significant risk" standard in the benzene and cotton dust cases. See Industrial Union
Dep't, 448 U.S. 607, 685-88 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (Rehnquist, J., & Burger, C.J., dissenting). But apart from a rather tentative nod by
the Benzene plurality, 448 U.S. at 642-52 (Stevens, J.), the Rehnquist-Burger approach garnered no
following. The nondelegation doctrine has fared no better in recent separation-of-powers cases. See, e.g.,
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989); id. at 413, 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding
unmanageability of standards for impermissible delegation).
122. See Steven Shimberg, Checks and Balance: Limitations on the Power of Congressional Oversight,
54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 244-45 (1991).
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represented through broadened standing and expanded participation in the
decisional process, as well as more potent procedures like citizen suits and
petitions.'23 Given the complexity of risk issues, it also requires better public
education about risks and the science of risk."2 The democratic objection to
flexibility is therefore more fundamental than the informational critique. The
democratic objection suggests that neutral expertise is chimerical at best; at
worst it is mystification that masks critical policy choices.
3. The Rationalist Critique
Precision, in the sense of expert judgments based on many factors and broad
comparisons, is a technocratic goal that requires discretion. EPA has clearly
indicated its preference for case-by-case determination of the reasonableness
of toxic health risks because it gives the agency the flexibility to balance a wide
variety of relevant factors in each unique context.'25 Even from a rationalist
point of view, however, lack of direction often leaves agencies at sea, not
knowing which policies to pursue or .how to accommodate conflicting poli-
cies.'26 Critics of this ad hoc decisionmaking have pointed out that while
"there is some merit in allowing EPA flexibility to adjust future regulations for
special circumstances ... this flexibility must be bounded by some overarching
conceptual framework that guides agency discretion."' 27 Schoenbrod criticizes
the Clean Air Act for being a "goals," and not a "rules," statute. It not only
permits the agency to "deflate" the statute through its wide discretion, but also
makes it difficult for the agency to do otherwise.'28 By ordering "safety,"
Congress made it impossible for EPA to confront (at least openly) the cost
123. Stewart, Reformation, supra note 66, at 1676-81, 1711-13; Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at
1104-05; FREEDMAN, supra note 51, at 44-57; ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 72.
124. Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501 (1989).
125. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,045,
38,049 (1989) (responding to Vinyl Chloride decision).
126. See Richard C. Fortuna, Preventing Hazardous Waste Management Liability: The Lessons of
Recent Legislation, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 877, 880 (1988); MENDELOFF, supra note 110, at 69; Floumoy, supra
note 12, at 386-89 (avoiding action by determining that reasonableness threshold not crossed).
127. See Cross et al., supra note 27, at 77.
128. Schoenbrod, supra note 115, at 753, 766-77. A rules statute sets out relatively specific standards
of conduct for the regulated industry; a goals statute gives a general mandate to an agency, which the agency
must translate into rules of conduct. Id. at 751-55, 783-89.
The reader may have noticed some dissonance here: Ackerman and Hassler hold up the Clean Air Act
as an exemplar of overly specific post-New Deal legislation, while Schoenbrod criticizes its generality. Both
are right. The Act was intended to respond to criticisms of the New Deal Ideal, but in fact Congress also
wanted to avoid tough choices. Schoenbrod spends much time explaining (convincingly) that what appears
clear and specific in the Act is not. Id. at 756-77.
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trade-off that it cannot avoid. EPA as technician is unwilling or unable to make
these policy choices that Congress ought to have made. 2 9
Lack of policy control and broad reliance on agency expertise can also
result in the squandering of scarce resources on costly, low-impact projects.
Technocratic expertise is narrowing; it tends to leave everything outside of its
particular focus blurry. A central theme of Ackerman's studies of the implemen-
tation of the Clean Air Act and of the cleanup of the Delaware River in an
earlier study was experts' failure to see the forest for the trees. "Unfortunately,
the EPA did not respond to the inept statute with creative use of its expertise,
but treated NSPS as if it were merely a problem in applied sanitary engineer-
ing."' 3 ° Good-but-vague'statutory intentions led to a progression of bad, even
perverse, policies from the perspective of broader environmental and economic
concerns. 131
Others have suggested that the problem is deeper and that expertise is
highly contingent. 32 Not only do experts lack the data upon which truly
expert decisions would have to be based, but they are subject to many of the
same weaknesses in judgment that other mortals are. Given inadequate informa-
tion, they must guess, and their guesses are subject to bias.'33 Technocratic
expertise, especially without an adequate informational foundation, is not itself
an answer; therefore, it provides a poor justification for rejecting democratic
policy control. Broad discretion merely amplifies the limitations in coping with
complex regulatory problems.
4. The Historical Critique
Finally, the skepticism is pragmatic: the technocratic model has, at least on
significant occasions, led to regulatory failure. The post-New Deal period
demonstrated that one problem with regulatory flexibility is that the agency may
do nothing or very little. 34 Natural inertia aside, flexibility contributes to
inaction in a number of ways. First, in an environment of scarce information,
129. Id. at 789-98. Schoenbrod goes on to point out that a goals statute is not easily fixed by the agency
so long as Congress itself fails to confront-or wholly delegates the resolution of-the basic trade-offs and
controversies involved in air pollution control. Id. at 798-803.
130. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 13. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
can be seen as a response to the same kind of narrowness. Despite clear public concern over the environ-
mental impact of major development projects, many federal agencies had refused to consider them. See
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971). NEPA was designed
to exert control over agencies with whose judgment Congress had become disillusioned. See Schroeder,
supra note 24, at 287-91 (describing general pattern of Congressional reassertion of control).
131. ACKERMAN ET AL., UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 62, at 317-30. Latin has complained that,
despite their nominal recognition of the uncertainties and policy judgments inherent in quantitative risk
assessment, agencies in practice treat numerical estimates "as gospel." See Latin, Good Science, supra note
35, at 145-46.
132. See JASANOFF, supra note 116, at 12-14; Latin. Good Science, supra note 35, at 134.
133. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at 1089-92.
134. See Rabin, Historical Perspective. supra note 51, at 1296.
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the expert agency can always use uncertainty as an excuse to do nothing or to
engage in endless introspective analysis. 35 Second, flexibility can result in
the "capture" of an agency by the very entities which the agency is supposed
to regulate. Capture occurs primarily as a result of the agency's limited infor-
mation and regulatory resources: the agency must rely on the industry for most
of the information it receives, and the industry can field greater resources per
target. Therefore, it is argued, the agency has a continuing incentive to "get
along" with industry and to avoid confrontation, and this relationship develops
into a close, symbiotic one over time. Captured agencies, as a result, no longer
actively control their industries, but rather take little action or act to protect
them.'36 The present regulatory structure of Congress setting broad and often
unworkable goals for EPA permits both Congress and the agencies to avoid real
accountability for the lack of progress.'37 The post-New Deal solution to
stagnation caused by uncertainty, lack of direction, and capture is to establish
specific goals and to mandate implementation. Congress must take control once
again.
It is not a mere platitude to conclude that both the technocratic approach
and its critiques have considerable merit. If, therefore, Part I demonstrated the
importance of thoughtful priority setting, then Part II demonstrates that priorities
must be set in the context of a regulatory structure that provides sufficient
flexibility for the agency to exercise its specialized knowledge and experience,
yet demands clear congressional guidance on policy and productivity.
III. Restructuring Toxic Substances Control
In this Part, I suggest a new structure for toxic substances regulation,
founded on the two basic propositions so far advanced: that the fundamental
problem in regulating toxic substances is scarcity of information and other
resources, which demands careful priority setting (Part I); and that the appropri-
ate allocation of control over toxics policy must recognize EPA's managerial
capacity and expertise, but also demand clear congressional guidance in estab-
lishing principles for priority setting (Part II). Policy control of EPA should not
come from aggressive judicial review of opaque congressional standards, based
on marginally relevant criteria such as burden of proof and substantiality of
135. See Flournoy, supra note 12; Latin, Good Science, supra note 35, at 126-34; Guruswamy, supra
note 10, at 482.
136. See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 66, at 1682-83, 1684-87; SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION,
supra note 68, at 98-100. Post-New Deal criticism of this phenomenon included BERNSTEIN, supra note
103, at 74-95.
In fairness, the charge of industry capture. has rarely made against EPA or OSHA. During the early
part of the Reagan administration both agencies were highly responsive to industrial concerns, but more
as a matter of philosophy than capture. See Schroeder,. Evolution, supra note 24, at 288 n.163.
137. Schoenbrod, supra note 115, at 751-55, 762-66; ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 9-12.
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inevitably uncertain evidence.'38 The essence of my proposal is that EPA
should be granted considerably greater flexibility in managing individual toxic
hazards that present a real risk, but that Congress should guide its overall toxics
program by requiring EPA to prepare and follow a plan that describes the
regulatory actions it plans to take in the next few years, the order in which it
plans to take them, and the reasons for its planned course of action. Under this
approach, Congress would mandate that the plans have certain characteristics
and priorities (for example, greatest short-term risk reduction for least cost,
carcinogens first, or occupational exposure last).'39 This Part begins with
explanations of three analytical frameworks that underlie the proposal. The
proposal is then described. Finally, each part of the proposal is analyzed
separately.
A. Analytical Frameworks and Terminology
1. Predicates and Targets
In instructing an agency to take substantive action, Congress must describe
the set of circumstances under which the agency is authorized to exert regula-
tory control. For toxic substances these are the existence or potential existence
of a risk to human health presented by a chemical or activity. These circum-
stances can be thought of as the trigger or threshold; I will use the term
"predicate." The predicate can be more or less stringent and more or less
specific. The Federal Trade Commission Act, for example, is an open-ended
authorization for the FTC to correct "unfair trade practices."" The Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), in contrast, requires EPA to make three very
specific findings-a potential risk, a data gap, and the utility of testing to fill
the gap--before it can impose the relatively limited requirement of chemical
testing. 4'
The predicate is the set of circumstances that must exist before the agency
takes action. Congress then must define the state of affairs that it wishes to
exist after the agency has taken action.'42 The latter is the goal of the statute;
138. For a detailed discussion of the negative effects of a substantial evidence standard in toxics
regulation, see Applegate, supra note 12, at 325-30; see also Dorfman, supra note 99, at 26-27 (arguing
that EPA should be able to "arrive at decisions with less documentation and review than is now required
of it").
139. See text accompanying notes 378-83 (suggesting possible ranking criteria).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1988); see also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1) (1988).
142. In the Benzene decision, the plurality opinion reached to the definition of "health and safety
standard" in the Occupational Safety and Health Act to demand that the agency make a threshold determina-
tion that a risk exists in the unregulated workplace and that it is "significant." See Benzene, 448 U.S. 607,
639-46, 662 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 842 F.2d 1146
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Vinyl Chloride) (following the Benzene analysis).
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I call it the "target." The target defines the extent to which a particular risk is
to be reduced. The predicate helps the agency to identify the appropriate
subjects of its attention and also protects regulated entities by ensuring that the
agency does not impose large costs without justification. The target, likewise,
protects public health by ensuring that when the agency acts it does so with
sufficient vigor. The target also provides the terms, however vague, of the
ultimate trade-off between risk and cost.
143
Congress often uses the same level of risk for both predicate and target. In
TSCA, unreasonable risk is a threshold for action and the level below which
the risk must be reduced:
If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude
that the manufacture. . . , use, or disposal of a chemical substance...
presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment, the Administrator shall by rule apply one or more of the
following requirements to such substance ... to the extent necessary
to protect adequately against such risk using the least burdensome
requirements: .... "
This provision clearly separates the predicate finding of "unreasonable risk"
in the first clause from the requirement of sufficient stringency "to protect
adequately against such risk" (in other words, making the risk "reasonable")
in the second clause. By conflating the two under the idea of reasonableness,
Congress hoped to "finesse a [target]-setting problem by getting agreement on
what was thought to be an easier notion."' 45 As a result, TSCA fails to recog-
nize the different goals of identifying hazards and regulating them.
2. The Regulatory Process
Broadly speaking, regulatory action occurs in four phases.'46 First, hazard
identification establishes the universe within which the remainder of the process
operates. The agency must initially identify and define the hazards which
143. Wilson and Crouch advocate the use of risk assessment "to select targets for regulation and to
decide how stringently to control the various sources that contribute to a particular problem." Wilson &
Crouch, supra note 70.
The dichotomy between predicate and target is illustrated in the Benzene case, the leading Supreme
Court case on toxic substances regulation. The plurality's finding that the target risk level of the Occupation-
al Safety and Health Act was greater than zero risk was well supported, but its conclusion that the Act
required a predicate finding of a "significant risk" was far more tenuous. The plurality forthrightly conceded
that its motivation was to limit OSHA's power to impose huge control costs. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 607.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1988).
145. Daniel Byrd & Lester B. Lave, Significant Risk is Not the Antonym of De Minimis Risk, in DE
MINIMis RISK 54 (Chris Whipple ed. 1987) [hereinafter Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk].
146. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 267, 285-94 (discussing information needs of each phase). This
description is based most closely on rulemaking, the dominant procedural mode of the toxics statutes.
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potentially require a regulatory response under the terms of the underlying
statute. For toxic substances, this includes the identification of chemicals that
are likely to be carcinogens, regardless of toxic potency.'47 Second, an agency
must allocate its resources by setting priorities for regulatory action among the
hazards it has identified as within the congressional mandate. Ideally, of course,
this phase would involve an exhaustive assessment of risks and other fac-
tors. 48 However, the resources that this would require are so extravagant that
agencies set priorities with incomplete information. Third, the agency must
choose the appropriate regulatory response. It must determine the level of risk
reduction (stringency of control measures) that it wishes to achieve. Unlike
priority setting, this cannot be accomplished without a fairly detailed assessment
of health effects, technology, and cost. Fourth, the agency must enforce the
standards it sets.'49
Hazard identification corresponds to the predicate determination, and
regulatory response corresponds to the target level of risk. From this perspec-
tive, the reason that hazard identification and regulatory response are the
traditional locations for exercising congressional control is quite apparent. The
predicate and target are the two elements that Congress must specify if the
agency is to have any idea of what it is expected to do, but it can leave priority
setting and enforcement to agency discretion. Acknowledging this, the courts
treat priority setting as a type of enforcement (prosecutorial) discretion, and
they accord agencies great deference in both. 5 °
3. Risk Levels
For the purposes of either a predicate or a target, the possible regulatory
risk levels form a spectrum from zero to 100 per cent risk, that is, from abso-
lute safety to actual harm. In view of the impracticality of either extreme, the
task is to find an appropriate middle level of risk. 5' The essential goal is to
147. See Graham, supra note 60, at 142-44 (listing under Clean Air Act).
148. See Russell & Gruber, supra note 47, at 287-88 (recognizing this sequence and advocating early
use of quantitative risk assessment). Early use of quantitative risk assessment also causes delays in reaching
the standard-setting phase, for which EPA has been criticized. See GAO, DELAYS IN EPA's REGULATION
OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS 3-4, 17-18 (1983) [hereinafter GAO, DELAYS].
149. These phases are not, of course, neatly compartmentalized. Setting a low priority on a chemical
may mean that the agency will not address it in the foreseeable future, and that is the equivalent (for the
time being) of setting an extremely loose standard. Likewise, placing a high priority on a chemical may
encourage the agency to set a highly stringent standard for it. However, for analytical purposes it is helpful
to distinguish the various purposes for which an agency collects information and for which legal mandates
are imposed.
150. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985). This is discussed further in Part IV(B)
infra.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 15-42.
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encourage EPA to concentrate on real risks, those of sufficient seriousness to
justify the expenditure of significant social resources. 52
The nonzero levels range as follows, very roughly from most to least
protective of human health:'53
- A de minimis risk standard excludes from regulatory action only trivial
risks;
• An unreasonable risk standard is higher than a de minimis standard and
recognizes a compromise between safety and cost;
154
* A near-unreasonable risk standard is described by its authors, Cross,
Lave, and Byrd, as "discernible risk." It denotes a risk large enough that
actual harm could in theory be detected in a population of the size actually
exposed to the chemical; 5
- A lowest-feasible risk standard sets the permissible level of risk based on
the technological capacity of the relevant industry to reduce exposure. It
is usually but not necessarily less stringent than the above risk-based
standards;
- A cost-effectiveness risk standard considers cost to the extent of choice
among alternative methods for achieving a fixed level of safety;
152. The courts, too, emphasize "real risks." "ITihe only question is whether a reasonable man having
the knowledge and experience to be expected of the chief engineer of the Wagon Mound would have known
that there was a real risk of the oil on the water catching fire in some way .... Overseas Tankship (U.K.)
Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (Wagon Mound (No. 2)) (opinion of Lord Reid for the Privy
Council) (discussing proximate cause). The D.C. Circuit recently urged EPA not to require expensive cleanup
of a Superfund site where it was unclear whether the site "pose[d] any real risk to the public." B & B
Tritech, Inc. v. EPA, 957 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
153. See CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at §4 (spectrum of zero risk, significant risk, cost-benefit
balancing, feasibility); LOWRANCE, supra note 117, at 78-84; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 96-108
(describing a spectrum of absolute safety, lowest feasible risk, elimination of significant risk, balancing costs
and health benefits, and free market); LAVE, Strategy, supra note 35, at 19-25 (identifying eight "frame-
works"-market regulation, no-risk, feasibility based, risk-risk (i.e., comparative risk), risk-benefit, cost-
effectiveness, regulatory budget, and benefit-cost); Rodgers, Guerilla Decisionnaking, supra note 35, at
201-14 (cost oblivious, cost sensitive, cost effective, cost-benefit); Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Quality,
Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1983) [hereinafter McGarity, Balancing Strategies (describing a spectrum of zero-
risk, unreasonable or significant risk, cost-benefit, and feasibility statutes). Market-based risk levels are not
discussed here, as they are an alternative to traditional regulation and beyond the scope of this Article.
154. See Byrd & Lave, Narrowing, supra note 6, at 96-98; Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note
145, at 42-44. Byrd and Lave take issue with those who suggest that unreasonable and de minimis risk are
antonyms-that is, that the terms simply describe being above or below a particular level of risk. For
examples of the terms being used in this way, see U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 438 n.84
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Proposed Ban on the
Use of Methylene Chloride as an Ingredient of Aerosol Cosmetic Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,551, 51,557
(1985) (issued by FDA).
155. See Cross et al., supra note 27, at 81-87 (advocating this risk level).
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* A cost-benefit justification standard requires that the benefits of the
controls outweigh their costs. Followed literally, it would tolerate very risky
levels of a very useful chemical.
These levels vary in stringency, precision, and information demands. The
consideration of many factors makes for flexibility and more precise action, but
also requires greater regulatory resources.
B. The Proposal
My proposal emphasizes broad priority setting and seeks to balance agency
discretion and Congressional control. It has three parts. First, the unreasonable
risk standard, which currently dominates toxic substances control, is relaxed
as a predicate to regulatory action. It is replaced by the de minimis standard,
which gives EPA greater flexibility and eases its informational burden. Second,
reasonable (i.e., not-unreasonable) risk as the target of regulatory action is
loosened to give the agency the ability to choose to regulate more or less
stringently on the basis of relative cost-effectiveness or other considerations.
A statutory design that accomplishes this separation of predicate and target can
be found in the hazardous air pollutant control process of the pre-1990 Clean
Air Act. That process required EPA first to list chemicals under a low threshold
of risk (the predicate),'56 and then required the automatic imposition of very
stringent controls (the target).'57 Separating predicate and target allows the
agency the greatest flexibility to identify problems, and then to deal with them
appropriately. The pre-1990 Clean Air Act failed, however, because it nullified
the distinction between predicate and target by requiring that extremely rigorous
controls follow automatically from listing.'58 Since EPA could avoid unduly
burdensome targets only by exercising discretion not to list in the first place,
in most cases it took no action at all. The present proposal would maintain the
separation of target and predicate by relaxing both.
156. EPA must list a chemical which "may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious ... illness." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1988).
157. Emission limitations must be set "at the level which ... provides an ample margin of safety to
protect the public health .. " 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988).
158. See Graham, supra note 60, at 143-46 (distinguishing listing, requiring some action, and choosing
stringency of emission control); see also Byrd & Lave, Narrowing, supra note 6 (distinguishing standards
for deciding to regulate from "how far to go").
Shapiro and Glicksman studied these elements as constraints on agency action, which they characterize
as limiting "regulatory discretion"-whether to regulate-and "legislative discretion"--if so, how to regulate.
See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 50, at 822-23. They note that Congress has in many cases abandoned
its traditional "discretionary" model of maximum regulatory and legislative discretion, in favor of models
that control one or the other, or both. Deadlines, for example, control regulatory discretion (when to regulate)
but preserve legislative discretion (how to regulate). Listing provisions like the Clean Air Act grant
discretion in when to act but leave little discretion in stringency. Congress regularly attempts to control both.
Id., at 824-40. Shapiro and Glicksman are critical of rigid constraints and recommend that the courts take
a more active role in policing residual agency discretion.
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To offset the greater flexibility given EPA for individual risks, and to ensure
that EPA uses its flexibility wisely and aggressively, the proposal imposes
controls on the agency's discretion in the otherwise unregulated priority-setting
phase of the regulatory process. Setting priorities requires an agency to take
a longer view than it does in applying a legal standard to a particular activity
on a case-by-case basis. It encourages the agency to articulate a comprehensive
ordering of its responsibilities and requires the agency to justify its actions in
terms of that ordering. Setting priorities, in a word, requires planning, and
requiring agencies to set priorities means requiring them to develop plans which
form the basis for regulatory action.
The requirement to plan, however, is inadequate in itself. EPA already does
plan on its own, but its planning lacks congressional direction. 159 Therefore,
Congress should require EPA to develop, in advance of regulating, a multi-year
plan of action based on criteria established by statute. It must be more than a
regularly updated list of existing priorities. 6' The plan would instead describe
the risk reduction activities that EPA proposes, identifying both the subjects
of regulatory action and the order in which it plans to act. It would explain its
choices in terms of the criteria Congress directed. For example, if the principal
criteria were risk, cost, and cost-effectiveness, EPA might explain that it plans
to order modest but inexpensive controls on chemical A to permit it to use
other resources to pursue chemical B. Or it might choose to defer for the
present action on chemical C-whose risks are fairly modest due to low,
generally avoidable exposure-in favor of chemical D-whose risk is better
understood and will consume far fewer information resources. Other factors
may well be thought equally or more important, and Congress would have to
specify the precise factors it deems relevant and their relative weight in setting
priorities.
In terms of procedure, the plan would be subject to public comment before
being finalized. In addition, it would be subject to judicial review (probably
on an expedited basis) to ensure compliance with congressional guidance and
minimum rationality. (It would also, obviously, be subject to Congressional
revision by legislation.) Finally, the plan would be binding during the period
of its operation. All regulatory actions would have to conform to the plan,
except for emergencies or significant new information.' 6'
159. See Fiorino, supra note 96, at 86, 88.
160. Hornstein criticizes proposals for annual updating: "Such a fluid system [would exacerbate] a
problem that already plagues government-induced technological innovation," that is, constant changes. See
Homstein, supra note 3, criticizing annual updating proposed in SAB, REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at
app. B, p. 58.
161. These exceptions are clearly manageable by the courts. Courts have routinely determined whether
or not a workplace hazard is an emergency or not. See infra note 378 and accompanying text.
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C. Analysis
1. The Regulatory Predicate: De Minimis Risk
The function of the predicate in any regulatory structure is to identify the
hazards of concern to Congress. To ensure that important risks are not over-
looked or summarily passed over because of uncertainty, the predicate risk level
should be low and easily demonstrated. As a predicate or threshold for regula-
tory controls, the unreasonable risk standard has been a failure. It has imposed
huge information demands, invited contention and judicial intervention, and
thwarted regulatory action. A risk standard that tries to measure a complex and
incompletely understood human health effect like cancer, that considers cost
and several other factors, that must do all of this for each chemical that it
wishes to control-and must do so with relative precision-makes enormous
information and resource demands on the regulator. Where the agency has the
burden of proof, the uncertainty of all of these elements leads to regulatory
paralysis, especially in the face of a well-financed opposition and critical courts.
The ineffectiveness of OSHA is legendary.'62 In fifteen years TSCA has
produced only a handful of rules and test rules, which the GAO attributes in
part to the unreasonable risk standard. 63 Deadlines for toxic water pollutants
are still being litigated."6 The Superfund program is subjected to constant
criticism for being big on cost and small on cleanup.'65 The 1984 amend-
ments to RCRA were a welter of deadlines designed to get the stalled program
on its feet. Congress, exasperated by the almost complete lack of progress on
air toxics in two decades, abandoned risk for technology-based standards in the
1990 amendments to the Act. 166 The basic problem of toxic substances is an
information problem. Information demands will always be high for toxic
substances, but the unreasonable risk standard aggravates the problem by
making the threshold almost unreachable.
The nonzero standard giving EPA the greatest predicate flexibility is de
minimis risk. "[E]ssentially a threshold concept" in any event, 167 de minimis
risk makes any real risk fair game for some level of agency action without
162. See Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA, supra note 6.
163. GAO, TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 98; David Roe, Barking up the Right Tree: Recent Progress
in Focusing the Toxics Issue, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 275, 279 (1988).
164. See Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL.
L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10528, 10559-560 (1991). See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (D.D.C. No.
89-0598) (June, 18 1991). A proposed consent degree was recently filed. See Proposed Consent Decree
Filed; EPA, EDF Settle Megadeadline Suit, 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 523 (June 28, 1991).
165. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMING CLEAN-SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN
BE SOLVED (1990).
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1991); see also Cross, Beyond Benzene, supra note 24, at 11, n.49; GAO,
DELAYS, supra note 148.
167. Fiskel, De Minimis Risk: From Concept to Practice, in DE MINIMIS RISK 3-4 (Chris Whipple ed.,
1987).
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further proof of the seriousness of the problem. The place for balancing is in
calibrating response, not in identifying the hazard at the beginning of the
process. A good internal priority setting scheme would obviate the need to
invoke de minimis risk, but if it fails, de minimis risk provides some assurance
of minimally rational agency priorities by cutting off further consideration of
a chemical that poses no real concern.'68 Even if it were so inclined, the
agency should not be permitted to spend scarce informational, agency, or social
resources to remedy trivial risks. EPA has consistently found the need to use
de minimis thresholds,'69 and the courts have readily inferred the agency's
power to ignore de minimis risk for just this reason. 70 Thus, de minimis risk
does not tie the agency to a particular value judgment and elaborate quantifi-
cation, but it also does not allow the agency to act improvidently.
An authoritative numerical definition of de minimis risk does not exist, and.
achieving one is probably undesirable."' Quantification of de minimis risk
(say, at 1/1,000,000) would imply a degree of precision that is unrealistic and
extremely expensive."' 2 Unquantified, however, de minirnis is a widely ac-
cepted idea. It derives from a maxim that courts have applied in many con-
texts. "'73 It has been variously described as "trivial,"' 174 "negligible,"' 5 or
"below regulatory concern."' 6  It is an absolute concept-very small risks,
like being hit by a meteor-and also a comparative one-a small increase
168. See Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note 110, at 55; Chris Whipple, Application of the De
Minimis Concept in Risk Management, in DE MINIMIs RISK 16-17 (Chris Whipple ed., 1987); Donnelly,
Implications of De Minimis Risk Concepts for OSHA, in DE MINIMIs RISK, supra, at 96-97.
169. See Cross, Beyond Benzene, supra note 24, at 17-36. FDA also soughtto adopt a de minimis
predicate under the Delaney Clause for this reason. See Merrill, Delaney, supra note 20, at 41-43; see also
Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988) (noting the
uniqueness of the Delaney Clause's rejection of a de minimis standard).
170. The courts have generally been willing to allow agencies the flexibility, regardless of statutory
language, "to overlook circumstances that in context may fairly be considered de minimis." Alabama Power
Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Clean Air Act). See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 639; Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 276-77 (1968) (excluding de
minimis agreements); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 786-87 (1968) (excluding small gas
producers from overall restrictions); Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (defining
"food additive" to avoid application of Delaney Clause).
171. One can find a very wide range of risk levels used for this purpose. See Cross, Beyond Benzene,
supra note 24, at 12-44; see also Byrd & Lave, Narrowing, supra note 6, at 98-99 (collecting levels).
172. See Floumoy, supra note 12, at 18, 41-43, 47 nn. 50-52, 54 (criticizing use by courts and Congress
of standard, binary burdens of proof); Latin, Toxic Health Risks, supra note 35, at 381-383; Rodgers,
Benefits, Costs, and Risks, supra note 117, at 221-22 (criticizing Fifth Circuit decision in Benzene).
173. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 626-30
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing degree of interference required to maintain private nuisance action); Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (search and seizure); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977)
(procedural due process).
174. See Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note 46, at 42 (de minimis risk is "socially trivial").
175. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC AND REGULATORY ISSUES UNDERLYING PESTICIDE USE PATTERNS
AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION, BOARD ON AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCILJNATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX 12-14 (1988)
(1/1,000,000); 53 Fed. Reg. 41,104 (1988).
176. "Below Regulatory Concern" Policy Issues Addressed by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 21
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1984 (Mar. 8, 1991).
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above background risk, for example, may be trivial.'77 Agencies support de
minimis exceptions as a way to avoid expending resources on the trivial,'78
and courts are willing to infer from seemingly absolute environmental statutory
requirements an unquantified de minimis threshold.'79 Accordingly, a de
minimis risk standard should provide flexibility at the predicate, assure at least
minimal rationality in the selection of regulatory actions, and reduce the
administrative costs of initially proceeding.
2. The Stringency of Control: Discernible Risk
a. The Dangers of an Inflexible Target
A rationalist axiom holds that a decisionmaker should have before it a
sufficiently broad array of considerations, techniques, and risk levels to enable
it to make efficient, sensible decisions. 80 EPA therefore needs the flexibility
to impose stringent controls on toxic substances, or not, as its overall plan
dictates. (The Delaney Clause, which entirely bans any substance that is found
to cause cancer in animals or humans, figures prominently in the technocratic
demonology.') As previously described, the pre-1990 Clean Air Act failed
to distinguish the separate functions of the target and predicate by making the
stringent target level of regulation automatically follow the very low threshold
for listing. As a result, it overregulated, especially in terms of absolute cost and
of the opportunity cost of other regulatory activities.'82 In many cases, it does
177. See Byrd & Lave, Narrowing, supra note 6, at 96.
178. See, e.g., Merrill, Delaney, supra note 20, at 9-41 (describing FDA's efforts to apply a de minimis
exception to the Delaney Clause); EPA Asks for Rehearing, Clarification on Mixture, Derived-From Rules,
22 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 2175 (Jan. 24, 1992) (reporting that EPA is in the process of drafting a de minimis
rule for certain RCRA provisions). FDA's efforts under the Delaney Clause were rebuffed by the D.C.
Circuit. The court recognized the sense and precedent for a de minimis rule, but it found that Congress
intended the law to be "extraordinarily rigid." Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
179. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (interpreting the
Clean Air Act ambient air quality standards).
180. It is very important to be able to select from a variety of regulatory techniques-e.g., emission
limits, required control technology, warnings, penalties, or marketable permits-but that is another subject.
This Article considers only risk levels and the considerations that should go into their establishment.
181. See, e.g., SuNsThIN, RIoHTs REVOLUTION, supra note 68, at 88-89.
182. See Graham, supra note 60, at 145-46. Dwyer discusses in detail the reasons that the agency
should be empowered to reinterpret the statute, despite its apparently clear cost-oblivious language. See
Dwyer, supra note 74, at 282-315.
In the Vinyl Chloride case, supra note 142, the D.C. Circuit rejected EPA's attempt to use feasibility
(ultimately, a cost issue) to limit § 112 of the pre-1990 Clean Air Act. In response, EPA testily asserted
that it was nearly impossible "to consider whether a risk is acceptable without at the same time considering
benefits of the activity causing the risk, feasibility of control, or other factors that EPA (or anyone) would
normally consider in deciding whether a risk was 'acceptable."' See National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. §61 (1988); see also id. at 28,512 (emphasizing the broad spectrum
of considerations appropriate, including cost and feasibility). Clearly, then, EPA wanted to have more
discretion to consider cost than the D.C. Circuit was willing to provide. See Dwyer, supra, at 274.
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not make sense to demand that the agency, having embarked on regulation of
a particular substance, go all the way to making it "safe," regardless of the
marginal cost. As a general rule, the marginal cost of control increases with
the degree of control."8 3 Increasing incremental cost of control means that at
some point increasing stringency becomes more expensive than it is worth in
terms of lives saved-it is no longer cost-effective.' The agency also loses
the opportunity to concentrate its resources on other problems.
Overregulation, paradoxically, can also result in inefficient underregulation,
which is in fact what happened under the Clean Air Act. EPA attempted (in
sequence) to insert economic factors, to adopt a best available technology
(BAT) standard, to rewrite the statute to accept feasibility, and finally to delay
and review-all to avoid listing."85 One delaying tactic was to insist on exces-
sive amounts of information before acting and to analyze the data endlessly,
a grotesquely wasteful use of limited resources. 186 In essence, EPA simply
refused to list anything that it was not prepared in effect to ban.'87 Not only
did this shift attention away from the standard-setting process where the
necessary risk-cost-benefit trade-offs could publicly be debated,'88 it also
meant that most hazardous air pollutants were not regulated at all (only seven
standards were promulgated two decades after the original Clean Air Act was
enacted). This result is perverse: aggregate pollution increased because the
stringency required for each pollutant was too great.189 Finally, overregulation
distorts the allocation of resources toward depth over breadth in coverage. There
is always a trade-off between depth and breadth in tackling an area of regula-
tion, but overly stringent standards ignore the very real possibility that breadth
183. See ACKERMAN ET AL., UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 62, at 91 (giving data for water pollution
control); Joyce P. Davis, The Feasibility of Establishing a De Minimis Level of Radiation Dose and a
Regulatory Cut-off Policy for Nuclear Regulation, in DE MINIMIs RISK 145, 194 (Chris Whipple ed., 1987);
Lave, Better Decisions, supra note 67, at 291 n.3.
184. See Lave, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 19-20, 30, 86; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 105; see
also ACKERMAN ET AL., UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 62, at 91-93 (discussing pollution-control cost
curve).
185. See Dwyer, supra note 74, at 250-81; Graham, supra note 60, at 116-39; GAO, DELAYS, supra
note 148, at 43-44. EPA itself has said as much. See EPA Hazardous Air Pollutant Strategy (Fourth Draft),
reprinted in 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1633 (Jan. 21, 1983).
186. See GAO, HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, supra note 185, at 11, 17-18; Graham, supra note 60,
at 116-23, 130-32; Dwyer, supra note 74, at 277-82. Merrill has noted the same tendency to overstudy a
problem when faced with the stringency of the Delaney Clause. See Merrill, Delaney, supra note 20, at 76.
187. See CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 104-07; Dwyer, supra note 74. Put another way, stringency
at the target stage can overcome stringency at the priority-setting stage. GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at
111-12.
188. See SUNSTEN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 68, at 91 (pointing out that even the most cost-
oblivious statute can have cost injected through prosecutorial discretion).
189. John Mendeloff first documented this phenomenon at OSHA. See MENDELOFF, supra note 110;
see also SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 68, at 106-07; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 111 -
12; Cross et al., supra note 27, at 64-65.
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might generate greater overall risk reduction. 9 At the very least, EPA ought
to consider this option.
Similarly, a mandatory best available control technology (BAT) target"'
would be flawed. Its critics assert that while feasibility is a cost consideration,
it is cost at the outer limits: any cost may be imposed as long as it is not
prohibitive.'92 Therefore, "[g]iven the immense task of protecting the environ-
ment on a limited public and social budget and given the large number of
important problems that receive little attention, the waste of resources inherent
in any strict BAT approach would seem unwise."' 93 In relative terms, too,
BAT standards focus on the financial soundness of the industry (to a struggling
industry, a relatively low control cost is prohibitive), creating irrational dispari-
ties in safety levels. 94 This reveals a deeper flaw in the BAT approach: it
is merely a surrogate, and not necessarily an accurate one, 95 for the underly-
190. Mendeloff and Sunstein are most persuasive in cases of gross overregulation leading to gross
underregulation, i.e., extremely stringent targets leading to no regulatory action. That outcome occurred under
the pre-1990 Clean Air Act. Shapiro and McGarity strongly dispute the existence of the overregulation-
underregulation paradox in the context of OSHA. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So
Paradoxical. The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 730-39 [hereinafter
Shapiro & McGarity, Technology-Based Regulation].
191. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 37, at 1335 (describing BAT targets); see also CROSS,
CANCER, supra note 6, at 90-95, 146-47 (advocating use of feasibility tests in regulation). For examples
of statutes requiring BAT, see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(1)(C) (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316(a)(l) (1988). EPA attempted to use it to replace the zero-risk standard for air toxics, but was rebuffed
in the Vinyl Chloride case, supra note 142. Congress adopted it for toxics (in the guise of maximum achiev-
able control technology, taking cost into account) as an interim standard in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1991).
192. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra note 35, at 1335-40, 1359-62; Graham, supra note
60, at 138-39; see also LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 131 (criticizing 90% across-the-board reduction
in emissions by cars for failing to recognize differences in abatement costs among pollutants).
In 1984, OMB undertook a lengthy critique of the use of BAT in EPA's standards for air emissions
of inorganic arsenic and radionuclides. It argued that BAT is too inflexible, principally because it fails to
consider wide variations in the risk reduction effects of its application. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, EPA's STANDARD-SETrING FOR ToxIc POLLUTANTS (1983), reprinted in 14 ENv'T REP. (BNA)
1594 (1984). OMB's alternative strategy was to set a mandatory marginal cost for control and apply it across
the board. DeMuth Favors Sending Air Act Proposals to Congress, Working on New Cancer Policy, 13
ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1574, 1575 (Jan. 14, 1985). This idea has superficial appeal, since it addresses the
marginal cost curve, but it suffers from the same rigidity as feasibility analysis. The only difference is that
it sets the cut-off at a lower cost.
193. Russell & Gruber, supra note 47, at 287. Other observers comment:
A BAT strategy is inconsistent with intelligent priority setting. Simply regulating to the hilt
whatever pollutants happen to get on the regulatory agenda may preclude an agency from dealing
adequately with more serious problems that come to scientific attention later.
Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra note 35, at 1337; see also Graham, supra note 60, at 138-40. But
see Latin, Good Science, supra note 35, at 106-07.
194. See Albert L. Nichols, Comparing Risk Standards: The Superiority of a Benefit-Cost Approach,
14 REGULATION 85, 87-88 (1991).
195. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra note 35, at 1353 (criticizing BAT standard for
focussing on "arcane" questions of technology); ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 103 (criticizing
EPA's overly technical approach); Christopher H. Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens,
If Feasibility Analysis is the Answer, What is the Question, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1488-1504 (1990)
(reviewing CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6) [hereinafter Schroeder, Manmade Carcinogens].
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ing trade-off of health versus cost.'96 BAT standards can be justified only by
lesser demands for information and other resources, 197 without which there
seems little reason to depart from health concerns. Technology-based regulation
may well be a realistic and effective second-best solution, 9g and EPA would
be free to adopt it in a particular case under the proposal's flexible target, but
it should not be the target for all toxic risks.
b. Discernible Risk as the Presumptive Target
As with the predicate, placing some limit on agency target-setting discretion
seems desirable. Instead of being the extent to which a risk must be reduced,
the target should be "the maximum extent to which a selected risk should be
reduced."' 99 The target, then, would be presumptive in the sense that it is
aspirational. 2°° First, a fixed target is prey to the very demands for precision
that have plagued unreasonable risk. Under unreasonable risk, the agency must
prove that it has met and not exceeded the target. Even a presumptive target,
of course, leaves open the possibility of challenge based on excessive strin-
gency. This seems unlikely to occur, but to the extent that it does, the risk of
such litigation is outweighed by a second benefit of a presumptive target: a
presumptive target gives the agency direction and a mandate to take vigorous
protective action. At the target stage, total flexibility raises the possibility of
underregulation which endangers public health. A presumptive target indicates
the level of risk that in Congress' judgment appropriately balances risk and
cost, all other things being equal. It is not utopian to suggest a long-term goal
of largely eliminating involuntary toxic risks, and that goal should not be lost.
In the meantime, however, scarce resources require a thoughtful, incremental
approach.
The presumptive target should be "discernible risk," the level of risk that
scientific evaluation concludes would result in actual injury to the group
196. Shapiro and McGarity argue that there is a normative, moral imperative "that workers do have
a right to insist that employers 'do the best they can' to protect human health." Shapiro & McGarity,
Technology-Based Regulation, supra note 190, at 743-44.
197. See Shapiro & McGarity, Technology-Based Regulation, supra note 190, at 744-51; McGarity,
Balancing Strategies, supra note 153, at 159, 206-08. This claim is disputed in Sanford E. Gaines, Science,
Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks Through Law, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 271, 299-303 (1990);
Schroeder, Manmade Carcinogens, supra note 195; James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case
for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985).
198. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1991) (adopting a preliminary
technology-based air toxics standard, to be superseded by a risk-based standard).
199. Baram, supra note 70, at 3 (emphasis added) (using the term "risk limit").
200. "Presumptive" ought not be construed to impose upon EPA a strict burden of proving that the
target should not be met. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(holding that EPA has the burden of showing that a pesticide registration proposed for cancellation after
a lengthy hearing should not also be immediately suspended).
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actually exposed.20 Discernible risk denotes the risk level at which the life-
time individual risk of death as a function of the potential number of deaths
(basically, the size of the exposed population) is sufficiently high that a statisti-
cally significant elevation in risk above background could be observed.2"2 It
is a real risk: "a risk that is large enough to be observed is nontrivial and
deserves attention.""2 3 To require actual observation of an injury-to say
nothing of being able to trace it back to the chemical in a particular case-is
highly unrealistic given the present state of the science of epidemiology and
the lack of adequate data; consequently, the effect must be observable in
principle only.' 4 Discernible risk is not particularly forgiving in terms of
information demands, though it does a far better job of coping with the uncer-
tain nature of the relevant data than does unreasonable risk. Nevertheless, its
data demands are ameliorated by its use in the context of a target-EPA need
not prove that it has achieved this specific level of risk reduction.
Discernible risk is particularly appropriate in the context of allocation of
scarce resources. It accentuates the number of persons actually exposed to a
substance, rejecting the dominance of theoretical individual risk as the basis
for regulation. "Identifying any risk, especially significant risk, has its basis in
the physical concept of a manifest, observable, or detectable event,"2 5 When
control resources are limited, risks that pose a real likelihood of actual harm
(though not to an identifiable individual) have a much stronger claim on
society's resources than inchoate personal risks. The D.C. Circuit recently urged
EPA to remove from the National Priorities List a Superfund site because,
although it met the legal requirements for placement on the National Priorities
List, there remained doubt that the site "poses any real risk to the public."2 6
In addition, discernible risk is essentially a comparative tool: statistical signifi-
cance is necessarily an operation that tries to sort excess from background
201. See Cross et al., supra note 27, at 83-85; see also Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note 46,
at 48.
202. The greater the exposed population, the greater the ability to discern small, statistically significant
increases in risk. Similarly, the more that the disease is a signature for a particular chemical, the easier it
will be to find causality, regardless of population. See Cross et al., supra note 27, at 83-84.
203. See Byrd & Lave, Narrowing, supra note 6, at 96-97; see also Cross et al., supra note 27, at 83-
85.
204. An effect is observable in priciple if it is large enough that it could be observed if the necessary
data were available. See Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note 46, at 48; Byrd & Lave, Narrowing,
supra note 6, at 96.
205. See Cross et al., supra note 27, at 81.
206. B & B Tritech, Inc. v. EPA, 957 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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risks,2 ° 7 and a discernible risk is large enough to be realistically measurable
against other risks.
208
3. Directed Priority Setting
It only remains to supply some way to structure the choice among real risks
and the decision to deviate from the presumptive target. Clearly, the tension
between discretion and direction cannot be resolved through the simple choice
of the "right" predicate or target level of risk. No simple set of words-like
"unreasonable risk"--can accomplish this balance.20 9 As -long as we focus
on the predicate and the target, we are faced with the discretion-direction
dilemma discussed above.210 We must therefore look elsewhere in the regula-
tory process. The present proposal already decrees discretion for predicate
(hazard identification) and target (regulatory response), so priority setting and
enforcement are left as possible locations for exercising congressional control.
Enforcement is clearly inappropriate: it comes at the end of the whole process,
so control at ihat point would be inefficient at best and probably wholly ineffec-
tive. Priority setting, on the other hand, is ideally located to provide direction
for the rest of the process. Even more importantly, priority setting directly
207. Byrd and Lave rightly point out that, at the individual level, no excess death can be considered
"trivial," but that perspective would require regulation (without more) of one excess death in a population
of a million which is already exposed to many, many other causes of death. See Byrd & Lave, Narrowing,
supra note 6, at 96.
208. See Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note 46, at 48. Byrd, Lave, and Cross emphasize the
priority-setting aspect of discernible risk. See Cross et al, supra note 27, at 85 ("On the other hand, a
maximum of one case per year in a population of 260 million is negligible and regulation of such risks
would waste important resources in controlling substances that present little or no risk." (emphasis added));
see also Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note 46, at 54-57 (making observable risk part of a priority-
setting process based on cost-effectiveness); Byrd & Lave, Narrowing, supra note 6, at 93, 99 ("We propose
that priorities be set by first giving attention to the situations estimated to cause the greatest number of
deaths.").
This account does not reflect all of the dimensions of the discernible risk concept. Its authors emphasize
the importance of considering other "currencies" of risk such as average lifetime risk and maximum lifetime
risk, as well as degree of scientific certainty, presumed accuracy of exposure estimates, context, and type
of restriction contemplated. See Cross et al., supra note 27, at 73-75, 86-87. Its application, in consequence,
depends on the availability of adequate quantification of risk and of data concerning the various currencies
of risk and other relevant factors. See Byrd & Lave, Narrowing at 100. Since the authors of discernible risk
intend it to be a minimum level for post-regulation risk and not a presumptive target, this complexity may
be justified. For our purposes, however, a simplified version must suffice.
209. The target-setting aspect tends to overwhelm priority-setting. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note
6, at 111-14 ("Only the significant risk doctrine addresses priority setting and standard setting simultaneous-
ly, and it does so ... in a highly elusive way." Id. at 114).
210. Shapiro and Glicksman present four models of delegated power, but they are variations on
flexibility and control in these two phases only. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 158, at 821-45.
Likewise, Stewart's four alternative responses to inactive agencies focus on the standard-setting stage:
deregulation, a revived nondelegation doctrine, structuring agency discretion, and providing substantive rules
for exercising agency discretion. See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 53, at 1688-711. His third alternative,
structuring administrative discretion by requiring "that it be exercised in accordance with consistently applied
general rules," could be applied outside of the identification and response phases. While Stewart dismisses
this approach as impractical in the context of standard setting, id. at 1698-1702, it is worth another look.
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addresses allocation of scarce resources, the fundamental problem that regula-
tors face. Control of priority setting can force public debate on critical alloca-
tion decisions, it can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory
regime, and it can reduce informational demands.
a. Scarcity
Confronted with more regulatory demands than they can possibly manage,
regulators must choose which risks to address first, which later, and which not
at all. Regardless of differences in the actual criteria they advocate, virtually
all observers of actual regulatory programs agree that a consistent, systematic
approach to priorities is essential to good regulation.2 ' At a minimum, regula-
tors must avoid paralysis in the face of competing demands for attention.
Without clear priorities, they are likely to shift focus constantly, disperse their
forces, and fail to accomplish much. They may ignore long-term problems in
favor of passing concerns, 2 or approach serious health risks incrementally,
narrowly, or haphazardly. The important hazard ignored at the outset may never
be revisited. From this perspective, simply being systematic about priorities is
as important as anything else in managing very limited resources.213 Several
commentators, in fact, advocate early review of agency plans for various
considerations. 24 Lack of authoritative guidance when faced with scarcity and
conflicting goals leaves the agency with nothing but its expertise, which by
itself is an uncertain guide.215
b. Legitimacy
The current approach to priority setting is justly criticized as unaccountable.
Congress imposes tasks, goals, standards, and deadlines that it knows EPA and
industry cannot meet, so the inevitable choices among risks are conducted
outside of the formally established regulatory process and without meaningful
211. For studies of specific programs, see Merrill, Cancer-Causing Chemicals, supra note 38, at 111-14;
Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 6, at 15-20 (OSHA); Dorfman, supra note 99, at 16-17 (FIFRA); Merrill,
CPSC Regulation, supra note 6, at 1304-09, 1360-65; GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 34-37, 200-01
(studies of regulation of benzene and formaldehyde); see also CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 138-42;
Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note 46, at 54-57; LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 6, 129.
212. See Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA, supra note 6, at 18-20.
213. "Muddling through," or trial and error, is not an appropriate response to toxic substances. See
Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at 1107-08; Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 507-08; Diver, supra note 54;
see also LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 86 (global view); FISCHHOFF ET AL.,. supra note 60, at 54,
154-55 (importance of .comprehensiveness).
214. See Floumoy, supra note 12, at 49 (pre-regulation look at plans); id. at 52 (principles or values);
see also Ralph A. Luken & Lyman H. Clarke, How Efficient Are EPA's Regulations?, 20 ENVTL. L. REP.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10419, 10423 (1990) (strategic planning).
215. See Fortuna, supra note 126, at 884-89 (congressionally established presumptions intended to cure
problem of too much discretion under pre-1984 RCRA).
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statutory direction." 6 Exercising control over priority setting would force
Congress and administrative agencies to face up to the real problem of scarcity
and to make the hard choices among risks to regulate." 7 Instrumentally,
explicit consideration reveals conflicts among goals and exposes the allocational
issues and value choices to public debate, both of which improve analysis.218
Beyond improved decisionmaking, explicit consideration of priorities is
essential to the legitimacy of agency choices in a democratic society. Alloca-
tional choices are ultimately Congress' to make. They involve fundamental
trade-offs, as Justice Rehnquist's Benzene concurrence pointed out.2"9 They
are in the broadest sense political choices about winners and losers.220 If
Congress does not make these choices itself, it is incumbent upon it to provide
standards and to mandate a process that will permit oversight. Judge Wald has
remarked:
Most reformers ... assume that Congress is incapable of addressing
these issues when crafting new statutes. The fact remains, however, that
Congress is the primary lawmaker and the most logical source of
general principles ....
Planning can serve this function very well because it combines "elements
both of rational-comprehensive and of incremental decision making" by permit-
ting analysis of options on the basis of technocratic principles within a frame-
work of congressional commands. 222 Under post-New Deal statutes "the
agency had to define its goals in a highly visible way and recognize that
Congress would call it to account by a specific date if it found the agency's
performance unsatisfactory." 23 This builds public understanding and confi-
dence in the decisions which affect lives and health. 224 Moreover, a systemat-
216. See Dwyer, supra note 74, at 284; Schoenbrod, supra note 115, at 789; Tomlinson, supra note
38, at 201-04.
217. Several commentators have emphasized this virtue of an explicit priority-setting regime. See
ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, 1569-70; CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6; Lave, Environmental
Regulations, supra note 123, at 161-62; see also Dwyer, supra note 74 (symbolic legislation fails to face
up to hard issues); Schoenbrod, supra note 115 (goals statutes likewise fail).
218. See Fiorino, supra note 96, at 86-87. McGarity catalogs this and other virtues of regulatory
analysis in Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1258-71.
219. See Benzene, 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980).
220. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra note 35, at 1355, 1362; Guruswamy, supra note 10,
at 533; Thomas 0. McGarity, Risk and Trust, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10201-04 (1986)
(discussing role of quantitative risk assessment); see also LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 147, 174-77
(expertise does not answer fundamental political trade-offs).
221. Patricia M. Wald, The "New Administrative Law"-With the Same Old Judges in It?, 1991 DUKE
L.J. at 647-667 (arguing in favor of express indications by Congress of its position on de minimis excep-
tions, cost-benefit analysis, and the like).
222. See Fiorino, supra note 96, at 83, 88 (discussing risk-based planning).
223. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 9 (but expressing doubts that this occurs in
practice).
224. See Lave, Better Decisions, supra note 67, at 294; LOWRANCE, supra note 117, at 109-14.
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would call it to account by a specific date if it found the agency's performance
unsatisfactory." '223 This builds public understanding and confidence in the
decisions which affect lives and health."' Moreover, a systematic, coherent
approach provides an important indication that the laws are being applied fairly
and evenhandedly.225
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)226 illustrates the
point. Concededly, NEPA only indirectly requires planning among projects by
forcing an agency to pick and choose among the more destructive projects
likely to attract opposition. 27 Nor does it require reordering of agencies'
substantive priorities to favor environmental protection. 221 Nevertheless, it is
a model of open decisionmaking in the technocratic tradition.229 Public disclo-
sure230 of information sufficient to permit a reasoned choice23 1 and the iden-
223. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 9 (but expressing doubts that this occurs in
practice).
224. See Lave, Better Decisions, supra note 67, at 294; LOWRANCE, supra note 117, at 109-14.
225. See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 53, at 1698-1701 (concluding that formal justice in the sense
of specific rules is not obtainable).
226. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332 (1988).
227. See Wesley A. Magat & Christopher H. Schroeder, Administrative Process Reform in a Discretion-
ary Age: The Role of Social Consequences, 1984 DUKE L.J. 301, 320-21 & n. 69; SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING
BUREAUCRACIES THINK 147-66 (1984).
The substantive policy of NEPA is subject to flexible balancing with other nonenvironmental policies
of the agency involved (e.g., providing hydroelectric power or flood control). The procedures, however,
are mandatory and relatively inflexible. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
349-50 (1989); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm, v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-18
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
For analyses of the effect of NEPA litigation on projects, see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 391-99 (1990) (collecting data on NEPA litigation
through 1989); TAYLOR, supra, at 351-61 (analyzing earlier CEQ data for delay).
228. See Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 349-50; Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. NRDC,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (per curiam). At most, the substantive policies themselves require a balancing
process that includes consideration of environmental factors. See Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC,
462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1109.
229. See McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1260-62; Diver, supra note 54, at 414-17;
see generally TAYLOR, supra note 227 (advocating the adoption of "science-like" procedures to improve
environmental decisionmaking). But see Paul J. Culhane, NEPA 's Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated
and Unanticipated, 20 ENVTL. L. 681, 684-702 (1990) (contending that the NEPA process undermines
technocratic, rationalistic decisionmaking by overemphasizing planning at the expense of operations and
by inviting appropriate public intervention); Stark Ackerman, Observations on the Transformation of the
Forest Service: The Effects of National Environmental Policy Act on U.S. Forest Service Decision Making,
20 ENVTL. L. 703, 710-11 (1990) (taking same position as Culhane, and arguing that public intervention
is undesirable).
Rabin suggests that NEPA departed from the New Deal tradition of agency discretion by demanding
consideration of specific items. Rabin, supra note 51, at 1287. He is right about discretion, but the cure
offered is simply more analysis in the technocratic tradition-NEPA does not specify results. Several
commentators are skeptical of NEPA's effectiveness for precisely this reason: technocratic process is fine,
but it does n6t in itself assure environmentally sound decisions. See Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth
About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 239, 245-48 (1973) (focusing on NEPA and its application to airport
development); Culhane, supra, at 682-84 (noting the inconsistencies between rationalist decisionmaking and
public participation).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988); 40C.F.R. §§ 1502.19 (1991) (circulation of draft EIS), 1503.1
(inviting comments), 1506.6 (public involvement).
231. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (purpose of EIS); see also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th
Cir. 1982).
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and (2) give legitimacy to the decisionmaking process.233 First, NEPA's Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirement is a "springboard for public
comment, ' 234 both to correct and supply information.235 Therefore, partici-
patory planning and priority setting are means of "conveying practical informa-
tion instrumental to a technocratic choice. 236 Second, planning that is acces-
sible to and solicits the contributions of the public and its representatives pro-
vides political legitimacy for the regulatory process.237 It enhances "democrat-
ic" legitimacy by encouraging participation by any interested individual, group,
or business.238 It also enhances "republican" legitimacy by creating an open
process that is subject to review by the constitutional branches of government:
executive control by the Council on Environmental Quality and EPA, congres-
sional oversight to ensure that Congress' policies are actually. being implement-
ed or to alter policies that Congress decides are unwise, and judicial review to
ensure minimal rationality and consistency with legislative command.
Congress contemplated that the Impact Statement would constitute the
environmental source material for the information of the Congress as
well as the Executive, in connection with the making of relevant deci-
sions, and would be available to enhance the enlightenment of-and
by-the public.
2 39
at 93-166 (1984) (concluding that NEPA improves agency decisionmaking by facilitating examination of
many alternatives).
233. Glen Robinson distinguishes the "informing" and "political legitimacy" models of public
participation in agency proceedings. See ROBINSON, supra note 103, at 126-39 (1991). The functions of
planning described here closely follow Robinson's models.
234. See Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 349.
235. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753,770-72 (9th Cir. 1981); RoBINsoN supra note 103, at 130;
see also William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 59 n.82
(1975) (pointing out that different groups often have better knowledge of different aspects of a regulation).
1 236. See ROBINSON, supra note 103, at 130-21; see also McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note
61, at 1261-62 (discussing importance of information gathering to analytical rationality); PETER L. STRAUSS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 168 (1989) ("Most thoughtful
observers would concede that the problems of fact-finding in these portentous matters, typically complicated
by issues of modelling, scientific judgment, and projection, require a public procedure of some fullness and
visibility.").
It is basic administrative law that an agency must make full disclosure of its data and reasons to
facilitate meaningful public comment. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1030-31 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1977); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
237. See ROBINSON, supra note 103, at 131-36; Magat & Schroeder, supra note 227, at 323-24;
Culhane, supra note 229, at 701-02 (praising informational contributions of NEPA).
238. "The propagation of information and sustenance of debate can both improve agency evaluation
of a particular contemplated project, and nourish broad-based consideration of long term questions of the
balance to be struck between development and preservation and the means to effect that balance." Grazing
Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1074 (1st Cir. 1980). See Gary L. Larsen, Herbicides, the
Forest Service, and NEPA, EPA J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 38, 38-39 (describing use of NEPA as forum for
communication among government and citizens).
239. NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 829, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted). NRDC v. Morton held
that the Department of the Interior was not limited to alternatives within its power without further legislation
or the action of other agencies, because such alternatives are "within the purview of both Congress and the
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The Supreme Court has recognized that "the broad dissemination of information
mandated by NEPA permits [both] the public and other governmental agencies
to react to the effects of a proposed action at a meaningful time." Ultimate-
ly, where congressional control over the agency is clear, an electorate that feels
strongly that its values are not reflected in administrative action can make its
views known at the polls.
c. Efficiency
To the extent that inefficiency results from failure to allocate scarce resourc-
es wisely, priority setting is the logical place to encourage efficiency. At the
most basic level, appropriate allocation requires a kind of regulatory triage
distinguishing emergencies from the routine, and the routine from the marginal.
At the higher end of the risk spectrum, all of the toxics statutes expressly
require the agency to take special action where imminent threats are posed.'"
Not everything is or should be treated as a crisis. At the lower end, de minimis
(as opposed to zero) risk sets priorities between risks of regulatory concern and
those that are not.
A more sensitive priority-setting system allows EPA to consider additional
factors and degrees of risk, and to compare risks with one another. The mean-
ing of "worst" could be refined by emphasizing the likely number of actual
injuries 2 or the type of toxicity.243 EPA must decide where its efforts will
have the most effect to avoid squandering limited funds on relatively minor or
intractable problems. Put another way, EPA should first address the "most
President, to whom the Impact Statement goes." Id. at 835. See also TAYLOR, supra note 227, at 362-69
(concluding that congressional oversight, though sporadic, succeeds in conveying its concerns to the relevant
agencies).
240. See Marsh, supra, at 371; see also Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 349 (1989).
241. See, e.g., FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c) (1988) (suspension of registration of pesticide where
"imminent hazard"); OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1988) (emergency temporary standards where "employees
are exposed to grave danger from exposure to [toxic] substances"); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(I)(A) (1988)
(emergency actions against "imminently hazardous chemical substances"); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9696
(abatement of "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health ... because of an actual or
threatened release of a hazardous substance").
242. OSHA's 1980 Cancer Policy rejected quantitative risk assessment as a basis for regulation of non-
threshold toxics but accepted it for setting priorities. Even so, it placed the number of persons exposed and
levels of exposure at the head of its list of priority factors. See 29 C.F.R. § 1990.32 (1991). Only where
adequate risk data existed was it factored in. See Position on Use of Risk Assessment, Cost Effectiveness
Analysis, Benefit-Cost Review in Setting Standards for Toxic Air Pollutants, 14 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1594-95,
1605-07 (Jan. 13, 1984); Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens,
45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5256 (1980) (issued by OSHA); see also Cross et al., supra note 27, at 81-83 (emphasiz-
ing importance of predicted actual injury).
243. TSCA gives testing priority to chemicals "known to cause ... or which are suspected of
causing ... cancer, gene mutations, or birth defects." 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(1)(A)). Likewise,. EPA sets
reportable quantities for carcinogens under CERCLA §§ 9602(a) and 9603 based solely on toxicity. See
Reportable Quantity Adjustments, 40 C.F.R. § 117 (1991) (issued by EPA); see also Bruce N. Ames et al.,
Ranking, supra note 29, at 271 (using animal cancer tests to develop a numerical index as a guide to priority
setting).
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serious solvable" problems. 2 Even without perfect information, a compara-
tive process permits EPA to choose the most appropriate targets from a wide
selection.
d. Information
Efficiency has its own risks, one of which is the demand for excessive
amounts of information. Priority setting has implications for information
requirements in two ways: the resource demands of the regulatory program as
a whole, and the needs of the priority-setting process itself. A cornerstone of
the efficiency argument is the belief that priority setting can reduce information
demands by taking into account the availability and cost of information in
choosing whether, when, and to what level to regulate a particular chemi-
cal. 24 5 For example, an agency might confine its regulatory activities to the
chemicals about which it either possesses or can readily obtain the most
information. u 6 Where resources are scarce, costly reduction of risks is to be
avoided, regardless of whether the source of the cost is information or control
measures. On the basis of information alone, a regulatory process that empha-
sizes priority-setting will tend to focus on stronger effects which are easier to
discover, assess, and set levels for. Under a cost-effectiveness priority scheme,
244. See CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 139; see also EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 31, at 7, 27,
33-34; SAB, REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at 16, 19-20; GAO, LIMITED RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 24-
28; 1992 Budget Hearings, supra note 1, at 321-22 (testimony of Richard L. Hembra).
One scientist recommended these rules of thumb, which focus regulatory activity on both high risks
and low costs:
1) Eliminate any risk that carries no benefit or is easily avoided.
2) Eliminate any large risk (about I in 10,000 per year or greater) that does not carry clearly overriding
benefits.
3) Ignore for the time being any small risk (about 1 in 100,000 per year or less) that does not fall into
category 1.
4) Actively study risks falling between these limits ....
Cyril L. Comar, Risk: A Pragmatic De Minimis Approach, 203 SCIENCE 319 (1979). See also Sheldon
Meyers, Applications of De Minimis, in DE MINIMIS RISK 101 (Chris Whipple ed., 1987) (arguing that a
de minimis standard can exclude both low risks to an exposed population and expensive incremental further
reductions in risk).
245. See la L. Cote et al., The Hazardous Air Pollutant Prioritization System, in RISK ASSESSMENT
IN SEIrING NATIONAL PRIORIES 159, 160 (James J. Bonin & Donald E. Stevenson eds., 1989); Chris
Whipple, Application of the De Minimis Concept in Risk Management, in DE MINmIS RISK at 17-18 (Chris
Whipple ed., 1987) (failure to meet a de minimis standard can be a valid reason not to undertake a great
deal of research on a low-risk chemical).
246. Faced with the congressional deadlines imposed in the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act,
EPA first regulated the point sources about which it had most information. See Tomlinson, Statutory Time
Limits, supra note 38, at 223, 230; Merrill, Cancer-Causing Chemicals, supra note 38, at 121 (discussing
CPSC). Merrill expresses concern that this "me-too" approach would be demoralizing to the agency staff.
Id. See also REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 175, at 49 (giving high review priority to chemicals similar
to ones already studied under FIFRA because the analysis can be done more cheaply).
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it is unlikely that EPA would get beyond first-order priorities, at least in the
foreseeable future.
247
The process of setting priorities need not be extraordinarily information-
intensive. There is always a temptation to attempt to fine-tune priorities, and
it is true that setting priorities to maximize the agency's impact on risk requires
evaluation of exposure, toxicity, cost, and feasibility. 8 The National Aca-
demy of Sciences (NAS) study of regulatory information needs concluded that
"the knowledge needed for unerring selection of the most important chemicals
and tests is the same as the knowledge resulting from a complete and accurate
testing program for all chemicals." 9 The point, however is that "unerring
selection" is unnecessary, as NAS recognized. 50 The NAS priority-setting
calculus is carefully designed to operate on limited information for precisely
this reason."' Such "risk indexing systems" are simplified versions of risk
assessment, to be used where precision is impractical or not cost-effective. 2
Houck has suggested that Congress abandon its attempt to "fine tune" water
toxics control and simply set deadlines for total elimination of the pollutants
"based on relative risk. Science may not be able to set absolute risk numbers,
but it can identify categories of greater and lesser risk." '253 Even advocates
of quantitative risk assessment in priority setting are careful to warn that
establishing priorities should not be as elaborate as a full-blown quantitative
risk assessment.
If an agency had to complete a cost-effectiveness analysis for every
possible proposal, it might never finish and never be able to take ac-
tion. . .-. [The cure is the idea] of "agency best effort." An agency
should begin with a general consideration of which situations are likely
to rank near the top of the cost-effectiveness list .... Other situations
would be ignored, at least initially. Inevitably, there would be disagree-
247. See LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 26-27. Other prominent toxicologists have questioned
the scientific and social validity of our hunt for ever more subtle carcinogens. See Bruce N. Ames et al.,
Nature's Chemicals and Synthetic Chemicals: Comparative Toxicology, 87 PROc. NAT'L. ACAD. Sci. 7782,
7782 (1990) (criticizing current regulatory efforts which place relatively greater emphasis on synthetic
chemicals than natural toxins).
248. In short, the priority-setting process creates its own data gap. Applegate, supra note 12, at 291-94.
EPA has called for the generation of more toxicity and exposure information and additional study of
quantitative methods to aid priority-setting. See EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 2-3, 98-99;
see also EPA, REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at 8, 18.
249. ToxIcrrY TESTING, supra note 13, at 205, 211, 215-22.
250. ToXIcrrY TESTING, supra note 13, at 215-16, 223, 296; see also MENDELOFF, supra note 110,
at 152-54 (discussing NIOSH).
251. ToxicITy TESTING, supra note 113, at 207. The same is true of EPA's Hazardous Air Pollutant
Prioritization System. See Cote et al., supra note 245, at 159.
252. Gary R. Rosenblum & Steven A. Lapp, The Use of Risk Index Systems to Evaluate Risk, in RISK
ASSESSMENT IN SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES 190-93 (James J. Bonin and Donald E. Stevenson eds.,
1989). At the lowest levels of risk, no method of risk quantification is accurate, so overindulgence in depth
of analysis and precision of quantification are pointless. Id.
253. See Houck, supra note 164, at 10560.
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ments as to which items should be on the list. The notion would be that
outside groups could attempt to persuade an agency by their own data-
gathering or analysis effort. This process would tend to help an agency
by supplementing its resources, rather than divert it by stopping actions
until proposals had been analyzed. 54
In fact, because of the difficulties of quantitative risk assessment, priority
setting is the most appropriate use of the technique. OSHA's 1980 Cancer
Policy rejected quantitative risk assessment as a basis for regulation of non-
threshold toxics, but accepted it for setting priorities, in part because the
technique was insufficiently precise to determine what nonzero level of risk was
below regulatory concern.2 55
Estimates are entirely appropriate.256 If they are systematic, thoughtful,
and consistent, best-guesses would be a major improvement over present
practices.7 Some observers of OSHA, for example, have recommended a
"committee" system for setting priorities, which incorporates available quantita-
tive data but relies principally on the experience and judgment of its mem-
bers. 8 EPA's Unfinished Business study declared itself "not analytically pure
but ... judgmentally correct and unlikely to be far wrong." '259 This seems
an appropriate standard for priority setting. It recognizes that the agency's
knowledge and experience in the field is manifested not only in its ability to
254. Byrd & Lave, Significant Risk, supra note 46, at 56-57; see also Martin R. Siegel, Integrating
Public Health Into Superfund: What Has Been the Impact of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry?, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. I. Inst.) 10,013 (1990) (arguing that toxicology profiles based on
incomplete information are adequate for ranking Superfund sites). Likewise, the Hazard Ranking System
(HRS) for Superfund sites, "provides a measure of relative rather than absolute risk.... [Tlhus, [it] is not
designed to be used as a quantitative risk assessment." Hazard Ranking System, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,963-64
(citing H.R. CONp. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-200 (1986) (conference report on SARA)).
255. Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg.
5002, 5240-41,5256 (1980) (issued by OSHA). EPA's views were similar. See National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Procedures for Identifying, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne
Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,646-49 (1979) (issued by EPA); Scientific
Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks; Request for Comments on Report,
44 Fed. Reg. 39,858, 39,871-72 (1979) (issued by Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group).
Similarly, McGarity concludes that, in view of informational and methodological limitations, regulatory
analysis (informed by comprehensive analytical rationality) is more appropriate for developing options and
setting priorities than for choosing the level of stringency. See McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note
61, at 1298-99, 1331-32; see also Latin, Good Science, supra note 35, at 95-98 (tracing quantitative risk
assessment at EPA); Leape, supra note 37, at 108-13 (recommending use of quantitative risk assessment
for rough priority classifications but not for setting standards).
256. See Lave, Better Decisions, supra note 6, it 292-93; see also LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35,
at 28 (partial quantification preferable to none).
257. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 200-01; CROSS, CANCER, supra note 6, at 80, 132-42; Rosen-
blum & Lapp, supra note 252, at 183; Baram, Comparative Risk, supra note 70, at 8; Shapiro & McGarity,
Reorienting OSHA, supra note 6, at 22. One commentator points out that the inconsistent application of
risk assessment across programs distorts priorities. Richard B. Belzer, The Peril and Promise of Risk
Assessment, 14 REGULATION 40, 47-48 (1991). One advantage of the interprogram priority setting that I
recommend is encouragement of consistent risk assessment.
258. See Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA, supra note 6, at 22-24.
259. EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 2.
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develop and perform an analytical calculus for ranking concerns, but also in
its intuitive judgments about importance and significance.260 Otherwise, prior-
ity setting differs little from standard setting. Since priority setting occurs early
in the regulatory process, the agency's decision does not in itself affect busi-
nesses and society, so that imprecision is less wasteful. If further review at the
standard-setting stage indicates a greater or lesser cause for concern, the risk
limit can be adjusted accordingly.26'
The foregoing arguments for using priority setting to direct agency action
parallel the four critiques of the technocratic approach in Part II. This is no
coincidence: the Article suggests that directed priority setting would improve
technocratic decisionmaking. The historical and rationalist critiques are met
because setting priorities combats agency inaction by confronting the central
problem of scarcity. Since setting priorities is an inevitable agency activity, the
democratic critique demands that the process be open and subject to majori-
tarian influence. The rationalist critique demands efficiency, and it is clear that
failure to address priorities in a systematic way has inefficient consequences.
Finally, priority setting, while susceptible to overanalysis, could meet the
informational critique by operating on the basis of less information than current
structures.
Congress has in fact adopted a plan, not unlike that advocated here, in the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.262 For hazardous air pollutants, the agency
has a relatively long lead time within which to impose regulations, thus steering
away from unrealistic deadlines. Within that framework, the agency must
establish priorities-and a schedule for action-for listed chemicals based on
stated criteria: known or anticipated effects, quantity and location of emissions,
and efficiency of grouping categories by pollutants or technologies. In addition,
while this structure does not grant flexibility in standard setting in the way
suggested here, Congress clearly recognized the value of trading stringency for
speed and scope. The Amendments defer regulation of the health-based level
of "residual risk" in favor of quick risk reduction based on the more easily
determinable best available technology.263 Unfortunately, the plan expressly
exempts the priority-setting process from judicial review (except for failure to
set a schedule at all).2" Despite several practical difficulties in implementa-
260. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (analogizing toxics decisions to agency predictions,
to which courts have traditionally deferred).
261. For example, the information required to justify placement on the National Priorities List under
EPA's Hazard Ranking System is less than that required for establishing the required cleanup measures and
degree of cleanup. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985); City of Stoughton
v. EPA, 858 F.2d 747 (DC. Cir. 1988).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(i)-(4) (Supp. 1991).
263. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(f)(A), 7412(f)(D) (Supp. 1991).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(4) (Supp. 1991) ("no action .. shall be final agency action subject tojudicial
review"),
The Yale Journal on Regulation
tion-not the least of which is commensurability of toxic risks-the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments confirm that such an approach is feasible.
IV. Implementation: Perspectives and Prospects
This Article cannot hope to explore all of the arrangements that putting a
new regulatory structure into practice would entail, but one cannot entirely
abdicate responsibility for addressing the practical aspects of restructuring. This
Part will first survey models for implementation of a regulatory regime based
on priority setting. The general models typically favor either executive or
legislative control; I will suggest their drawbacks and examine two mixed
alternatives. This Part then considers the problem of judicial review of priority
setting. Finally, we look at congressionally mandated priority setting under the
National Priorities List and other programs, and at the prospects for a unified
environmental protection statute that would provide an umbrella for EPA
planning.
A. Planning
1. Executive Coordination and Direction: Executive Order No. 12,498
The White House is an important locus of planning. The President possesses
general supervisory responsibilities over the executive branch and recent
incumbents have exercised it aggressively.265 The "Regulatory Planning Pro-
cess" established by President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,498 is intended
to provide government-wide coordination of policy to avoid inconsistency and
duplication, as well as to set priorities for regulatory expenditures.266 It re-
quires each executive branch agency annually to submit a "Draft Regulatory
Program" to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. The
approved programs are published together as "The Regulatory Program of the
United States." This provides each agency with an excellent opportunity to take
a broad view of its own responsibilities and to undertake internal planning and
priority setting, which are necessary for effective management." 7 The annual
agendas, therefore, can be the vehicle for comprehensively analyzing agency
265. See generally Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127,128-68 (1991) (tracing regulatory review
programs).
266. See Exec. Order 12,498 § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. § 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 601 (1988).
267. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management 6f Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
533 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to "Hard Look" Review, 1989 DuKE L.J.
538, 548 (contrasting "atomistic" judicial review); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White
House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075,1085 (1986); McGarity, Regulatory Analysis,
supra note 61, at 1265-69, 1308.
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action in terms of rationalist criteria like the relative effectiveness and cost of
regulatory programs. 2 8 Thus, Executive Order 12,498 finds much support
among observers who suggest an analytical approach to regulation.269 At EPA,
a Strategic Planning and Management System (SPMS) supplements the Execu-
tive Order 12,498 process by annually setting priorities and establishes opera-
tional programs for carrying priorities into effect.27°
Unfortunately, the Executive Order 12,498 process is purely executive,
intensely partisan, and subject to nonpublic influence. 27 ' Control is given to
OMB, which (until the Competitiveness Council assumed the responsibility)
provided the shock troops of the White House deregulation team. OMB has,
for example, taken the position that EPA overstates risks, and consequently
suggested less stringent regulations. 27 2 On its own terms, Executive Order
12,498 seems to require consideration of substantive criteria by agencies which
are absent from or inimical to the underlying statute.273 Fix and Eads have
warned:
Congress does have an important role to play in setting the tone of
regulatory activities by taking a comprehensive look at regulatory
priorities. Unless such broad scale reviews are conducted, the Congress
will surrender to the executive the power to set regulatory priorities.
274
268. See Diver, supra note 54, at 413-21 (describing elements of the analytical, rationalist approach);
McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1258-69 (describing analysis to improve decisions and
policy management); DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 267, at 1080-82 (noting relationship of Exec. Order
12,291 in this respect).
269. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal
Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184, 188-90 (1986); Strauss, supra note 267, at 548-49; Frank B.
Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies,
4 J. L. & POL. 483, 538-40 (1988).
270. See Fiorino, supra note 96, at 86.
271. See Percival, supra note 265, at 168-72, 178-204.
272. See Magat & Schroeder, supra note 227, at 330 (Exec. Order 12,291 process tends to reduce
stringency of regulations).
273. See House Panel Democrats Release OMB/EPA Papers Showing Interference in Superfund Regula-
tions, 19 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2459 (Mar. 17, 1989).
The review process uses highly suspect methodologies such as cost-benefit analysis, which are
susceptible to bias and co-option because of the difficulty or impossibility of measuring soft variables like
social cost and benefit. See generally McGarity, Regulator), Analysis, supra note 61, at 1271-1308 (catalog-
ing difficulties with quantitative analyses, especially lack of information); Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E.
Benfield, Rulemaking in the Shadows: The Rise of OMB and Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 143, 169-75 (1991); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with
Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1065-66 (1986). Even
DeMuth, who later headed the OMB office implementing Exec. Order 12,498, concedes that supporters of
cost-benefit analysis recognize that where an agency or government has many, often conflicting, purposes
(i.e., that by which benefits are measured), strict cost-benefit discipline cannot be imposed; at best, it could
demand a "reasonable relationship" between the two. DeMuth, supra note 41, at 36.
274. Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory Reform: The Legacy of Reagan's
First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 316 (1985).
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Indeed, the express goal of the planning process is to "ensure that all regulatory
actions are consistent with the goals of the agency and of the Administra-
tion. '275 Whatever policy-neutral justifications it may have, Executive Order
12,498 was promulgated as part of a partisan deregulation agenda.276 Finally,
Executive Order 12,498 is a largely private exercise in which relatively
unknown OMB officials review and often alter the proposals of responsible
agency officials acting under statutes.2 77 Similarly, the Strategic Planning and
Management System (SPMS) program is an internal, bureaucratic mechanism
with no direct congressional involvement.7
In contrast to the existing planning structures, the present proposal would
involve Congress in setting the overall direction of the agency, rather than
leaving it to the executive branch. Openly managed, the regulatory agenda could
be the occasion for a thorough airing of the agency's direction and priorities,
both internal and external, before the public or its authoritative representa-
tives. 279 This would both ensure adherence to existing statutory factors and
allow Congress to recast its commands to alter a decision permitted under
current standards.8 °
2. Legislative Control: Statutory Deadlines
Congress has attempted to influence EPA's agenda by imposing statutory
deadlines for taking particular actions. In many cases, Congress was simply
expressing frustration with what it perceived as inaction by the agency. In
275. Exec. Order No. 12,498, § l(b), 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985).
276. See Fix & Eads, supra note 274, at 293; Howard & Benfield, supra note 273, at 154; Morrison,
supra note 273, at 1062-63; see also McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1270-71 (discussing
Exec. Order 12,291).
Exec. Order 12,498 was preceded by edicts in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies that served
the same purpose. See McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1247-53; Cross, supra note 269,
at 493-98; Bruff, supra note 267. The best known is Reagan's Exec. Order 12,291, under which OMB
imposed cost-benefit considerations on all regulations through "regulatory impact statements." See 46 Fed.
Reg. 13193 (1981), 3 C.F.R. § 127, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 601. Even Congress got into the act in
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which authorized OMB to review regulations for their impact on small
businesses. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982). Exec. Order 12,498 was in this sense merely cumulative of
other initiatives that are directly aimed at halting, delaying, or weakening environmental regulations and
other strictures. President Bush's Council on Competitiveness, chaired by Vice President Quayle, is similarly
positioned to object to stringent health and safety regulations in general on the ground that they may make
the United States less "competitive."
277. See Howard & Benfield, supra note 273, at 151-57; Morrison, supra note 273, at 1064-68, 1072-
73; Bruff, supra note 267.
One defense of the process is that as outsiders who are not familiar with the subject area, OMB officials
are in a good position to ask hard questions of regulators. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 267, at 1083-
84.
278. See Fiorino, supra note 96, at 88. Congress is indirectly involved because SPMS can only operate
where statutes have not established priorities. In addition,,there is close congressional oversight of EPA.
id. at 86, 88.
279. See McGarity, Regulatory Analysis, supra note 61, at 1269-70; ACUS Recommendation 88-9,
1 C.F.R. § 305.88-9; Morrison, supra note 276, at 1072-73; Magat & Schroeder, supra note 227, at 341.
280. See Howard & Benfield, supra note 276, at 175-78; Fix & Eads, supra note 276, at 314-15.
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others, Congress was consciously attempting to set agency priorities.28 Inter-
nally, deadlines are clearly a good management tool;282 externally imposed,
they provide important guidance on priorities in terms of time and importance.
The actual practice, however, has paradoxically provided too much as well as
too little direction. As to the former, deadlines are blunt. They are by their
nature designed to remove an agency's discretion over its priorities.283 As a
result, deadlines reduce EPA's ability to balance options, within and among
programs, in terms of cost, effectiveness, and other criteria.2 Deadlines force
an agency to commit resources to projects that may be ill-timed, not thoroughly
considered, or disruptive of other programs.
285 .
As to the latter, Congress has often squandered its opportunity to exercise
centralized planning control by imposing deadlines indiscriminately and unreal-
istically. In addition to being too short, they are too numerous. When an
agency's resources are too limited to meet all of the deadlines imposed, the
agency has no choice but to violate some of them. As a result, agencies are
placed in the position of themselves setting priorities among the deadlines.
2 86
Alternatively, agencies sometimes respond to deadlines by shifting discretion
to different, untimed, and unobserved parts of the process? 7
281. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 32 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1969, 1975 (D.D.C. 1991) (finding that Congress
enacted deadline for promulgation of effluent standards out of "frustration with the agency's sluggishness").
The basic surveys of federal statutory deadlines are Edward A. Tomlinson, Report on the Experience
of Various Agencies with Statutory Time Limits Applicable to Licensing or Clearance Functions and to
Rulemaking, ACUS REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-1978 119; Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against
Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit Approach, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 171 (1987)
[hereinafter Abbott I]; Alden F. Abbott, Case Studies in the Costs of Federal Statutory and Judicial
Deadlines, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 467 (1987) [hereinafter Abbott U]. The Abbott case studies draw heavily
on Tomlinson's work. Abbott, as his title suggests, opposes them categorically; Tomlinson finds the record
"indecisive" on their desirability. Tomlinson, supra, at 140.
The principal concern in this Article is with deadlines for rulemakings. Deadlines for adjudication and
licensing take a more individualized form. See Tomlinson, supra, at 128-39. As a result, deadlines for
adjudication and licensing do not have the direct planning and priority-setting function that rulemaking
priorities do. To the extent that adjudicatory deadlines demand that agency resources be committed to a
prompt response, they communicate a congressional determination of relative importance.
282. See Tomlinson, supra note 281, at 120-23.
283. See Abbott II, supra note 281, at 469; Tomlinson, supra note 281, at 182. See also NRDC v. EPA,
32 ENv'T REP. at 1972-73 (rejecting EPA claim that Clean Water Act § 304(m) is merely a target as to
which EPA may exercise discretion).
284. See Fix & Eads, supra note 274, at 315-16 ("Congress should ... focus on promoting the
responsible use of discretion and not second-guess day-to-day decisions of regulators who seek to fashion
coherent regulatory programs."). The courts recognize this problem and much prefer to enforce deadlines
of the agency's own creation or acquiescence. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 158, at 834-36.
285. See Graham, supra note 60, at 124; Tomlinson, supra note 281, at 143; Abbott 1, supra note 281,
at 186-200 (documenting "wasted resource" and "misallocation" costs); Abbott II, supra note 281, at 468-69,
472-76, 480-85 (case studies). For example, ATSDR has been unusually prompt in publishing Superfund
health assessments in accordance with deadlines in CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i), but only at the cost,
according to GAO, of reports that were too narrow in scope and of poor quality. See Statutory Deadline
Blamed for Inadequacy of Superfund Health Assessments by ATSDR, 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1272-73 (Sept.
6, 1991).
286. See Abbott 1, supra note 281, at 181-84; Dwyer, supra note 74 (criticizing "symbolic" legislation).
287. See Tomlinson, supra note 281, at 201-04, 209.
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Current legislative priority-setting techniques, therefore, tighten deadlines
without loosening substantive commands. The present proposal recognizes the
need for some agency flexibility in exercising judgment, and it differs from
current legislative efforts by compensating for tightened priorities with loosened
predicates and targets. This approach is consistent with the suggestion that
Congress itself, or the agencies at Congress' behest, set nonbinding dead-
lines.288 This would, in effect, require the agencies to plan while taking ad-
vantage of the need for expertise and discretion in making the trade-offs
necessary to reasoned priority setting. This compromise has the additional
benefit of retaining original direction and overall supervision in Congress.
3. A Mixed Model: Regulatory Budgets and Calendars
Commentators have advanced two models that combine legislative control
with executive management. Both bear instructive similarities to the proposal
in this Article. One, the "regulatory budget," requires Congress to establish cost
parameters within which the agencies must operate. A competing theory,
legislated regulatory calendars, would have the agency propose an allocation
of resources (in terms of time) subject to congressional approval. The regulatory
budget is like E.O. 12,498, but with numbers attached. 289 Congress (and the
President, since it is legislated) would set an upper limit on the costs which
regulation could impose on the economy. "The policies of individual regulatory
statutes would have to be implemented within this budget constraint, just as
they now must be implemented within the constraint of the expenditure bud-
get. ' 29" The idea of a budgetary process has the important virtue of recogniz-
ing the central problem of scarcity (the capacity of the economy to absorb
control costs) and of the central necessity of allocating resources and setting
priorities. It thus forces Congress to come to grips, openly and explicitly, with
the policy issues implicit in priority setting, and to give answers.291 Within
the agency, a budgeting process forces it to sort out its goals and priorities,292
and encourages consideration of whether resources invested in one task would
288. See Tomlinson, supra note 281, at 122-23; see also Abbott I, supra note 281, at 200-03; Abbott
I1, supra note 281, at 487.
289. See Fix & Eads, supra note 276, at 312 (making this point in similar terms).
290. See DeMuth, supra note 41, at 30-31; see also LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 133-58
(extensively discussing regulatory budget proposal).
291. See LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 23; LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 147, 173-81;
Dwyer, supra note 74; see also DeMuth, supra note 41, at 37 (emphasizing political accountability); Fix
& Eads, supra note 274, at 313 ("Budgets are political statements which are manifestations of a govern-
ment's priorities.").
292. See LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 87-88.
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yield greater benefits elsewhere2 93 and whether it has chosen the most cost-
effective actions possible.294
The principal problem of regulatory budgets is measurement of regulatory
costs across the economy as a whole. Not only would the amount of data
needed by enormous, but the information gathered would itself be highly
uncertain, indeed speculative.29 Measurement aside, the capacity of the econ-
omy to absorb regulatory costs is not really meaningful at the macro level:
some industries are marginal and face heavy competition; some products are
practically unavoidable (the demand being inelastic), so increases in cost can
be passed along.296 Litan and Nordhaus have recommended "legislated regula-
tory calendars" as a more practical alternative. Rather than focus on numbers,
the calendars would force Congress to make fundamental policy decisions. 97
The agencies, through OMB, would submit to Congress a list of Notices of Pro-
posed Rulemakings. Before further action could be taken, Congress would have
to approve each major regulation by enacting a regulatory calendar that includes
it.298 On the other hand, post hoc legislative enactment of specific agency
actions seems rigid and time-consuming.299 Congressional handling of such
complex items is notorious for inviting the inclusion or deletion of parochial
interests.3" The annual Congressional budget process, for instance, does not
inspire confidence. Litan and Nordhaus suggest that a more realistic alternative
would require agencies to submit their priorities and agendas to Congress for
approval.3 1 This structure, like the deadlines compromise, plays better to the
strengths of each institution. It still requires detailed Congressional involvement,
293. See LrTAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 81-83.
294. See DeMuth, supra note 41, at 36. Indeed, DeMuth expressed hope that the antithetical pressures
of budgetary limits and political expectations would create a synthesis of agencies incorporating cost-benefit
analysis into their decisionmaking, and central authorities like OMB would simply wither away. Id. at 36-37.
This has not yet happened. See also LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 79 ("The essence of both cost-
effectiveness and regulatory budget frameworks is the comparison among alternative actions an agency
might take that would enhance health.") (emphasis added); LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 83-89
(criticizing the constraints of agencies' ability to balance costs and benefits to come up with the most
efficient priorities).
295. Secondary effects, joint causation, and capital expenditures further complicate the calculations.
See LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 22-23, 29-45, 86-87; DeMuth, supra note 290, at 38-42; LrrAN
& NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 150-54.
296. For a review of the practical problems of the proposal, see LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41,
at 140-60.
297. LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 167 (political accountability is the "primary objective"
of the calendar proposal).
298. LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 159-82. Diver severely criticizes both regulatory budgets
and legislated regulatory calendars in his review of Litan and Nordhaus' book. His fundamental critique
is that these simply add a higher level of command-and-control regulation to cure the problems that the
authors deem inherent in the lower level. See Diver, Book Review, Regulating the Regulators, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 1243, at 1248-49 (1984).
299. See Fix & Eads, supra note 274, at 315-16 (Congress is ill-equipped to establish or approve
specific budgets or to draft regulations). "If anything, regulators need more, not less, discretion." Id.
300. Litan & Nordhaus concede that annually fixing priorities may be politically impossible. See LrrAN
& NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 162-67.
301. LrrAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 171-73.
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 9: 277, 1992
but does not provide for ex ante Congressional guidance. "With a clearer
articulation of priorities, fewer occasions would arise when Congress would feel
the necessity of instructing an agency about details."3 2
4. The Conservation Experience: Planning in National Forest Management
The conservation area of environmental law,3°3 in particular the manage-
ment of federal lands and natural resources, provides actual experience in the
use of planning as a technique for exercising congressional direction. The
federal government owns millions of acres of valuable timber land, mainly in
the western United States. Areas that have been designated national forests are
managed by the U.S. Forest Service. 3°4 These lands are also suitable for recre-
ational use as wilderness areas or ski resorts in their more or less natural states.
The commercial and recreational uses can be fundamentally incompatible with
each other. Wilderness by definition305 cannot accommodate any commodity
uses or intensive recreation. Other statutorily recognized uses-outdoor recre-
ation, range, watershed, and wildlife and fish3°6 -can be incompatible with
wilderness, with timber, and with each other. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a
tract of land that could accommodate more than two or three of these uses
simultaneously.3 7 Because some uses, notably recreation and timber, are in
high demand, the major task of land managers is the distribution of land among
302. LAVE, STRATEGY, supra note 35, at 87.
303. For discussion of the distinction between the conservation and pollution control/toxics areas of
environmental law, see Samuel P. Hays, Three Decades of Environmental Politics: The Historical Context,
in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 21-28 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1989); see also Rabin, supra
note 51, at 1280-81 (distinguishing the wilderness and pollution strands of the environmental movement);
see generally Mitchell, From Conservation to Environmental Movement: The Development of the Modern
Environmental Lobbies, in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 81-113 (Michael J. Lacey ed.,
1989) (distinguishing first- and second-generation environmental issues). The conservation and toxics areas
of environmental regulation are also managed by different agencies: the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of the Interior manage conservation programs; EPA, OSHA, and FDA manage toxics regulation.
304. The Forest Service is part of the Department of Agriculture. National parks are administered by
the National Park Service and wildlife refuges by the Fish and Wildlife Service, both in the Department
of the Interior, but they represent a relatively tiny proportion of the Western public lands. The remainder,
much of it rangeland, is administered by the Bureau of Land Management in the Interior Department.
Rangelands are managed under a statutory regime very similar to that for national forests, but it is more
open-ended and more disorganized. Therefore, I will concentrate on the forests.
What follows is necessarily a thumbnail sketch. The reader interested in a full description and analysis
of planning for federal lands should consult the excellent literature on the subject. See, e.g., GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS, I PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ch. 13 (1992); CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H.
MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1987); Michael C.
Blumm et al., Symposium on NEPA at Twenty: The Past, Present, and Future of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990); Symposium, Resource Strategies: Use and Protection of Natural
Resources, 5 NAT. RES. & ENVT. (1991).
305. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1988) ("an area where the earth and its community of life are untram-
melled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain").
306. See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1988).
307. See 2 COGGINS, supra note 304, at 16-12 (discussing multiple-use management); MICHAEL D.
BOWES & JOHN V. KRUTILLA, MULTIPLE-USE MANAGEMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FORESTLANDS
32-34, 88 (1989).
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these competing uses. Because high-quality lands are scarce, managers are
confronted with an allocation problem that parallels the problem with toxic
substances control. To allocate national forest land, Congress turned to the
highly detailed planning structures3"8 that now dominate forest manage-
ment.3 o9
Congress arrived at the planning solution through much the same tension
between expert discretion and the need for policy guidance that was discussed
previously. There is a long technocratic tradition in federal natural resources
management. The then-new science of forestry was the driving force in the
original movement to manage federal timber resources for. sustainability and
profit under Gifford Pinchot and President Theodore Roosevelt.31° Pinchot's
goal, acceded to by Congress, was to free land managers to make the best
scientific decisions to achieve a high yet sustainable yield of renewable
resources. The Forest Service regarded allocation decisions as fundamentally
technical-scientific matters. Congressional micromanagement, and the judicial
intervention that followed, was antithetical to "everything in which the Forest
Service believed and on which it had been founded: expertise, scientific for-
estry, discretion, and professional independence."3 1' By the 1970s, however
Congress became increasingly concerned that the Forest Service was not
managing these lands as Congress wished. In particular, Congress thought the
managers had become too tied to commodity uses at the expense of the envi-
ronment, and consequently sought to reduce discretion and to give the agencies
clearer guidance.312 Recognizing the impossibility of setting specific standards
for each forest and range, Congress sought a compromise and found land-use
planning. In doing so, it followed the 1970 recommendation of the Public Land
Law Review Commission, which had seen in planning the opportunity to
provide much-needed guidance to land managers.3 13
The Forest Service manages the national forests under the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA).3"4 Based on statutory guidelines, princi-
pally the "multiple use" mandate discussed below, the Forest Service must
308. See National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). The cognate
provisions for rangeland are in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1711-1712, 1732(a) (1988).
309. "Federal land use planning is becoming the most critical stage in the overall process for allocating
public natural resources." I COGGINs, supra note 304, at 13-2.
310. Gifford Pinchot, the guiding force for the establishment of the national forests, was trained in
Europe in the late nineteenth century when formal training in forestry did not exist in this country. He sought
to bring scientific principles to American forest management and to develop a highly professional Forest
Service to carry them out. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (1958).
311. Joseph L. Sax, Parks, Wilderness, and Recreation, in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 133-36 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1989).
312. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 304, at 13, 69-71, 159-70, 371; 1 COGGINS, supra note
304, at 13-3, 13-28; Sax, supra note 311, at 122-25 (less discretion and "more environmentally focussed").
313. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 41-54 (1970)
[hereinafter ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND].
314. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601 (1988).
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develop a hierarchy of plans, beginning with a national policy and descending
to management of individual tracts.3" 5 Consistency from top to bottom-from
statute to program to plan to individual permits and contracts-is statutorily
required3"6  and judicially enforceable. 17 The structure of the process is
highly technocratic. Before reaching a final decision, the agency must (1) gather
data and inventory assets; (2) develop comprehensive, integrated management
strategies in the context of other disciplines and concerns; (3) consider alterna-
tives (NEPA is expressly incorporated); and (4) obtain public comment.
31
Although forest planning may fall short of the ideal in practice-it is often
criticized as expensive, time-consuming, and poorly executed 319 -its structure
does provide a workable model for setting priorities among toxic risks.
B. Judicial Review
1. The Traditional Administrative Law Approach
A plan that is to be the basis for regulatory action based on congressional
directives must be subject to judicial review and enforcement if it is to be
mandatory in any meaningful sense. 320 Typically, judicial review of agency
315. At the highest level, the Secretary must prepare, every five years, a program of activities looking
forward forty-five years, including analysis of needs, objectives, and priorities. Every ten years, the Forest
Service must prepare an assessment, or inventory, of all forest resources. Finally, at the individual unit level,
NFMA requires the maintenance of a current inventory of forest lands and resources. From these, the Service
must develop "one integrated [interdisciplinary land use] plan for each unit" revised every fifteen years (or
sooner if conditions warrant). See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1988); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219 (Forest Service
planning regulations). For general descriptions of the NFMA planning regime, see I COGGINS, supra note
304, at 13-34--13-44; ANDERSON & WILKINSON, supra note 304, at 10-12 & passim.
316. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (1988).
317. The availability of.review for statutory consistency not expressly provided for in the statute was
confirmed in subsequent appropriations legislation. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (applied in Portland Audubon
Society v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3229 (1989)); see also Griffin v.
Yeutter, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20400 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (judicial review of NFMA plans); Inter-
mountain Forest Indus. Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330, 1339-43 (D. Wyo. 1988) (rejecting industry
challenge); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 588-89 (9th Cir. 1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that forest plans themselves are reviewable for
consistency with collateral requirements like water pollution standards and NEPA); American Motorcyclist
Ass'n v. Watt (AMA II), 543 F. Supp. 789 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (judicial review of FLPMA plans).
318. Like NEPA, both emphasize public participation at several stages of the process. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1604(d) (1988) (forests); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a), (f) (1988) (rangeland). See Deborah Harten, Comment,
The Public Participation Requirement in Environmental and Public Land Decision-Making: Politics or
Practice?, II PUB. LAND L. REV. 153, 154-57 (1990).
319. See I COoo1NS, supra note 304, at 13-14 (BLM).
320. Review would occur at two points: (1) when the plan is promulgated to determine its consistency
with the congressional standards, and (2) when controls are later imposed to determine their consistency
with the plan. Review at the later stage should not detain us long. The only really difficult problem is
intentional deviation from the agenda based on new information, for example, data indicating an emergency.
The court would have to determine the newness of the information and whether it is sufficiently substantial
to warrant a variance from the agenda. This is a familiar exercise in civil litigation, see FED. R. Ctv. P. 60(b)
(relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence), and in several environmental statutes which
permit courts to order reconsideration of rules based on newly discovered information. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 2618(b) (1988) (TSCA judicial review provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(c) (1988) (Clean Air Act judicial
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action has been limited to the last two stages of the regulatory process: the
choice of response (promulgation of a rule) and enforcement. Review of a prior
stage, including priority setting, has been precluded by the doctrines of finality
and ripeness. Unless otherwise provided by statute, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act provides no right of review to an agency action that is not "final,
' 321
and even technically final actions can escape immediate judicial review if they
are not "ripe" for review. While conceptually distinct, finality and ripeness
apply to similar situations and are motivated by a common set of judicial
concerns. Indeed, ripeness is in many respects a nonjurisdictional replay of the
finality analysis.
322
The leading cases in the area, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner32 3 and its
two companion cases, 31 concentrate on two issues: the immediacy of the
complainant's need for judicial resolution of the challenge to the agency action,
and the fitness of the issues for judicial determination.3" On the need question,
the two cases that granted review focused on the "immediate and substantial
impact" upon the complainant. 326 The other, which denied review, emphasized
the numerous contingencies that intervened between FDA's unquestionably final
regulations and the actual enforcement pressure that would compel the com-
plainant to take costly action to comply or to resist.327 The fitness issues are
more complex. The first is the familiar one of agency discretion and judicial
control. As a general rule, agencies should be permitted to go about their
business with a minimum of judicial interference, especially at the early stages
review, interpreted in Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 216-20 (8th Cir. 1975), affirmed, 427 U.S.
246, 255-56 (1976)).
321. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
322. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); see generally Brian C. Murchison,
On Ripeness and "Pragmatism" in Administrative Law, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 159 (1989) (describing the
relationships of ripeness and finality to several basic issues about the structure and legitimacy of the
administrative state); E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Note, Preserving Review of Undeclared Programs: A
Statutory Redefinition of FinalAgency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643,646, n. 31 (1991) (describing relationship
of finality and ripeness).
323. See 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
324. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S.
167 (1967).
325. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149.
326. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152-54; Gardner, 387 U.S. at 171-74; see also Columbia
Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) (granting pre-enforcement review of FCC
regulation announcing policy in future licensing proceedings). Justice Fortas' dissent in the Abbott cases
dismissed the harm as "vastly overdrawn cries of distress." Toilet Goods, 387 U.S. at 199 (Fortas, J,,
dissenting).
There are exceptional cases, of course. The D.C. Circuit held that an agency's decision to begin
proceedings to cancel a pesticide registration, but not to suspend the registration in the interim, was
reviewable due to the potentially severe health effects of use of the pesticide in the interim. See EDF v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). This decision
had much to do with the court's perception that an imminent health hazard existed (the pesticides involved
included the notorious DDT) and the unique structure 'of FIFRA. Other courts came to the opposite
conclusion. See, e.g., Nor-Am Agricultural Products v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
327. Toilet Goods, 387 U.S. at 162-64.
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of the regulatory process.328 Second, the courts want to avoid involvement
with abstract and potentially unrealistic disputes.3 29 This concern motivated
the Supreme Court's recent, very restrictive finality analysis in National Wildlife
Federation v. Lujan, which refused to accord finality to a course of conduct
which the agency had not formalized into a "program."
330
The third fitness concern, only hinted at in the Abbott Laboratories cases
and Lujan, is that administrative decisions at the early stages of the regulatory
process are by their nature ill-suited to judicial resolution.33' In Lon Fuller's
phrase, such decisions are "polycentric." They involve choices among many
competing subjects of concern, and a decision as to each affects all of the
others. Reasoned adjudication, on the other hand, requires that the decision-
maker's choices be narrowed to a bipolar standard or established succession
of bipolar standards to which the tribunal can apply the facts it finds.332 Poly-
centric problems, therefore, must be handled by managerial decisionmaking,
that is, an authoritative individual handing down a decision after consideration
of the many interdependent variables. 333 Priority setting fits this description.
James Henderson has observed that planning and resource allocation decisions
328. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148; see also Toilet Goods, 387 U.S. at 175-76 ("the courts
should not intervene in the administrative process at this stage, under these facts and in this gross, shotgun
fashion"); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 842 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
(in priority setting, where "an agency is choosing how to allocate finite enforcement resources, the agency's
choice will be entitled to substantial deference").
329. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148 (requiring finality); Toilet Goods, 387 U.S. at 163-64;
Gardner, 387 U.S. at 171. It wastes judicial resources to litigate a case in which the agency may yet change
its mind about proceeding. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil of California, 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
330. 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189-90 & n.2 (1990). in the planning context, despite the existence of
Congressional guidelines, one court has decided that (at least at the system-wide level) these allocation
decisions implicate fundamental executive policy choices. See National Wildlife Federation v. United States,
626 F.2d 917, 924-28 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that judicial review of system-wide planning would
constitute an undue interference with executive policy making). The problem of ripeness of plans for review
was considered at some length in AMA 11, where the court concluded that, even without application, the
plans met the Abbott Laboratories standards of finality and fitness. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Watt,
543 F. Supp. 789, 793-94 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (AMA II). AMA 11, of course, predates National Wildlife
Federation v. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190-91, and a post-Lujan case has suggested some concern about
ripeness. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990). These developments are discussed
in 1 CoGoiNs, supra note 304, at 6-39--6-44.
331. See Gardner, 387 U.S. at 193 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (distinguishing prior cases permitting review
because they were "two-dimensional" and not "part of the warp and woof of an elaborate administrative
pattern, intimately woven into the congressional design").
332. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 394-404 (1978)
(posthumous publication of materials substantially completed by 1957). Fuller's ideas were further explicated
in an important article on tort law. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the .Negligence Concept, 51
IND. L.J. 467, 469-77 (1976); see also id. at 476, 497-98 (planning problems generally, and environmental
planning in particular, are polycentric).
333. See Fuller, supra note 332, at 398-403; Henderson, supra note 332, at 469-77; see, e.g., Washing-
ton Crab Producers v. Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438, 1446-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (deferring to agency management
plan for complicated resource). It may be coincidental, but it is not insignificant, that Landis viewed agencies
as "managerial" in very much this sense. See supra Part I(A)(I).
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are "one of the most unadjudicable problems imaginable,"334 and courts have
tended to agree. 335 Thus, in Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court considered
prosecutorial discretion, which is a form of priority setting used when resources
are inadequate to enforce all of the laws all of the time. The Court stated that
an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balanc-
ing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.
Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred,
but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,
whether the agency is likely to Succeed if it acts, whether the particular
enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and,
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action
at all .... The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with
the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. 36
In priority setting, the Supreme Court has reversed the traditional presumption
in favor of judicial review under Abbott Laboratories with a strong policy that
review of decisions not to proceed is inappropriate.337
2. Overcoming Polycentricity
The problem of polycentricity for adjudication is not unavoidable. It may
be overcome in two ways: by requiring an explanation of the agency action that
is reviewable for basic rationality, or by providing sufficient statutory or
administrative guidelines for courts to apply. My proposal incorporates both
features to ensure its reviewability and hence enforceability.
a. Reasoned Explanation
The strong position taken by the Chaney majority against review was
strikingly unnecessary to that case because the administrator's decision was
bipolar and was exceptionally well defined (FDA had published a detailed
explanation). The issue was highly unusual, since the choice whether to enforce
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act was clearly not made in the same
334. See Henderson, supra note 332, at 470 ("Potentially, at least, a contracts case involves the
resolution of one of the most unadjudicable problems imaginable-the allocation of scarce resources in
society.").
335. See National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens v. Dunlop, 554 F.2d 1196, 1198-1200 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (El Congreso II); 626 F.2d 882, 888-90 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (El Congreso III); see also WWHT,
Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (competing licensing applications to FCC).
336. 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (declining to compel FDA to prosecute states for using approved
drugs in an unapproved way, viz., human execution).
337. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Ronald M. Levin,
Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MiNN. L. REV. 689, 762-73 (1990).
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way that choices about routine enforcement are. FDA provided a thorough, well
reasoned justification for its decision.338 As the concurring justices pointed
out, deferential review of FDA's statement was entirely appropriate, but it ought
not to be unreviewable per se.339
The concurring justices' approach was in effect adopted in an earlier series
of cases dealing with priority setting by OSHA. Section 6(g) of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act is unusual in its explicit recognition of the
agency's need to set priorities, although it provides no substantive standards
for doing so.34° In the El Congreso cases, migrant farmworkers asked the
courts to mandate the development of regulations governing field sanitation.
341
The district court had originally rejected resource allocation as a reason for
noncompliance with statutory deadlines, 342 but the court of appeals allowed
OSHA to use section 6(g) as a defense to claims that agency action was
unreasonably delayed. Section 6(g) represented "implicit acknowledgement [of]
traditional agency discretion to alter priorities and defer action due to legitimate
statutory considerations," 3 3 and it was entirely appropriate to proceed "on
a 'worst-first' basis," as long as the agency exercised its discretion "honestly
and fairly."'3" Yet, on remand, OSHA felt obliged to come up with an elabo-
rate statement of its reasons (as FDA did in Chaney) for assigning the field
standard a low priority. It pointed to risk, available resources, existing enforce-
338. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (refusing to
require FDA to promulgate a regulation requiring aspirin warning for Reye's Syndrome; also a relatively
bipolar decision). For criticisms of the Chaney approach, see Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 50, at 874-
75.
339. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 842, 854 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("the
basis on which the agency chose to exercise this discretion-that other problems were viewed as more press-
ing-generally will be enough to pass muster").
340. The Occupational Safety and Health Act reads:
In determining the priority for establishing standards under this section, the Secretary shall give
due regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory safety and health standards for particular
industries .... The Secretary shall give due regard to the recommendations of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services regarding the need for mandatory standards in determining the priority
for establishing such standards.
29 U.S.C. § 655(g).
341. The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires OSHA to take regulatory action within specified
time limits. OSHA had missed these deadlines. The courts excused the delay on the ground that § 655(g)
gives OSHA considerable latitude in setting its priorities. National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens
v. Dunlop, 554 F.2d 1196, 1198-200 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (El Congreso 11), reversing 425 F. Supp. 900, 902
(D.D.C. 1975) (El Congreso 1); 626 F.2d 882, 888-90 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (El Congreso 11).
342. El Congreso 1, 425 F. Supp. at 902.
343. El Congreso 11, 554 F.2d at 1200. The legislative history of subsection (g) provides little
illumination. Congress evidently sought to ensure that the Secretary would have sufficient flexibility to target
urgent demands for regulations in particular industries without waiting to develop broader standards. See
116 CONG. REC. 37,623 (Nov. 17, 1970) (amendment offered by.Sen. Javits).
344. See also El Congreso 11, 554 F.2d at 1199-1200; El Congreso 11, 626 F.2d at 889-90 (reversing
district court ruling on remand from El Congreso 11 that OSHA had set priorities irrationally); Benzene, 448
U.S. at 644 n. 49 (under § 655(g), "a court cannot tell the Secretary which of two admittedly significant
risks he should act to regulate first").
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ment commitments, number of employees, severity of the health or safety
hazard, and availability of information, which the court accepted.34 A subse-
quent ruling, Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, went a step
further. The court acknowledged, "[w]e would hesitate to require the Assistant
Secretary to expedite the EtO [ethylene otide] rulemaking if such a command
would seriously disrupt other rulemakings of higher or competing priority," but
it ordered action because, from its own review of OSHA's docket, the court
concluded that the agency could not point to any more pressing needs.3 46 The
agency had not given "due regard to the urgency of the need," as required by
section 6(g).347 A subsequent Third Circuit case expressly found that this
language provides "a statutory standard by which to measure the exercise of
the Secretary's priority-setting discretion.
Under the NFMA, Congress mandates such explanations. Every five years
the Forest Service must develop a Statement of Policy for budget requests, and
the pre-Chadha statute provides for a one-house veto of the Policy. If the Forest
Service submits an annual budget request for less than the Policy indicates, it
must supply an explanation:
[The report] shall express in qualitative and quantitative terms the extent
to which the programs and policies projected under the budget meet the
policies approved by Congress .... In any case in which such budget
so presented recommends a course which fails to meet the policies so
established, the President shall specifically set forth the reason or
reasons for requesting the Congress to approve the lesser programs or
policies presented.349
345. See El Congreso III, 626 F.2d at 888-89; see also Thomas 0. Bartman, Note, Deciding What to
Regulate: Priority-Setting at OSHA, 2 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 87,108-15 (1982) (describing submission).
OSHA published its reasoning in the Federal Register. See Field Sanitation, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,086, 15,087-90
(1985) (justifying priorities based on relative risk and allocation of scarce regulatory resources); see also
BENJAMIN MtNTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 83-85 (1984). OSHA was ultimately compelled
to issue a field sanitation standard. See Farmworker Justice Fund Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
346. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also
NRDC v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that even good faith reliance on limited
resources and higher priorities could not excuse delay amounting to failure to carry out statutory program);
see also In re Barr Laboratories, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cit. 1991) (declining to order FDA to approve
a new drug applications because, despite conceded lateness under the FFDCA, promptness with Barr's
applications would merely result in lateness elsewhere).
347. Health Research Group, 702 F.2d at 1158.
348. United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted)
(rejecting exclusion of certain industries from Hazard Communication Standard).
349. See 16 U.S.C. § 1606(b) (1991). The process is described in National Wildife Federation v. United
States, 626 F.2d 917, 919-21 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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While the explanation provides no strong basis for judicial review,35° this
process provides a model similar to the process envisioned here. Taken as a
whole, the process represents a structure in which (1) Congress sets parameters,
(2) the agency takes the lead in fleshing them out, and (3) the courts maintain
supervision for consistency with congressional policy.
b. Statutory Guidance
If one wants congressional direction of agency action, judicial review could
be more directly obtained by statutory guidance of priority setting. Chaney
expressly recognized that adequate guidelines could render even prosecutorial
discretion reviewable.35' Applied to planning, it is clear, first, that Congress
can create finality if it so desires.352 For example, agency plans that create
no legal rights under OSHA or Executive Order 12,498111 do create a right
of review under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) because
Congress has specifically so provided.35 4 The real problem is the one
addressed in Overton Park: the court needs some "law to apply. '355 Just as
a specific deadline gives content to the otherwise amorphous "unreasonably
delayed" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act,356 there is nothing
inherent in priority setting that precludes judicial review. Establishing clear
standards addresses Chaney' s main concern. At the vague end of the spectrum
350. See National Wildlife Federation, 626 F.2d at 924-28 (denying mandamus relief based on inade-
quacy of explanation).
351. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 827, 832-34. The Court distinguished an earlier case, Dunlop v. Bach-
owski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), on the ground, among others, that the statute there "provided guidelines for
the exercise of its enforcement power." 470 U.S. at 834.
352. See Switchmen's Union v. NLRB, 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1947). Even the cramped formulation of
finality in Lujan makes it clear that (within very broad limits) Congress can create final agency action. See
110 S. Ct. at 3190 ("Some statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the 'agency action,' and thus to
be the object of judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects normally required for APA review
are felt.")
Congress can also decline to recognize finality in a decision which would otherwise appear to have
the necessary characteristics. See Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding preclusion
of review of nuclear waste disposal guidelines that would otherwise possess "the requisite 'hallmarks of
finality' to make them ripe for review").
353. Compare Merrill, Cancer-Causing Chemicals, supra note 38, at 121-23 (discussing OSHA Priority
Lists); Exec. Order 12,498 § 5 (regulatory agendas are purely internal and create no judicially enforceable
rights), with 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c) (authorizing judicial review of leasing program).
354. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349(c)(1). Under OCSLA, the first stage of activity is establishment of
five-year plans for outer continental shelf exploration and development. Challenges, however, have not been
notably successful due to the vagueness of the applicable statutory standards. See NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d
288 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (remanding the 1987-92 plan); California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Watt
11) (upholding the 1982-87 plan on remand from Watt 1); California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Watt 1) (upholding the 1980-85 plan).
355. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (applying 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2)); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1988).
356. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(l) (1988). Failure to meet a specific deadline would bring the agency within
the scope of the mandatory "unlawfully withheld" language. id.
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of statutory criteria is the multiple use principle357 that forms the core sub-
stantive criterion for planning in national forests." 8 Multiple use requires the
balancing of renewable resources, nonrenewable resources, recreation, wilder-
ness, watershed, and fishing. 5 9 Despite the diversity and obvious incompati-
bility of these goals, the clear intention of the statute is to accommodate
simultaneously as many uses as possible on the same tract of land. 360 And
it leaves the relative importance of each use to be measured by the astonishing-
ly vague standards of what will "best meet the needs of the American people,"
and what represents the "most judicious use of the land."36' This state of
affairs not only fails to give any real direction to the agency, but also makes
judicial review nearly impossible.3 62 The imposition of conflicting demands
on an agency gives it nearly unlimited discretion, since virtually any decision
it makes can be justified by reference to at least one of the statutory crite-
ria.3 63 Courts have thus felt themselves unequipped to take a hard look at
forest planning.M
357. Congress first enacted the multiple use principle in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960
(MUSYA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988).
358. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604(e), 1604(g) (1988); see also 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1702(c),
1702(h), 1712(c)(1) (1988) (rangeland).
359. See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (identifying "outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and
fish purposes" as the uses to be balanced).
The specialized literature should be consulted for a more complete understanding of these issues. See,
e.g., 2 COGINs, supra note 304, ch. 16-20; Constance E. Brooks, Multiple Use Versus Dominant Use: Can
Federal Land Planning Fulfill the Principles of Multiple Use for Mineral Development?, 33 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 1 (1988) , BOWES & KRUTILLA, supra note 307.
360. See 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (defining "multiple use"); 2 CoGGiNs, supra note 304, at 16-7-16-9,
16-12; see also Brooks, supra note 359, at 12-15,28-29 (objecting that Forest Service improperly fails to
provide for all uses, specifically mineral uses).
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) for rangeland goes out of its way to
emphasize simultaneous use by requiring BLM to report to Congress "[alny management decision or action
... that excludes (that is, totally eliminates) one or more of the principal or major uses for two or more
years with respect to a tract of land of one hundred thousand acres or more." 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(2).
361. See 16 U.S.C. § 531(a).
362. See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, supra note 313, at 44-45; 2 COGGINs, supra note 304,
at 16-10-16-20.
363. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418, 432 (1935). The holding that contradictory
provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act rendered it an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power may have little continued validity, but Chief Justice Hughes' observation remains apt.
364. The tendency is to require "consideration" of other uses, but not to interfere with the agency's
actual allocation of uses. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. U.S. Forest Service, 592 F. Supp. 931,
937-38 (D. Ore. 1984) ("The standards in MUSY are broad, but they do exist. MUSY is not entirely
discretionary."); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 113 (D. Alaska 1971) (Forest Service must
"consider certain factors"), rev'd on other grounds, 3 E.L.R. 20292 (9th Cir. 1973); Dorothy Thomas
Foundation v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-76 (W.D.N.C. 1970). Each court suggested that MUSY
reached the outer limits of reviewability, and, perhaps, of the nondelegation doctrine. Id. (Judicial review
of BLM decisions, under statutes described as "breath[ing] discretion at every pore," has been similarly
deferential to the point of abdication. See Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 804-07 (9th Cir. 1979)
(FLPMA); Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1975) (Classification and Multiple Use
Act of 1964).)
There is an important exception, a pre-NFMA ban on clearcutting, but it relied on the Organic Act
of 1897 and eschewed reliance MUSY, calling it "broad and ambiguous." lzaak Walton League v. Butz,
522 F.2d 945, 948-52, 954 (4th Cir. 1975). The Organic Act may be found at 16 U.S.C. § 476. All in all,
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This vagueness can be remedied. The Wilderness Act permits hard-look
judicial scrutiny because it strictly defines wilderness and provides specific uses
for such areas.36 Even within the general multiple use mandate, Congress
stepped in to control clearcutting with the Church Guidelines,366 which were
followed in the NFMA's very specific harvesting criteria. 67 Even though
NFMA plans have not yet been subjected to much litigation, the few cases that
have considered them recognize the new teeth in planning. In the Rio Grande
Forest" and Bighorn Fore1369 cases, the courts were willing to look
closely at the compliance of Forest Service plans with substantive statutory
guidance, to require explanations, and to examine the basic rationality of the
Forest Service's reasoning. They did not, however, attempt to reorder priorities
that Congress had left to the discretion of the agency. 70
There remains, of course, doubt whether Congress has the ability to provide
truly detailed guidance on the allocation of national forest resources.3 7' The
allocation among uses presents as polycentric a problem as one could ask for:
Congress has provided for five very different uses in the Multiple Use-Sus-
tained Yield Act (MUSY), plus wilderness and mineral uses under separate
statutes.3 72 Under MUSY and NFMA, the agency must consider economic
and noneconomic factors; it must serve the needs of industry and the American
people generally; it must consider productivity in the short and long terms, at
the unit and system levels; and it must assess the "relative values" of these
incommensurables.3 73 The agency's own planning can give the detail and
texture that the congressional commands lack.374 Once the plans are accepted,
however, judicial review of forest and rangeland planning has been haphazard. See I CoGGiNs, supra note
304, at 13-23 - 13-28 (rangeland), 13-43-13-54 (forests); WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 304, at
69-75 (pre-NFMA judicial review).
365. See Sax, supra note 229, at 121-22.
366. SUBCOMM. ON PUBLIC LANDS, SENATE INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS COMM., CLEARCUTrING
ON FEDERAL TIMBERLANDS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1972). The courts held the Guidelines enforceable
against the Forest Service. See Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201, 209-10 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 775 (9th Cir. 1982); National
Wildlife Federation v. U.S. Forest Service, 592 F. Supp. 931, 937 (D. Ore. 1984).
367. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(D)-(F) (timber harvest and clearcutting). The relatibnship between
the Church Guidelines and the NFMA is described in WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 304, at 138-59.
Wilkinson and Anderson analyze the NFMA criteria in depth. See id. at 159-88.
368. Citizens for Environmental Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970, 983-94 (D. Colo. 1989).
369. Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095, 1099-1101 (D. Colo. 1990).
370. See Citizens for Environmental Quality v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989); Sierra
Club v. Cargill, 372 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1990); Griffin v. Yeutter, 20 E.L.R. 20400 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
371. See, e.g., Stark Ackerman, Observations on the Transformation of the Forest Service: The Effects
of NEPA on Forest Service Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 703, 731-34 (1990).
372. The Wilderness Act clearly trumps the MUSY uses. Constance Brooks has argued that the Forest
Service has failed to recognize that hard-rock mining trumps MUSY uses. See Brooks, supra note 359, at
15-19.
373. See I COGGINS, supra note 304, at 13-39-13-41; BOWES & KRUTILLA, supra note 307, at 87-88
(interrelated resources).
374. See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, supra note 313, at 45-52 (planning and dominant use);
Brooks, supra note 359, at 16; 2 COGGINS, supra note 304, at 16-18-16-19.
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they become the agency's own "law to apply." '375 The response of the Forest
Service to the practical impossibility of simultaneous multiple use--de facto
"dominant use" planning for particular areas 376-- could facilitate judicial re-
view, as well. Even though the agency, and not Congress, has established what
the dominant use is to be, that decision is at least available for congressional
review (post hoc guidance, so to speak) and subject to judicial review for
rationality.377
Turning to priority setting for toxic substances, existing provisions for
responding to emergencies constitute a crude form of priority setting among
the problems calling for an agency's attention. In challenges to the invocation
of emergency procedures where the only criterion is imminence of hazard, the
courts of appeals (the Fifth Circuit most vociferously) have enforced a strict
distinction between OSHA's emergency temporary standard power and its
ordinary cases.378 If a more complex set of criteria is needed, the multiple
use experience suggests that the best way to establish judicially manageable
375. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("statutes or regulations...
may well provide 'law to apply') (emphasis added); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 230-36 (1974)
(holding that while agency may make extra-statutory rules to allocate limited funds, it was required to
promulgate formal, public rules to do so); Curry v. Block, 738 F.2d 1556, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1984)
(requiring agency to promulgate regulations to administer program); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,
337 F. Supp. 737, 758-59 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court, per Leventhal, J.) (rejecting nondelegation
doctrine challenge to price control standards because price control authority provided specificity through
its regulations).
376. See 2 CoGc[Ns, supra note 304, at 16-10; BowEs & KRtrrLLA, supra note 307, at 32-34.
377. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 945-50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring FDA
to establish "action levels" for exercising prosecutorial discretion to challenge unavoidable contaminants
in food through legislative rulemaking); Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-
Regulation: CNI v. Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 150-54 (1992) (criticizing
CNI v. Young and expressing doubt that external controls on prosecutorial discretion could be effective).
378. See Asbestos Information Ass'n/North America v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 424-27 (5th Cir. 1984);
Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Dept. of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129-32 (5th Cir., 1974); Dry Color Mfrs.'
Ass'n v. Dept. of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 102-07 (3d Cir. 1973); Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
Auchter, 554 F. Supp. 242, 247-49 (D.D.C. 1983), modified, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Despite the similarity in language, courts have interpreted emergency provisions in other statutes more
loosely. The imminence criterion in CERCLA has been virtually read out of the statute through expansive
interpretation of what constitutes a threat. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89, 95-97 (D.
Conn. 1988); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 191-97 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
This approach is consistent with judicial interpretation of CERCLA generally. Under the D.C. Circuit's
treatment of suspensions under FIFRA, once a notice of intent to cancel is issued, the burden is on the
agency registrant to explain why it is not suspending the registration. See Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 532-33, 539-40 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (aldrin and dieldrin); EDF v. EPA, 510 F,2d 1292,
1297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (aldrin and dieldrin); EDF v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1002-05 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied 431 U.S. 925 (heptachlor and chlordane). This similarly conflates routine activity with emergencies.
TSCA's emergency provision, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (imminent hazards), has been virtually unused. The sole
case interpreting it suggested in dicta that the difference between routine and emergency cases is imminence
of harm, rather than degree of risk. See United States v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 620 F. Supp. 1404,
1410-11 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see also Dow Chemical Co. v. Blum, 469 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(imminence under FIFRA requires a substantial likelihood of harm within the next 3-4 months). While the
weakening of the threshold for emergency action increases agency freedom to take emergency action, it
renders these provisions of little use in controlling agency priorities. While the Fifth Circuit decisions betray
some general hostility to OSHA, and they make use of emergency temporary standards nearly impossible,
they do vindicate the Congressional priorities.
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"law to apply" is to establish a firm hierarchy of the relevant criteria for setting
priorities.379 Congress has in fact done this in a few, limited cases. A simpli-
fied model which divides the relevant factors into two categories, of primary
and secondary importance, has been used in the Clean Water Act38° and in
Superfund cleanup priorities. 381 EPA has used such a system for its National
Priorities List/Hazard Ranking System. 382 More recently, Congress developed
a priority list of desired actions under the Pollution Prevention Act.383
For toxic substances, the primary directive could be the greatest overall risk
reduction possible within the budget allocated by Congress.31 Relative risk
and cost-effectiveness are also obvious candidates for priority-setting criteria,
but each has significant drawbacks. 385 Alternatively, attacking situations which
present the maximum risk or the lowest marginal cost of reduction might be
emphasized. 386 Congress could also indicate general preferences, such as
breadth versus depth: remedy many problems less fully, or a few
completely.387 I do not propose in this Article to advocate particular criteria
that Congress ought to instruct EPA to use in setting priorities. The fact is that
"worst" can mean a number of things, including but not limited to the degree
of risk and avoidability. 388 It is up to Congress to decide, at least initially,
what it does mean.
379. This is essentially what GAO recommends that EPA do internally for the ITC, in the absence of
such direction from Congress. See GAO, Toxic SUBSTANCES: EPA's CHEMICAL TESTING PROGRAM HAS
MADE LrrrLE PROGRESS 23-25 (1990).
380. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B), which was explained and applied in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,
590 F.2d 1011, 1044-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (distinguishing between "comparison factors," to which the agency
is to give primary weight, and "consideration factors," a list of several factors in no particular order of
relative importance).
381. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (requiring the National Hazardous Substance Response Plan to
include criteria for determining priorities among releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances).
382. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)
(1991) (distinguishing between threshold, balancing, and modifying factors).
383. See 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b).
384. Ackerman and Hassler make the similar suggestion that Congress should give EPA an overall
risk target (like 25,000 lives saved per year) within which EPA is free to allocate its resources as it sees
fit. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 51, at 124-28. Schoenbrod criticizes plans such as Ackerman
and Hassler's as vague goals which overstate the ability of law to compel sensible planning. Schoenbrod,
supra note 115, at 801-02.
385. Valuable analyses of the advantages and disadvantages of risk-based priority setting can be found
in the sources cited supra note 3 and in Fiorino, supra note 96; see also Robert F. Blomquist, The EPA
Science Advisory Board's Report on "Reducing Risk": Some Overarching Observations Regarding the
Public Interest, 22 ENV'rL. L. 149 (1992).
386. Compare SAB, REDUCING RISK, supra note 2 (targeting greatest risks) with Letter from Christo-
pher J. DeMuth, Director, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, to Milton Russell, Assistant
Administrator for Policy Planning and Evaluation, EPA, reprinted as OMB Position on Use of Risk
Assessment, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, Benefit-Cost Review in Setting Standards for Toxic Air Pollutants,
14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1593 (Jan. 13, 1984) (establishing maximum acceptable marginal cost of risk
reduction).
387. See GAO, CHEMICAL TESTING PROGRAM, supra note 379, at 24 ("Officials are uncertain about
whether the testing program's goal is to gather a little informatiori on as many chemicals as possible or to
require extensive testing for a few chemicals more highly suspected of posing an unreasonable risk.").
388. See Merrill, Cancer-Causing Chemicals, supra note 38, at 114-17.
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C. Prospects
The most common congressional approach to agency priority setting is to
ignore it. The major environmental statutes typically instruct EPA to take action
"if it finds" that a certain predicate exists. Since the predicate often covers
vastly more than the agency can handle-the hallmark of the hazard identifica-
tion process is casting a broad net-the agency has no choice but to set priori-
ties on its own.
The National Priorities List (NPL) established under CERCLA is a rare
example of explicit congressional concern for priority setting, perhaps because
even the optimists of 1980 recognized the gulf between the resources available
and those needed to clean up all of the Love Canals in the United States. At
the very least, the limited Superfund monies had to be protected from "ill-
conceived or disorganized cleanup efforts."38 9 Congress has in fact been able
to establish meaningful criteria for the ranking of sites for Superfund cleanup.
Under CERCLA, clean-ups financed by the Superfund itself must meet several
criteria for techniques and degree of safety. The threshold requirement, how-
ever, is that the site be included on the National Priorities List (NPL) of
sites.390 CERCLA originally gave EPA very little guidance in choosing priori-
ties for the NPL, so EPA created on its own a Hazard Ranking System (HRS)
to facilitate the identification and ordering of NPL sites. 391' The HRS is a
quantitative scoring system for estimating relative risk. Several pathways of
exposure to hazardous chemicals are separately evaluated for toxicity, waste
quantity, and exposed population. Factors are assigned numerical values,
weighted, and ultimately combined according to formulas set out in the regula-
tions. The intended result is a system for developing a uniform metric for
comparing Superfund sites.392 In the 1986 Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), Congress officially recognized the HRS and set
out several characteristics for it. Congress emphasized relative risk, but added
some special concerns, for example, that the highest state priorities be reflected
in high placement on the national list.393
389. See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 302 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing legislative
history).
390. For general descriptions of the NPL and its role in the CERCLA process, see Eagle-Picher Indus.
v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 932-33 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Eagle-Picher II); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d
905, 919-21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Eagle-Picher ); City of Stoughton v. EPA, 858 F.2d 747, 749 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
391. EPA promulgated the first Hazard Ranking System (HRS) in 1982. See National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180, 31,187-92 (1982); see also Amendment to
the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan; National Priorities List, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,658
(1983).
392. See Hazard Ranking System, 55 Fed. Reg. 51,532 (1990), revising Hazard Ranking System for
Uncontrolled Hazardous Substance Releases, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,962, 51,962-64 (1988) (proposed rule).
393. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605(a)(8), 9605(c)(l)-(2). To assist in this effort, SARA also revitalized the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). One of ATSDR's main functions is to develop
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The NPL/HRS program has three basic strengths. First, it recognizes the
central importance of priority setting to effective agency operations with limited
resources. While the goal of the HRS is "accurately [to assess] relative risks,"
Congress recognized that priority setting under these circumstances cannot mean
perfect accuracy in risk assessment.3" Rather, "the NPL is simply a rough
list of priorities, assembled quickly and inexpensively."395 Congress recog-
nized the difference in the SARA amendments, and it urged EPA to determine
relative risk "to the maximum extent feasible." '396 Scoring systems are an
appropriate means to accomplish this task.397 Like priority setting, listing is
essentially a preliminary step entitled to substantial deference,398 but it is
nevertheless a final agency action which is reviewable for consistency with
congressional policy.
399
Second, the program seeks to achieve a compromise between agency
flexibility to exercise expertise and congressional authority to establish basic
policy. It serves the former goal by letting the agency set the priorities and the
priority-setting criteria; it serves the latter goal by allowing Congress to enact
ex ante standards for the priorities and by mandating an explicit and public
process for ex post review. The existence of an open, agency-created priority-
setting system enabled Congress, finding itself dissatisfied with the policies
underlying the HRS, to require EPA to revise its priorities better to reflect
Congress' views. 00
a rank-ordered list of the 100 most hazardous chemicals commonly found at Superfund sites, as a means
of assisting in (among other things) revision of the NPL. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2)(A). Congress required
ATSDR to consider basic components of chemical risk (degree of toxicity and potential human exposure,
in addition to the frequency of its occurrence at Superfund sites), which the agency has developed into its
own scoring system. See Revised Priority List of Hazardous Substances, 56 Fed. Reg. 52,166,52,167 (1991).
394. See H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-200 (1986) (Conference Report).
395. See Eagle-Picher 11, 759 F.2d at 932; see also B & B Tritech, 957 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Washington State Dep't of Transportation v. EPA, 917 F.2d 1309, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1990); City of Stoughton,
858 F.2d at 751; Eagle-Picher 1, 759 F.2d at 921; Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1304
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that Congress did not want improvement of accuracy of HRS to interfere with
identification of new sites in the interimr); Hazard Ranking System, supra note 254, at 51,963-64 (distin-
guishing the HRS score from quantitative risk assessment).
396. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(1). See H.R. REP. No. 962,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-200(1986) (Conference
Report).
397. See Hazard Ranking System, supra note 254; see also Rosenblum & Lapp, supra note 252, at
183-85 (describing advantages of risk indexing over risk assessment in setting priorities).
398. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1980); see also U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. Carlson, 638
F. Supp. 513 (C.D. 11. 1986). The courts have granted EPA considerable latitude in establishing the HRS.
See, e.g., Eagle-Picher I; Eagle-Picher Ill.
399. See Washington State Dep't of Transp. v. EPA, 917 F.2d 1309, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
400. SARA required revision of the HRS, 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(1) (1988), because Congress was
dissatisfied with EPA's treatment of high-volume, low-toxicity waste sites as a high priority. See S. REP.
No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1986), and other
sources cited in Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1303-04 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See Fiorino,
supra note 96, at 83 ("For theoretical perspective, risk-based planning can be seen as a version of mixed
scanning, with elements both of rational-comprehensive and incremental decision making.").
SARA, incidentally, also reveals the darker side of congressional control-high-volume, low-toxicity
wastes are mainly the result of mining operations, and it may be inferred that the operative dissatisfaction
was less Congress' than the mining industry's.
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Third, the HRS establishes criteria for setting priorities that are derived from
a general congressional policy but are specific enough to be enforceable in
court should the ranking system itself be challenged.t" Moreover, despite the
broad discretion which must remain with the agency, an individual can obtain
searching judicial review of actual placement on the NPL under the congressio-
nally mandated criteria.' °2
The National Priorities List is a promising development, but it is limited
to one program and involves a relatively homogenous group of risks to rank.
Since EPA's responsibilities are spread among statutes and constituencies,
interprogram priority setting is also needed.' °3 EPA has already undertaken
a large amount of research on this subject. EPA's Unfinished Business, and the
subsequent evaluation by its Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk, identified
numerous environmental problems and sought to estimate the extent of four
types of risk posed by each. The resulting ranking of relative risk was compared
to existing EPA priorities (as measured by funding levels) and public percep-
tions of risk. Not surprisingly, EPA's priorities matched public perceptions
much better than the pure risk-based approach. The practical and theoretical
limitations of the risk-based methodology, substantial as they are,' do not
undermine the point that, faced with scarce resources, EPA must develop some
way of allocating them in a sensible manner. Thus, far more important than the
rather unsurprising results of Unfinished Business and other comparative
studies, is EPA's interest in the problem and the stated intention of its leader-
ship to be guided by the results of these studies.' °5
EPA's interest in interprogram priority setting goes hand in hand with its
interest in intermedia (or integrated) pollution control. Integrated pollution
control is an important subject in its own right, and it is beginning to receive
considerable attention in the legal literature.4 For present purposes, it is most
relevant that the twin aims of integrated environmental management and overall
risk reduction have been taken up in a proposal by the Conservation Foundation
for a single environmental statute. The idea has been endorsed by the present
was less Congress' than the mining industry's.
401. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that EPA's Hazard
Ranking System was ripe for review upon promulgation and that it was improper to wait for actual
application to challenge it).
402. See Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1321, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding listing decision for
failure to explain basis of certain assumptions); see also Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d. 1299,
1307 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming listing decision after detailed discussion of agency's analysis); Eagle-Picher
III (same); City of Stoughton (same).
403. See Reilly, The Turning Point, supra note 2, at 1389; Reilly, Aiming Before We Shoot, supra note
2, at 3-4; SAB, REDUCING RISK, supra note 2, at 1.
404. Hornstein's "normative critique" of risk-based priority setting leaves little doubt that a purely
quantitative approach to priority setting is deeply flawed. See Homstein, supra note 3, at 584-629.
405. See Reilly, The Turning Point, supra note 2, at 1389 (1989); EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS
AND CHALLENGES: EPA's UPDATE 6 (1988) (overview by former Administrator Thomas).
406. See Symposium, supra note 5; Guruswamy, supra note 10.
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Administrator of EPA.4° 7 The Conservation Foundation draft would bring the
many responsibilities of EPA under a unified regulatory structure, guided by
a single safety standard, the familiar "unreasonable risk." 8 This structure
is primarily intended to facilitate integrated, intermedia pollution control,49
but it is also intended to help "set rational priorities among different pro-
grams. ' ' 4 10 In this respect, the draft's approach is very much in the technocrat-
ic, rationalist tradition. The agency "shall be guided by the goal of improving
overall environmental quality as effectively and efficiently as possible." 411 The
basis for setting priorities and measuring safety is risk, and the unreasonable
risk standard takes account of a wealth of factors including types of risk, costs,
innovation, availability of substitutes, and administrability.412 Indeed, while
disclaiming reliance on quantitative measures and formal cost-benefit balancing,
the draft puts its faith in the agency's "judgment' 4 3 and attempts to circum-
scribe judicial review.414
The most important limitation, both theoretical and practical, on inter-
program priority setting is the difficulty in comparing health risks in very
different contexts. Within a single program, choices are relatively easy because
the chemicals at issue have the same kinds of benefits, raise similar issues of
cost (necessity and ability to substitute), and pose similar risks. Crop pesticides,
for example, not only save farmers money, but make agriculture possible at in
certain places and for certain crops. They also assuie a reliable, plentiful, and
affordable food supply, which is a health benefit of inestimable value. The risks
they pose include poisoning of farm workers, land and groundwater contaiina-
tion and runoff, and residue on agricultural commodities." Even among
pesticides, however, wood preservatives, crop dusts, and marine antifoulants,
for instance, present very different cost, risk, and benefit issues.
Moving beyond pesticides simply magnifies the difficulties of comparing
risks. An agency like EPA with diffuse responsibilities experience great diffi-
407. Administrator Reilly is the former president of the Conservation Foundation. He appointed the
principal author of the draft to a top policy position at EPA. See Single Statute Pushed by Reilly to Replace
Existing Environmental Laws, 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1351 (Dec. 1, 1989).
, 408. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT (SECOND DRAFT 1988)
[hereinafter CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, SECOND DRAFr].
409. See Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 521; Thomas L. Adams Jr. & M. Elizabeth Cox, The Environ-
mental Shell Game and the Need for Codification, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl, L. Inst.) 10367, 10367-68.
Little has been accomplished if air pollutants are reduced by discharging the chemicals into the sewver or
landfilling them.
410. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, SECOND DRAFT, supra note 408, at 2.
411. See id. § 301(b).
412. See id. §§ 801(b)(l)(B) and 801(c).
413. See id. § 801(b)(2). This aspect of the rationalist model is discussed in McGarity, Regulatory
Analysis, supra note 61, at 1255; see also supra Part II(A)(l).
414. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, SECOND DRAFT, supra note 408, at § 801(c).
415. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 136a-l(c) (1988) (requiring EPA to establish a priority system for
reregistration of pesticides).
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culty in reconciling all of the environmental effects that it must regulate.416
Beyond the relatively straightforward criterion of risk,417 very different con-
siderations are relevant to different areas of exposure to toxic substances.4"'
Simply in determining costs, it is very difficult to measure the value of life and
health in the first place. It is hard to see how one can meaningfully compare
human health risks with natural resources damage, or quantify voluntariness
of risk exposure. The cost-risk-benefit metric itself excludes several relevant
considerations in the acceptability of risk, for example, the distribution of risk-
bearing and control costs, intergenerational equity, and the ethics of risk
creation.419 EPA's studies of inter-program priorities, Which are premised on
the commensurability of risks, return again and again to the problems of
420comparisons.
Whatever its limitations, the Conservation Foundation proposal establishes
a framework for priority setting. The draft itself stops far short of mandated
priority setting42' and gives only general guidance to the priority setter.
422
Moreover, the politics of environmental regulation may foreclose unifi-
cation.423 Nevertheless, Congress' recent deliberations on a new Cabinet-level
Department of the Environment raise the possibility that further integrating and
416. Even a narrowly focused agency like OSHA must allocate its resources between the worker-safety
and worker-health sides of its mandate. This is a highly controversial choice, and the emphasis often changes
with the leadership. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 6, at 82-84.
417. Actually, measurement of risk is not as obvious as it might seem. See Cross et al., supra note
27, at 73-75; Baram, supra note 70, at 12.
418. See Homstein, supra note 3, at 587-616; see also Baram, supra note 70, at 33-37 (1987)
(describing problems of measurement, comparison, and administration).
419. Faced with the daunting task of the allocating the entire outer continental shelf, the Secretary of
the Interior initially declined to make inter-region comparisons of "environmental sensitivity." He could
not, he said, meaningfully compare the Alaska fishery with the New England fishery, because they were
entirely different, to say nothing of comparing Arctic whales with Gulf of Mexico coral. See Watt 1, 668
F.2d at 1311-12. The court rejected this claim, first because the Department had in the past developed
criteria for just such comparisons, and, second, because Congress required the Department to do it:
Lack of information, lack of time, and methodological imperfections all may make the consider-
ation highly speculative, as will the difficulties inherent in comparing, to use the Secretary's
example, coral reefs with arctic whales. But the difficulties inherent in this comparison were
recognized by Congress .... The statute does not require the Secretary to compile a top-to-
bottom ranking among all OCS regions, but he must at least attempt to identify those areas whose
environment and marine productivity are most and least sensitive to OCS activity.
Id. at 1313.
420. See EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 3; EPA, COMPARATIVE RISK, supra note 3; SAB,
REDUCING RISK, supra note 2; see also GAO, LIMITED RESOURCES, supra note 1.
421, See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, SECOND DRAFT, supra note 408, § 203(i) (requiring annual
reports to Congress of agency's "goals, priorities, and plans," together with a progress report).
422. See id. § 801(b)(2) ("Inexercising the judgment necessary todecide whether an action under this
Act should be taken the Secretary shall give greatest weight to the benefits of the proposed action.").
423. Guruswamy concludes that integration is more likely to be accomplished through existing
legislation. See Guruswamy, supra note 10, at 519-30. EPA is currently making some efforts in this direc-
tion. See Adams & Cox, supra note 409, at 10368-69; Applegate, supra note 12, at 330-32 (advocating a
wider role for TSCA in information development).
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consolidating legislation will be forthcoming.4" Most important, it shows that
Congress and EPA recognize the centrality of scarcity to the regulatory struc-
tures they must develop, and further recognize the need to make explicit
judgments and to act on them. The interprogram studies of relative risk, for all
their inadequacy, have focused attention on the need to confront directly the
need for allocation and priority setting across the various areas of EPA's
responsibility. These choices must be made, and in fact are made, because
resources are limited. Our task is to see that they are made in a sensible and
appropriate way.
Conclusion
There is nothing particularly mysterious about the uncertainty that afflicts
the regulation of toxic substances. It does not necessarily require unique or
drastic regulatory strategies. Rather, uncertainty stems from the lack of adequate
information concerning the nature and extent of the health effects of toxic
substances. The data gap for toxic substances is much larger than most, and
perfect knowledge is unobtainable as a practical matter. But where in regulation
is perfect knowledge obtainable? The information problem for toxic substances
is unusually great, which makes it a particularly interesting setting in which to
study regulatory systems, but it is like other information deficits in three ways:
(1) more information will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of regula-
tion; (2) the deficit may be reduced by obtaining more information; and (3) the
effects of the deficit may be mitigated by better allocation of resources. Since
the government's ability to generate more information is sharply limited,
Congress and EPA must face up to the central problem of allocating scarce
resources.
The present regulatory structure naturally focuses on the most obvious
regulatory phases of toxic substances control: the substantive predicates for
agency action to protect industry from administrative zealotry, and target levels
of safety to protect the public from administrative lassitude. These are critically
important, of course, but the systematic application of both has been under-
mined by inadequate resources and undirected priority setting. Therefore, this
Article has suggested that we turn away from predicates and targets in exercis-
424. See S. 533, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1991) (passed Senate on Oct. 1, 1991) (creating a
commission to study integration of environmental programs); see also H.R. REP. No. 428, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 39 (1990); S. REP. No. 262, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1990). S. 533 would also create a Bureau
of Environmental Statistics to facilitate centralized management of environmental effects across media. The
current House bill, H.R. 3121, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), does not include these provisions, but bills
in the 101st Congress did.
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands recently enacted legislation to permit an integrated approach
to environmental decisionmaking. See Graham Bennett, The History of the Dutch National Environmental
Policy Plan. 33 ENV'T 6 (1991); STEPHEN TROMANS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT 1990 (1991).
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ing congressional control except at the outer limits, and that we look instead
to the process of setting regulatory priorities. For regulators, this approach
provides useful discretion in achieving the most effective protection of public
health. For Congress, it reestablishes legitimating political control over funda-
mental policy choices in toxic substances regulation. For both, relocating
control to priority setting focuses attention on the part of the regulatory process
that is most directly concerned with the fundamental problem of allocating
scarce resources.
The present proposal is admittedly novel in the control of toxic substances,
but it has antecedents in other areas of environmental law. Planning and
priority-setting schemes can be found in general regulatory reform measures.
Of even greater interest, planning has become the centerpiece of federal natural
resources management. This experience, together with an analysis of the
relevant administrative law doctrines and policies, suggests that it is both useful
and feasible to exercise policy control through mandated planning. EPA has
shown great interest in proceeding along these lines. Where resources are
limited, fundamental choices must be made. This Article aims to focus attention
on these choices and to provide a regulatory structure that encourages Congress
and EPA to make their choices wisely.

